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In this thesis, I examine the effects of noncompliance with securities laws on financial 
reporting quality and director turnover. The thesis consists of three main chapters. 
Chapter 2 introduces the enforcement actions brought by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), based on which I collect data on noncompliance cases. It also 
describes the data collection process and reports summary statistics for noncompliance 
cases. It contributes to our understanding of the SEC’s enforcement actions. The dataset 
is used in examining the effects of noncompliance with regulations on financial 
reporting quality and director turnover in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively. 
Chapter 3 investigates the association between noncompliance with securities laws and 
financial reporting quality. Compliance control and financial reporting quality are two 
overlapping aspects of control within the integrated internal control framework. I 
explore the association between compliance control and financial reporting quality by 
testing whether the rate of financial reporting problems is higher for firms that fail to 
comply with securities laws. I find that firms not complying with securities laws have 
significantly higher rates of financial reporting problems than control firms that do not 
violate securities laws. Furthermore, the results show that the effect is much stronger 
for accounting frauds than for accounting restatements, and the evidence is more 
pronounced in the post-noncompliance (with securities laws) windows than in the pre-
noncompliance windows. This chapter presents the first empirical examination of the 
link between the compliance aspect of internal control and financial accounting 
problems.  
Chapter 4 investigates director turnover surrounding noncompliance events. While 
directors are expected to play a disciplining role, the evidence is still limited on this. I 
examine directors’ reactions to firm misconduct around the time when firms start to 
violate securities laws. I find, in general, that firms that failed to comply with securities 
laws (noncompliant firms) have significantly higher director turnover rates around the 
start of noncompliant than control firms. Noncompliant firms are also more likely to 
have unexpectedly departing directors around the start of noncompliance. When outside 
directors are examined separately, significantly higher director turnover is observed 
only for the pre-noncompliance period and not for the post-noncompliance period. 
These results suggest that directors are more likely to leave a firm if they perceive 
wrongdoing, while outside directors tend to leave before they could possibly be 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
Companies are increasingly accountable to mandated laws, regulations and 
standards on a number of dimensions. Noncompliance with applicable regulations has 
become a material negative event for a company. Prior research explores the 
consequences of different types of noncompliance, such as accounting violations (see, 
for example Karpoff et al., 2014), false advertising (Peltzman, 1981), product recalls 
(Jarrell and Peltzman, 1985), air safety disasters (Mitchell and Maloney, 1989), and 
environmental violations (Jones and Rubin, 2001;Karpoff et al., 2005;Al-Tuwaijri et al., 
2004). However, these studies are based mainly on the disclosure of the negative events. 
There is little empirical evidence provided to help us understand the internal 
mechanisms of the noncompliant firms at the time of committing fraud. My thesis, 
containing two major topics, separately examines the association between 
noncompliance and financial reporting quality under an integrated internal control 
framework, and the impact of noncompliance on director turnover before the 
noncompliance behaviour becomes public. I explore these two issues by employing a 
hand-collected comprehensive non-accounting noncompliance dataset for which 
noncompliance information is gathered from the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC)’s enforcement actions filed between 2003 and 2012.  
Gathering information from the SEC’s enforcement actions, which apply to 
noncompliance with securities laws, provides a good setting in which to examine 
noncompliance effects, for several reasons. Chapter 2 of this thesis explains why I 
collect data from the SEC’s non-accounting enforcement actions. It also describes the 
process of collecting the data and reports summary statistics for the noncompliance 
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events and firms. The final sample comprises 126 noncompliance events for 123 firms, 
96 of which firms have complete financial statement and market data available. The 
most common areas of noncompliance in my sample include insider trading, foreign 
bribery, kickback payments, misleading press releases, misleading information on 
business, fraudulent sales transactions, unregistered securities, stock manipulation, 
related-party transactions, and stock option backdating.  
Chapter 3 discusses the first research question, through which I investigate 
whether not complying with securities laws has implications for firms’ financial 
reporting problems. Compliance control and financial reporting quality are two 
overlapping aspects of control within the integrated internal control framework. I 
conjecture that they are connected through internal interaction and general factors which 
affect the internal control system as a whole. I explore the association between 
compliance control and financial reporting quality by testing whether the rate of 
financial reporting problems is higher for firms that fail to comply with securities laws. 
Noncompliant firms are identified from the hand-collected dataset described in Chapter 
2. Control firms are identified through a propensity score matching method.  
I use the presence of accounting restatements, provided by Audit Analytics, and 
accounting fraud, provided by Karpoff et al. (2008a, 2008b) as measures of poor 
financial reporting quality. I collect data on restatements from Audit Analytics. I find 
that firms not complying with securities laws have significantly higher rates of financial 
reporting problems than control firms that do not violate securities laws. Furthermore, 
the results show that the effect is much stronger for accounting fraud than restatements, 
and the evidence is more pronounced in the windows after noncompliance starts. I check 
whether some underlying firm characteristics affect the results, by employing the 
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MHbounds approach, and find that the inferences are not affected by unobservable 
factors.  
Chapter 3 presents the first empirical examination of the link between the 
compliance aspect of internal control and financial accounting problems. This study 
makes three main contributions to the literature. First, compliance captures a different 
aspect of internal control quality than is studied in prior research. This extends our 
understanding of internal control as an integrated system, while accounting research 
typically explores internal control systems in relation to the financial accounting aspect 
alone. Second, my study improves our understanding of noncompliance effects. Prior 
research mainly examines noncompliance effects on market reactions. None of these 
studies examines the effects of noncompliance on financial reporting quality, nor do 
they perceive noncompliance as a proxy for ineffective internal control, despite 
compliance being one objective of internal control. Finally, my findings have 
implications for business and public policy. They provide evidence consistent with the 
notion that internal control over financial reporting only partially identifies financial 
reporting problems. They also correspond to the newly updated Internal Control - 
Integrated Framework (COSO, 2013), which emphasizes the implementation of the 
compliance aspect of internal control.  
Chapter 4 discusses the second research question, through which I investigate 
director turnover surrounding noncompliance events. There are high expectations of 
directors to play a disciplining role when they are confronted with serious principal-
agent issues. However, it is usual for a firm to remain a ‘black box’ when it is doing 
wrong. A stream of research has investigated the association between director and firm 
misconduct, with a focus on the effects after these negative events have been announced 
or disclosed. However, largely absent from these inquiries is the analysis of directors’ 
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responses to fraudulent behaviour at the time the misconduct commences. I examine 
directors’ reactions to the misconduct of firms surrounding the commencement of 
noncompliance problems. Specifically, I examine whether noncompliant firms have 
higher director turnover rates than control firms. The noncompliant firms come from 
the hand-collected dataset identified in Chapter 2. Control firms are identified through 
propensity score matching. I then hand-collect corporate governance data for both 
noncompliant and control firms. 
I predict that, other things equal, directors have strong incentives to leave 
noncompliant firms around the beginning of the violation period, and that the departure 
is likely even without intervention from external forces. I identify two event dates to 
examine my prediction. The first one is the original noncompliance start date. The 
second is a shifted event date, an arbitrary number of days after the start of the violation 
period but before the violation becomes public. Given that focusing on this date allows 
violation to get underway for a period of time and possibly excludes the effects of a 
public announcement, the results will help to indicate whether a director might detect 
and respond to fraudulent behaviour through private information channels.  
I find that, in general, noncompliant firms have a significantly higher director 
turnover rate around the start of noncompliant than control firms. Noncompliant firms 
are also more likely to have unexpectedly departing directors around the time of the 
start of noncompliance. However, when outside directors are examined separately, 
significantly higher director turnover is observed only for the pre-noncompliance period 
and not for the post-noncompliance period. These results suggest that directors are more 
likely to leave a firm when they perceive wrongdoing, while outside directors tend to 
leave before they could possibly be involved in the firm’s wrongdoing.  
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This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, to my knowledge, 
this is the first study to focus on director turnover surrounding the commencement of 
noncompliance rather than the announcement or revelation of a negative event. It 
extends the research that investigates negative events and director behaviour. Second, 
it contributes to our understanding of the internal governance mechanism between 
management and boards of directors, especially enhancing our observation of directors 
when a firm fails to comply with applicable regulations, laws or rules. Third, I exploit 
a unique data setting, i.e. the SEC’s non-accounting enforcement actions, to explore 
directors’ reaction to firms’ negative events. I then assemble a hand-collected corporate 
governance dataset for these noncompliant firms and their compliant propensity-score-
matched control firms. By applying comprehensive non-accounting data, I am less 
concerned about the capacity for generalizing the conclusion. Finally, my findings also 
have some policy implications. Dimmock and Gerken (2012) argue that there are 
shortcomings in the current governance system, wherein the majority of decisions 
regarding the fiduciary duty doctrine have developed in the director context but not on 
the exact nature and scope of officers’ fiduciary duties. Consistent with this argument, 
my findings suggest that directors tend not to fulfil their expected disciplining role when 
they are confronted with management misconduct. To prevent firms from misconduct, 
it might be more efficient to hold misbehaving managers accountable rather than 
emphasize directors’ disciplining role.  
1.2 Thesis Structure 
The thesis structure follows the convention that allows chapters to be presented 
in a format suitable for submission and publication in peer-reviewed academic journals. 
Therefore, this thesis is structured around two essays containing original research in 
Chapters 3 and 4. These two chapters are self-contained, each having a separate 
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literature review, answering unique and original questions, and employing distinct 
analysis and datasets, although there are similarities in data and methodology. Wherever 
there is repetitive discussion regarding common data and similar methodology, I refer 
to the earlier-appearing discussion, but for the purpose of keeping the integrity of each 
essay, I repeat the necessary discussion and reported tables. The equations, footnotes, 
tables, and figures are independently numbered from the beginning of each chapter. 
Page numbers, titles, and subtitles have a sequential order throughout the thesis. 
The thesis continues as follows. Chapter 2 presents the generation of the 
noncompliance dataset and reports the summary statistics of the noncompliance sample. 
Chapter 3 examines the link between the compliance aspect of internal control and 
financial accounting problems. Chapter 4 investigates whether there is a significantly 
higher director turnover rate around the commencement of noncompliance events. 
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Chapter 2 Noncompliance with Securities Laws/Regulations 
2.1 Introduction of Noncompliance with Securities Laws/Regulations 
Frequent corporate misconducts have dominated the headlines over the past two 
decades. There are severe consequences if a firm fails to comply with applicable laws, 
rules, and regulations. Prior studies find that, once involved in lawsuits,  noncompliant 
firms face significant stock price declines(see, for examples, Peltzman, 1981;Bizjak and 
Coles, 1995;Bhagat et al., 1998;Bhattacharya et al., 2007;Gande and Lewis, 
2009;Ozkan, 2011;Leng et al., 2011); losses in legal and regulatory penalties(see, for 
examples, Bhagat and Romano, 2002;Karpoff et al., 2005); higher costs of capital (see, 
for examples, Feroz et al., 1991;Dechow et al., 1996;Karpoff et al., 2008), and negative 
abnormal operating performance (see, for example, Leng et al., 2011), etc. 
Most of these studies focus only on one specific type of noncompliance. 
Especially, accounting violation prevails in research focuses. Karpoff et al. (2014) 
document that there are at least 150 papers investigating accounting frauds, and this 
number is based solely on four popular databases. There is research on some other 
specific types of noncompliance as well, such as false advertising (Peltzman, 1981), 
product recalls (Jarrell and Peltzman, 1985), air safety disasters (Mitchell and Maloney, 
1989), and environmental violations (Jones and Rubin, 2001;Karpoff et al., 2005;Al-
Tuwaijri et al., 2004). These studies focus mainly on event effects upon the revelation 
of the problems. 
In contrast to the relatively large literature that studies a specific type of 
noncompliance, surprisingly, there is little or no direct source of studies on a relatively 
comprehensive noncompliance setting. Such scant research might stem from the 
absence of publicly available data that can help for identifying comprehensive 
noncompliance. This task is difficult because applicable laws and regulations are 
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complicated and vary across industries and firms. First, generally, the regulation on 
noncompliance disclosure is weak. Fasterling (2012) finds that the regime of 
compliance disclosure1 serves less to discipline companies by making company practice 
transparency and more to trigger a process of norm development in which law, company 
and stakeholders interact. It indicates that the regulatory power on compliance 
disclosure is very weak; therefore, it is not possible to expect firms to fully disclose 
noncompliance behaviour.  
Second, the regulatory framework faced by a firm also depends on which 
industry the firm operates in and what products it is producing. For instance, Kim and 
Skinner (2012) show that litigation rates of security class actions in four industries 
(biotechnology, computers, electronics, and retail) are consistently higher than those in 
other industries. Furthermore, not surprisingly, different rules for product quality are 
applied for different product recalls, such as laptops and automobiles. 
Third, for the purpose of avoiding different consequences from just one type of 
noncompliance behaviour, a variety of rules are usually in place. Taking environmental 
regulation as an example, Karpoff et al. (2005) report six types of violations against 
eight related Acts among 478 events that involve environmental harm. They are the 
1970 Clean Air Act and its 1977 and 1990 amendments, the 1977 Clean Water Act, the 
Water Quality Act of 1987, the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, and the Toxic Substances and Control Act of 
1976. 
                                                 
1 Herein, compliance disclosure is a relatively recent regulatory technique whereby companies are obliged to disclose 
the extent to which they comply with codes, “best practice standards” or other extra-legal text containing norms or 
prospective norms. The largest field of mandatory disclosure lies in securities and company law, but disclosure is 




Relative to other types of violations, gathering information from the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)’s enforcement actions, which is for firms 
violating securities laws/regulations, provides a good setting to investigate research 
questions related to noncompliance for several reasons. First, noncompliance with 
securities laws is an influential component of a firm’s noncompliance behaviour. 
Common conduct that may lead to the SEC’s investigations includes: (1) 
misrepresentation or omission of important information about securities; (2) 
manipulating the market prices of securities; (3) stealing customers’ funds or securities; 
(4) violating broker-dealers’ responsibility to treat customers fairly; (5) insider trading 
(i.e., violating a trust relationship by trading while in possession of material, non-public 
information about a security); and (6) selling unregistered securities.2 Each type of the 
common misconduct involves related parties (such as investors and consumers) who do 
business with the violating firm, which means there is a directly-related party whose 
benefits will be damaged by this violating behaviour. Relative to other types of 
violations which do not directly affect the parties with whom the firm does business 
(such as violation of environmental laws), the related-parties-involved noncompliance 
usually triggers larger decreases in firm value (Karpoff and Lott, 1993;Murphy et al., 
2009;Karpoff, 2012).3  
Second, the SEC is a law enforcement agency and it has the same regulatory 
power over all registrants regardless of industry or size. Each year the SEC brings 
hundreds of civil enforcement actions against individuals and companies for violations 
                                                 
2 The above information comes from the SEC’s website: http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml. 
3 By reviewing different types of noncompliance behaviour, Karpoff (2012) concludes that the loss of 
market value far exceeds direct costs such as fines, penalties, and law-suit settlements for some types of 
misconduct which impose costs on their counterparties such as investors, employees, customers, suppliers, 
etc. However, for some other types of misconduct, such as environmental violations, which do not 
directly affect the parties with whom the firm does business, there are small or negligible losses in 
addition to the cost imposed by regulators and courts.  
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of the securities laws or regulations. The Division of Enforcement of the SEC assists 
the Commission in executing its law enforcement function by recommending the 
commencement of investigations of securities laws violations, by recommending that 
the Commission bring civil actions in federal court or as administrative proceedings 
before an administrative law judge, and by prosecuting these cases on behalf of the 
Commission. The Division obtains evidence of possible violations of the securities laws 
from many sources, including market surveillance activities, investor tips and 
complaints, other Divisions and Offices of the SEC, the self-regulatory organizations 
and other securities industry sources, and media reports.  
In contrast, other types of noncompliance do not have a universal regulator 
because the regulatory framework to which firms are subject depends on which industry 
they operate in and what products they produce. For instance, noncompliance with 
environmental regulations occurs mainly in the utilities and manufacturing sectors 
while noncompliance with product quality standards (measured by product recalls) 
varies across products.  
Third, the SEC’s website provides comprehensive information on firms’ 
noncompliance with securities regulations and it is publicly available. The SEC’s 
enforcement action releases can be obtained by using its online annual archives. These 
archives provide litigation releases concerning civil lawsuits brought by the SEC in 
federal court, and notices and orders concerning the institution and/or settlement of 
administrative proceedings from 1995 onwards.  
2.2 Data Collection of Non-accounting Noncompliance with Securities Laws 
To provide a relatively comprehensive data setting to investigate research 
questions related to noncompliance, I construct a comprehensive sample of 
noncompliance with securities laws through searching the SEC’s enforcement action 
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releases. Since 1982, the SEC has issued Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Releases (AAERs)  during or at the conclusion of an investigation against a company, 
an auditor, or an officer for alleged accounting and/or auditing misconduct. AAERs 
account for over half of the SEC’s enforcement action releases as shown in my further 
data collection process. However, I exclude AAERs from my noncompliance sample 
for the following reasons.  
First, my research question based on noncompliance sample in Chapter 3 
investigates the association between non-accounting noncompliance and financial 
reporting problems. Given this research question, my noncompliance sample needs to 
be based on non-accounting noncompliance events while AAERs are vastly used as 
proxies for accounting problems (Dechow et al., 2011). 4 Therefore, I exclude AAERs 
from my noncompliance sample. 
Second, dataset for AAERs has been well established. Dechow et al. (2011) 
construct a dataset which currently consists of 3,052 SEC AAERs (1,214 firm 
accounting noncompliance events) issued between  May 17, 1982 and September 1, 
2010.5 Their dataset provides varying degrees of detail on the nature of the misconduct, 
the individuals and entities involved and their effects on the financial statements. 
Therefore, it is less likely that incorporating AAERs in my noncompliance data will 
contribute incremental understanding to the accounting noncompliance database that 
has been well developed. 
Finally, as shown in Table 1, AAERs counts for over half of the SEC’s 
enforcement action releases, it makes the task of data collection infeasible for a PhD 
                                                 
4 A detailed description of the dataset of AAERs is available in Dechow et al. (2011). 
5 The dataset constructed in Dechow et al. (2011) catalogs all the AAERs from AAER 1 through AAER 
2261 spanning May 17, 1982 through June 10, 2005. They then develop the dataset to incorporate more 




study. Besides the data collection for noncompliance events, my research question in 
Chapter 4 also involves hand collection on corporate governance data for noncompliant 
firms and their matched pairs. Therefore, to make my PhD study feasible, I also need to 
exclude AAERs from my noncompliance sample.  
In the case of noncompliance, there are two types of actions that the SEC can 
take: Federal Court Actions (civil actions) and Administrative Proceedings. The former 
are litigation releases concerning civil lawsuits brought by the SEC in a federal court 
while the later are orders and related materials released by the SEC when it brings non-
judicial actions before an administrative law judge. Whether the SEC decides to bring 
a civil action or administrative action may depend upon the type of sanction or relief 
that is being sought. 6  It is possible that when the misconduct warrants it, the 
Commission can bring both proceedings. The SEC maintains an online publicly 
searchable database on litigation releases (hereinafter ‘LR’) and administrative 
proceedings (hereinafter ‘AP’) in the form of annual archives from 1995 onwards. I use 
this database to identify firms that violated securities laws. There are also another two 
other types of enforcement actions: opinions issued by Administrative Law Judges in 
contested administrative proceedings (ALJ Decisions) and opinions issued by the 
Commission on appeal of Initial Decisions or disciplinary decisions issued by self-
regulatory organizations such as NYSE or NASD (Commission Opinions). Since these 
two types of actions are not original enforcement actions towards firms’ misconduct, 
my data collection does not take them into concern.  
My sample includes enforcement actions brought by the SEC from 2003 to 2012. 
I collect noncompliance data from January 1, 2003 onwards because, for one of my 
                                                 
6 For example, the Commission may bar someone from the brokerage industry in an administrative 
proceeding, but an order barring someone from acting as a corporate officer or director must be obtained 




research questions in this thesis, I believe the data on a key variable in Chapter 3, i.e. 
Internal Control Deficiency, is not available before 2003 since Section 302 of Sarbanes-
Oxley Act was enforced only for the period on and after August 29, 2002.7 The data 
collection process consists of the following five steps.  
First, I generate annual enforcement action index files for LR and AP after 
excluding releases that are classified as AAERs, that are issued against individuals 
rather than against firms, that do not include the firm’s name in the release title or do 
not help for event identification.8 Although I exclude releases against individuals, I 
retain those releases involving both individuals and firms in my index files for further 
identification process. Releases that do not help to identify noncompliance typically 
involve fair fund distributions and intentional omission. 9  Applying these filters 
produces a sample of 1,354 LRs relating to 1,666 unique firms, and 2,400 APs relating 
to 2,591 unique firms. Pooling LRs and APs yields a sample of 4,129 unique firms. 
I match each firm name in the index file with EDGAR to retrieve the CIK 
identifier. From the initial sample of 4,129 firms, I am able to identify 2,471 matches. 
The number of matched firms is reduced by 1,658 because all securities offerings are 
potential targets for SEC’s enforcement actions but not all companies that offer stock 
for sale must file electronically with EDGAR. For example, certain small companies 
may be granted exemptions from regular SEC reporting (SEC, 2013); therefore it is not 
possible to gather their information from EDGAR.10 
                                                 
7  However, my results do not include this Internal Control Deficiency information disclosed under 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act because there is no sufficient data for analysis. 
8 This means that the releases are not helpful for identifying firms’ noncompliance behaviours, such as 
releases for fair fund distributions. 
9  The “Fair Fund” provision is enforced under Section 308(a) of the SOX. It authorizes the SEC to take 
civil penalties collected in enforcement cases and add them to disgorgement funds for the benefit of 
victims of securities law violations. The SEC or the hearing officer may, at any time, order any party to 
submit a plan for the administration and distribution of funds in a Fair Fund or disgorgement fund. Usually, 
the SEC’s Division of Enforcement submits a proposed plan no later than 60 days after the respondent 
has turned over the funds or other assets pursuant to the SEC's order. These releases are issued as APs. 
10  Information is achieved from the SEC’ website: https://www.sec.gov/answers/regis33.htm and 
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I match the resulting sample of noncompliant firms with COMPUSTAT to 
determine whether financial data (total assets) are available. This requirement results in 
the loss of 1,703 firms.11 Generally, COMPUSTAT’s North American population has 
financial data for companies filing public source and having a trading issue but for 
private firms, COMPUSTAT adds them into the database only when they meet certain 
criteria. For example, one criteria is that companies trade on both a US and Canadian 
exchange. The criteria for OTC to be added in the North American population are that 
the equity must be pricing at least $0.01 and trading with volume must occur fairly 
consistently; in addition, the company must file sources regularly.  
I then match the remaining 768 firms with the enforcement action index files 
and identify all relevant release documents. My final sample consists of 900 
enforcement releases. I download these manually and check each release to extract the 
key variables for my analysis. Inspection of the enforcement action releases reveals that 
many cases involve failure to file periodic financial statements (known as delinquent 
filings). I treat delinquent firms as having financial reporting problems rather than non-
accounting noncompliance, and therefore I remove these cases from my sample of 
securities laws noncompliance. The resulting sample contains 142 LRs and 390 APs.12  
Finally, I read all 532 releases and extract information on securities laws 
violations. Note that multiple releases may pertain to one noncompliance event at a 
single firm, such as order instituting proceedings, initial decisions, and final decisions. 
Meanwhile some releases are not relevant for identifying noncompliance behaviour 
such as those relating to fair fund, granting waivers, and individuals. Information 
                                                 
https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/cik.htm#.U39rPdJdWE4 . 
11  According to a contact with WRDS, not every firm that files with the SEC can be found in 
COMPUSTAT. 
12 At this stage, it is not necessary to identify the number of unique firms involved with those releases 
because many of these do not contain the information I need for identifying noncompliance events and 
would therefore be removed from my scrutiny of information extraction. 
16 
 
exacted for each noncompliance event includes: the firm name, release numbers 
pertaining to each firm, one observation per noncompliance event, 13  the violation 
beginning/ending date, the law(s) violated, the violated sections of law(s), a general 
description of the reason that the release was issued, whether CEO or top management 
names are involved in the misconduct, the filing date that the SEC released the 
document where I extract main information for this noncompliance event, and the date 
of the first enforcement action release for it.14 
Table 1 describes the process of identifying relevant releases. Appendix A 
provides two simplest examples for the SEC’s enforcement action releases. One of them 
is an administrative proceeding and the other one is a litigation release. Both of them 
provide the information that I need to extract for noncompliance event except for the 
first date of this enforcement action. However, as we can see from the example for 
litigation release, it refers to other releases and Complaints as well. In many cases, it is 
not possible to achieve the information I need for a complete noncompliance event from 
one release; then I need to read through all the releases and Complaints to gather 
information for my research purpose.  
2.3 Data Description of Noncompliance with Securities Laws 
The final noncompliance sample comprises 126 noncompliance events for 123 
firms, of which 96 firms have complete financial statement and market data available. 
A noncompliance event may violate multiple sections of laws. The most common areas 
of noncompliance in my sample include insider trading, foreign bribery, kickback 
payments, misleading press releases, misleading information on business, fraudulent 
                                                 
13  Firm noncompliance event might be covered by a set of related releases, I, therefore, integrate 
information from different releases towards one noncompliance event as one observation. 
14 As footnote 13 discussed, there might be a set of related releases regarding one noncompliance event, 
here I search for the date of the first publically available release. 
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sales transactions, unregistered security, stock manipulation, related party transactions, 
and stock option backdating.  
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the noncompliance events and firms. 
Panel A describes the distribution of the 126 noncompliance events across calendar 
years based on the violation-beginning years and violation-ending years. Relatively few 
noncompliance events were initiated prior to 1995 and after 2009 in my sample. 
However, this does not necessarily mean noncompliance rarely happened in these years. 
Since my sample collection covers the releases filed from 2003 through 2012, it is likely 
that noncompliance events occurring before 2003 were filed in years prior to 2003, thus 
not being covered in my sample. Likewise noncompliance events that were initiated in 
more recent years may have not yet been investigated by the SEC, and are thus not 
included in my sample. The period from 1999 through 2003 includes the initiation of 
more than half (59.5%) of the noncompliance events. 
Panel B in Table 2 reports the industry distribution of the 123 noncompliant 
firms. The industry classification scheme follows Frankel et al. (2002) and Dechow et 
al. (2011). Noncompliant firms cluster in certain industries. For example, 57.73% of the 
noncompliant firms come from three industries: Durable Manufacturers (21.14%), 
Banks & Insurance (20.33%), and Computers (16.26%). Since Banks & Insurance have 
20.13% proportion of COMPUSTAT population, this industry is not overrepresented in 
the noncompliance sample. However, both Durable Manufacturers and Computers 
compose only approximately 11% of the population on COMPUSTAT whereas the 
noncompliance rate is relatively higher. Meanwhile, Chemicals also has a higher 
noncompliance rate relative to its representation in the COMPUSTAT population. 
These results are roughly consistent with the higher litigation risk industries from 
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(Francis et al. (1994b);Francis et al. (1994a)) where they treat the biotechnology, 
computers, electronics, and retail industries as industries with higher litigation risk.  
Table 3 reports summarized details for the 126 (123) noncompliance events 
(firms). Panel A shows that approximately 60% of the noncompliance events have a 
violation period of less than 1,000 days while about 25% of the events have a duration 
between 1,000 days and 2,000 days. The mean (median) of the noncompliance event 
duration is 1,052 (653) days. Four acts form the basis for the SEC’s investigations: the 
Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment Company 
Act of 1940, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. Noncompliance events can 
involve multiple acts and multiple subsections under one act. Table 3, Panel B reports 
the distribution of violation events by securities acts. Most of the violation events 
involve the Securities Act of 1933 (45.2%) and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(85.7%). As shown in Panel C of Table 3, the mean (median) noncompliance event 
involves 2.44 (1.59) subsections of securities laws, and 42 events involve violations of 
a single subsection while the highest number of subsection violations is 8 (three cases). 
Panel D shows that 62.61% of the noncompliance events involve CEO and/or president, 
and 18.26% also involve other top management. The cases that involve CFO and 
general counsel/compliance officer count for 16.52% and 13.04%, respectively.  
2.4 Summary 
Overall, constructed from the SEC’s enforcement action releases, my sample 
represents a comprehensive noncompliance setting and incorporates multiple types of 
violations of securities laws. Based on this dataset, I investigate the association between 
noncompliance and financial reporting quality, and the association between 
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 Sample Selection of Enforcement Action Releases 
Panel A: Sample selection of Enforcement Action Releases 
Number of Releases 
Total releases (2003-2012) 10,923 
        Total_LR(2003-2012) 4,675 
        Total_AP(2003-2012) 6,248 
       less: releases towards individual and categorized as AAER 5,904 
       less: other releases 1,212 
Indexed releases  3,754 
Panel B: Sample selection of firms against by Enforcement Actions  
Number of Firms 
Number of firms referred by indexed releases 4,129 
Number of firms found in EDGAR 2,417 
Number of firms with Compustat financial data 768 
Panel C: Sample selection of relevant Enforcement Action Releases 
Number of Releases 
Indexed releases  3,754 
Releases traced back from Compustat matched firms 1,551 
      less: duplicated releases 651 
Unique releases traced back from Compustat matched firms 900 
      less: releases against firms delinquent  in financial reports 368 
Releases checked manually 532 
 Comprising:   Total_LR 142 
                        Total_AP 390 
Panel D: Final sample of noncompliant firms 
Noncompliance events  126 
Noncompliant firms  123 
Note  
This table reports the process of identifying relevant SEC’s enforcement actions releases. 
Total_Releases: the sum of SEC's enforcement releases in each year for the period from 2003 to 2012. 
Releases_Indexed: the number of SEC's enforcement releases covered in our index file. 
INDIV&AAER: the number of releases which are purely against individuals or which are categorized as AAER 
by the SEC. 
Other Releases:  the number of releases which are not relevant for identifying firms' non-compliance 












Table 2  
Summary Statistics for Frequency of Noncompliance Events/Firms by Year and Industry 
Panel A: Year Frequency of 
Noncompliance Events 
 Panel B: Industry Frequency of Noncompliant firms 
Vio_Beg Freq Vio_End Freq  Industry Freq Percent Compustat 
1986 1     Mining & Construction 3 2.44 11.04 
1994 2     Refining & Extractive 4 3.25 7.18 
1995 1     Food & Tobacoo 4 3.25 1.93 
1996 5 1996 1  Chemicals  7 5.69 1.84 
1997 5     Pharmaceuticals 7 5.69 9.46 
1998 4     Durable Manufacturers 26 21.14 11.24 
1999 13 1999 5  Computers 20 16.26 11.18 
2000 15 2000 2  Transportation 4 3.25 5.06 
2001 22 2001 9  Utilities 4 3.25 4.26 
2002 15 2002 24  Retail 7 5.69 6.49 
2003 10 2003 23  Banks & Insurance 25 20.33 20.13 
2004 7 2004 14  Service 12 9.76 7.25 
2005 4 2005 10      
2006 8 2006 11      
2007 5 2007 8      
2008 3 2008 4      
2009 1 2009 6      
2010 2 2010 4      
2011 2 2011 3      
2012 1 2012 2      
Total 126   126   Total 123 100.00 97.06 
Note 
This table reports summary statistics for frequency of securities laws noncompliance events/firms by 
year and industry. 
Following Dechow et al (2011), Industries are based on the following SIC codes: Agriculture: 0100–0999; Mining 
& Construction: 1000–1299, 1400–1999; Food & Tobacco: 2000–2141;Textiles and Apparel: 2200–2399; 
Lumber, Furniture, & Printing: 2400–2796;Chemicals: 2800–2824, 2840–2899; Refining & Extractive: 1300–
1399,2900–2999; Durable Manufacturers: 3000–3569, 3580–3669, 3680–3828, 3852-3999;Computers:3570–
3579, 3670–3679, 7370–7379; Transportation: 4000–4899; Utilities: 4900–4999; Retail: 5000–5999; Services: 
7000–7369, 7380–9999; Banks& Insurance: 6000–6999; Pharmaceuticals: 2830–2836, 3829–3851.  
The calculation of Compustat industry proportion is based on the firms which have valid financial statement data 
in year 2012. I do a small correction for Dechow et al (2011), where they include 3829-3851 in both Durable 








Table 3  
Summary Statistics for Noncompliance Events 
Panel A: Frequency of Violation Days   Panel B: Frequency of Violated Acts  Panel C: Frequency of Violated Subsections of Acts 
Vio_Days Frequency Percentage  Vio_Acts Vio_ dummy Total  Num_Vio_Subsections Frequency Percentage 
1-999 75 59.52   0 1 .*   1 42 33.87 
1000-1999 31 24.6  Vio_33 67 57 2 126  2 36 29.03 
2000-2999 13 10.32  Vio_34 16 108 2 126  3 22 17.74 
3000-3999  4 3.17  Vio_ ICA40 119 5 2 126  4 12 9.68 
4000-4999 1 0.79  Vio_ IAA40 120 4 2 126  5 4 3.23 
5000-5999  1 0.79        6 5 4.03 
>6000 1 0.79        8 3 2.42 
mean 1052.45         . * 2 1.59 
median 653.00                
Total  126 100         Total 126 100 
Note 
This table reports summarized details for the 126 (123) noncompliance events (firms). 
Vio_  dummy indicates if a specific Act was violated or not. 
Vio_Acts indicates what Act was violated. 
Vio_33 stands for the violated law was Securities Act of 1933. 
Vio_34  stands for the violated law was Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
Vio_ICA40 stands for the violated law was Investment Company Act of 1940. 
Vio_IAA40 stands for the violated law was Investment Advisers Act of 1940.  
Num_Vio_Subsections is the number of subsections of Acts that a non-compliance event violated. 
* For one of the two missing cases, the SEC issued a formal order of private investigation therefore this information is not publically available. For the other case which involves insider trading, the 
violated acts information is missed without known reason.  
24 
 
Appendix 1 Examples for the SEC’s Enforcement Action Releases  
Appendix 1a.15An Example of an Administrative Proceeding
                                                 
15 This is a simple example of an administrative proceeding where noncompliance event information 



















Appendix 1b.16 An Example of a Litigation Release  
Litigation Release No. 18190 / June 16, 2003 
SEC v. Alliance Industries, Peter H. Norman and Donald A. Baillargeon, United States District Court for 
the Central District of California, Civil Action No. 99-6073 REC DLB. (July 27, 1999) 
SEC Settles Claims Against Former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Alliance Industries In 
Manipulation and Fraud Action 
On February 10, 2003, United States District Judge Robert E. Coyle entered a Final Judgment by consent 
against Peter H. Norman ("Norman"), the former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Alliance 
Industries ("Alliance"). The Complaint, which alleged violations of the securities registration and 
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, was filed on July 27, 1999, in the United States District 
Court for the Central District of California, against Alliance, a Bakersfield, California company, Norman 
and Donald A. Baillargeon ("Baillargeon"), Alliance's former Vice President of Public Relations and 
Marketing. (See Litigation Release No. 16223, July 28, 1999). The Commission obtained a default 
judgment against Alliance on August 24, 2000, for its failure to answer or otherwise respond to the 
Commission's Complaint, and obtained a Final Judgment by consent against Baillargeon on January 10, 
2002. 
The Complaint alleged that from January 1, 1996 through November 26, 1996, Norman and Baillargeon 
engaged in various fraudulent acts that resulted, among other things, in the manipulation of the price of 
the common stock of Alliance, a financially troubled company engaged in housing development and 
construction. According to the Complaint, Norman and Baillargeon made false and misleading 
representations concerning Alliance's cultivation and sale of fast-growing "paulownia" trees, its breeding 
and selling of live goats and carcasses, and its development of a nationwide chain of chiropractic 
franchise clinics, among other matters. The Complaint alleged that Norman and Baillargeon disseminated 
false and misleading projections of Alliance's future revenues and earnings knowing that Alliance was a 
foundering company that had no paulownia tree business, goat business or chiropractic business. In 
addition, the Complaint alleged that Norman engaged in transactions designed to make it appear that 
there was an active market for Alliance's common stock, and he personally sold more than 90,000 shares 
of his unregistered Alliance common stock directly to members of the public. The Complaint alleged that 
as a result of the defendants' fraudulent conduct, investors lost more than $1.4 million. 
Norman, without admitting or denying the allegations in the Commission's Complaint, consented to the 
entry of a Final Judgment permanently enjoining him from violating the securities registration and 
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws - Sections 5 and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5. The Final Judgment 
also ordered Norman to pay disgorgement of $1,372,572.01, representing profits that he obtained from 
the fraudulent sale of his personally owned stock to investors, together with prejudgment interest thereon 
in the amount of $754,088.81, and a civil money penalty of $110,000. In addition, Norman consented to 
a permanent bar from acting as an officer or director of any reporting or non-reporting public company. 
The default judgment against Alliance permanently enjoined Alliance from violating the securities 
registration and antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws - Sections 5 and 17(a) of the Securities 
Act, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5. Baillargeon, without admitting 
or denying the allegations in the Commission's Complaint, consented to the entry of a Final Judgment 
permanently enjoining him from violating the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws - Section 
17(a) of the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, and 
ordering him to pay a civil money penalty of $10,000. 
                                                 
16 This is one of the simplest examples of a litigation release where noncompliance event information can 
be extracted from this single release alone. Original document is coming from the followed 
website:  http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18190.htm. 
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Chapter 3 Non-accounting Noncompliance and Financial 
Reporting Quality  
3.1 Introduction 
A recent stream of research explores the association between internal control 
over financial reporting (ICFR) and financial reporting quality (Doyle et al., 2007a). 
However, other aspects of the internal control system, such as compliance control, 1  can 
also influence financial reporting quality; while it has not yet been explored. In this 
paper, I investigate whether a firm is more likely to have financial reporting problems 
if it does not comply with non-accounting regulation/laws/rules. This association is 
suggested by Karpoff et al. (2008b) who provides descriptive evidence that most 
accounting misrepresentation is associated with non-accounting noncompliance, such 
as insider trading, civil and criminal fraud, racketeering and tax evasion. To my 
knowledge, apart from this preliminary evidence, there is no other empirical research 
on the association between non-accounting noncompliance and financial reporting 
quality. My study seeks to address this gap in the literature by exploring how non-
accounting noncompliance and financial reporting quality are related. My findings 
represent an important step towards a better understanding of financial reporting 
problems and the multidimensional nature of internal control.  
Although the association between compliance control and financial reporting 
quality is not as intuitive as the association between ICFR and financial reporting 
quality, anecdotal evidence suggests that these two could be associated.  Consider the 
                                                 
1 According to the generally accepted integrated internal control framework by the Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations (COSO), operation control is another aspect of internal control besides 
compliance control and ICFR (COSO, 1992; 2013). 
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case of AGCO. 2 AGCO Corporation, from 2000 through 2003, made big amounts of 
kickback payments in connection with their sales of equipment to Iraq. The marketing 
staff created a fictional account to characterize the kickbacks as “after sales service 
fees”, but no bona fide services were performed. AGCO’s accounting for these 
transactions failed properly to record the nature of the payments. In this case, the 
kickback payment transaction by the marketing department is an underlying transaction 
which has caused both noncompliance and accounting problem, regardless of whether 
the accountants intended to conceal the wrongdoings or were simply misled by the 
marketing department.  
A recent practical improvement of the internal control framework (COSO, 2013) 
sheds light on the importance of compliance for the effectiveness of firms’ internal 
control. COSO (2013) 3  expands the application of internal control beyond financial 
reporting to other internal control objectives including compliance. Previously, internal 
control was primarily viewed in a narrow way (i.e., in terms of ICFR), by regulators 
and by researchers who conduct empirical studies. This is possibly because regulations 
required disclosure of the effectiveness of ICFR (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 
1977; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act, 1991; Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX), 2002), which made data on the quality of ICFR readily available. In contrast, 
data on other aspects of internal control are not widely available. 
To investigate the implications of non-accounting compliance control for 
financial reporting quality, my analysis builds on prior research and on the internal 
                                                 
2  Data source comes from the SEC’s enforcement action: Litigation Release No. 21229, filed on 
September 30, 2009. 
3 COSO was organized in 1985 to support the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
which was created to suggest steps to reduce the incidence of financial reporting frauds. COSO developed 
a generally accepted framework for internal control ‘Internal Control — Integrated Framework’ in 1992. 
Its recommendation on internal control over financial reporting has finally been accepted by the SEC’s 
regulation. In 2013, COSO updated this framework. The newly updated framework retains the same core 
concepts but expands the application of internal control beyond financial reporting to other forms of 
reporting, operation and compliance objective. 
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control framework presented by COSO (1992).4 An integrated internal control system 
aims to achieve three objectives: compliance with applicable laws and regulations, 
reliability of financial reporting, and effectiveness and efficiency of operations (COSO, 
1992). I conjecture that compliance and financial reporting quality are connected within 
this integrated system. First, if a firm violates laws and regulations, it indicates poor 
internal control as firms rely on internal control to ensure compliance. Therefore, I 
expect that noncompliance with laws and regulations is related to accounting problems 
because both of them reflect poor internal control. Second, noncompliance and 
accounting problems can be resulted from the same underlying transactions. 
Alternatively, it could be argued that the primary responsibility of preparing financial 
reports rests with the chief financial officers (CFO); so CFOs independently influence 
firms’ earnings management (Jiang et al., 2010) and their professional qualifications 
determine ICFR quality (Li et al., 2010). Therefore, it might be in doubt that whether 
the control beyond the scope of accounting control could possibly influence financial 
reporting quality. 
I explore the association between compliance and financial reporting quality by 
testing whether the probability of financial accounting problems is higher for firms that 
fail to comply with securities laws than those without noncompliance issues. Here, the 
term of ‘financial reporting problems’ means that the firm violates either Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles or the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) 
accounting regulations.5 Identifying a general measure of noncompliance is difficult 
because applicable laws and regulations are complicated and vary across industries and 
                                                 
4 My study follows COSO’s 1992 framework rather than 2013 framework because the new framework 
was published after my sample period. 
5 For example, the Staff Accounting Bulletins of the SEC reflect the Commission staff’s views regarding 
accounting-related disclosure practices. They represent interpretations and policies followed by the 
Division of Corporation Finance and the Office of the Chief Accountant in administering the disclosure 
requirements of the federal securities laws. 
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firms. For example, an automobile manufacturer faces regulations from quality-
standards setters, environmental regulators, security exchanges, and other possible 
regulators related to operating aspects of the business. Therefore, it is difficult to 
compare comprehensive compliance control in different firms across industries. Two 
feasible ways of examining the relation between compliance and financial reporting 
problems are either investigating a specific type of noncompliance for a broad sample 
or using a comprehensive compliance index for a small set of industries. In this paper, 
I implement the first strategy and focus on firms’ non-accounting noncompliance with 
securities laws.  
Noncompliance with securities laws provides a good setting to examine 
noncompliance effects for several reasons.6 First, noncompliance with securities laws 
is an influential component of a firm’s noncompliance behaviour. Most of the common 
misconduct that leads to SEC investigations involves related parties (such as investors 
and consumers) who do business with the violating firm.7 Relative to other types of 
violations which do not directly affect the parties with whom the firm does business 
(such as violation of environmental laws), the related-parties-involved noncompliance 
usually triggers larger decreases in firm value (Karpoff and Lott, 1993;Murphy et al., 
2009;Karpoff, 2012). 8  Second, the SEC has the same regulatory power over all 
registrants regardless of industry or size. In contrast, other types of noncompliance do 
                                                 
6 Part of the discussion here is similar to that in Chapter 1 where I give the reason why I want to generate 
noncompliance dataset based on the SEC’s Enforcement Actions. 
7 Common conduct that may lead to SEC investigations includes: (1) misrepresentation or omission of 
important information about securities; (2) manipulating the market prices of securities; (3) stealing 
customers' funds or securities; (4) violating broker-dealers' responsibility to treat customers fairly; (5) 
insider trading (i.e., violating a trust relationship by trading while in possession of material, non-public 
information about a security); and (6) selling unregistered securities. Information comes from the SEC’s 
website.  
8 By reviewing different types of noncompliance behaviour, please refer to Karpoff  (2012). He concludes 
that the loss of market value far exceeds direct costs such as fines, penalties, and law-suit settlements for 
some types of misconduct which impose costs on their counterparties such as investors, employees, 
customers, suppliers, etc. However, for some other types of misconduct, such as environmental violations, 
which do not directly affect the parties with whom the firm does business, there are small or negligible 
losses in addition to the cost imposed by regulators and courts.  
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not have a universal regulator because the regulatory framework to which firms are 
subject depends on which industry they operate in and what products they produce. For 
instance, noncompliance with environmental regulations occurs mainly in the utilities 
and manufacturing sectors while noncompliance with product quality standards 
(measured by product recalls) varies across products. Furthermore, the SEC’s website 
provides comprehensive information on firms’ noncompliance with security regulations 
and it is publicly available. A detailed discussion of the securities laws noncompliance 
data is provided in Section 3.3.1. 
I collect data on non-accounting noncompliance with securities laws from the 
enforcement actions brought by the SEC between 2003 and 2012. For the purpose of 
identifying firms’ non-accounting noncompliance events, I exclude enforcement 
actions classified as Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs), those 
against individuals rather than firms, and those that do not permit firm identifications. I 
use two measures of financial reporting problems. The first indicator is the presence of 
an accounting restatement. I collect data on restatements from Audit Analytics. The 
second indicator relates to accounting frauds, data on which are provided by Karpoff et 
al. (2008a; 2008b) and extended to December 31, 2012 by them.  
I find that firms not complying with securities laws have higher rates of financial 
reporting problems than control firms that do not violate securities laws. The effect is 
much stronger for accounting frauds than for restatements. This is consistent with my 
expectation since accounting frauds is a sharper and more powerful proxy for financial 
reporting quality than financial restatements. Furthermore, the evidence is more 
pronounced in the period after the securities-laws noncompliance started. Although I 
control for selection bias using propensity score matching based on observed variables, 
some underlying firm characteristics such as systematic risk in the control environment 
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are difficult to measure and likely affect both compliance and financial reporting quality; 
therefore, my results potentially suffer selection bias due to unobservables.  Following 
the discussions and suggestions by Tucker (2010), Peel and Makepeace (2012) and Peel 
(2014), I employ the MHbounds approach to test how strong a hidden bias would need 
to be to affect my inferences. Results suggest that my inferences are not sensitive to an 
unobservable factor unless it increases the likelihood of selection into noncompliance 
by an unlikely degree.  
My study makes several contributions to the literature. First, compliance 
captures a different aspect of internal control quality than studied in prior research, this 
extends our understanding of internal control as an integrated system. 9 Accounting 
research typically explores internal control system on the ICFR aspect alone. However, 
there is frontier research starting to explore other aspects of internal control. For 
example, Feng et al. (2013) and Goh and Kim (2013) examine the association between 
operational efficiency and ICFR. To the best of my knowledge, my study presents the 
first empirical examination of the link between the compliance aspect of internal control 
and accounting problems. My study has potential implications for understanding the 
complexity of the internal control system and the interaction among different aspects of 
an integrated internal control system. 
Second, my research also improves our understanding of noncompliance effects. 
By analysing the effects of firms’ noncompliance with different regulations, extant 
compliance research demonstrates the impact of a variety of noncompliance behaviours, 
such as false advertising (Peltzman, 1981), product recalls (Jarrell and Peltzman, 1985), 
                                                 
9  Untabulated analyses reveal that only 4.8% of noncompliance firms reported internal control 
deficiencies under SOX (1 out of 21 noncompliance firms with available internal control deficiencies 
information after 2003) for the start of the noncompliance period. For a five-year period centred on the 
noncompliance beginning year, only 15.4% of the noncompliance firms reported internal control 




air safety disasters (Mitchell and Maloney, 1989), and environmental violations (Jones 
and Rubin, 2001;Karpoff et al., 2005;Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004) on firm reputation, 
market value, economic performance, and wealth of intra-industry shareholders. There 
is also related research based on comprehensive settings of noncompliance behaviour 
(for example, Karpoff and Lott, 1993;Karpoff et al., 2005;Murphy et al., 2009). 
However, none of these studies examines the effects of noncompliance on financial 
reporting quality nor do they perceive noncompliance as a proxy for ineffective internal 
control despite compliance being one objective of internal control.  
Third, my research also extends the understanding of financial reporting quality. 
I document an explicit link between securities laws noncompliance and accounting 
frauds and/or financial restatements, thereby providing evidence that noncompliance 
also impacts financial reporting quality.  
Finally, my findings also have several implications for business and public 
policy. They provide evidence that, to generate good quality financial reports, effective 
compliance control is necessary. This corresponds to COSO’s updated integrated 
internal control framework (COSO, 2013). COSO (2013) suggests that not only ICFR 
but also the other two aspects of the internal control system need to be well implemented 
so that firms can have effective internal control systems.10 My results indicate disclosed 
internal control deficiency under SOX, which reflects ICFR, is not a sufficient indicator 
of the effectiveness of the internal control system in relation to financial reporting 
quality. Thus reporting on the effectiveness of compliance controls could provide 
investors with complementary information.  
The remainder of my paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents my 
motivation and develops hypotheses. Section 3.3 provides the sample selection. Section 
                                                 
10 See Section 3.2.1 for the definition of integrated internal control system and its three objectives. 
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3.4 discusses my research design. Section 3.5 presents empirical results, and Section 
3.6 concludes. 
3.2 Motivation and Hypotheses Development 
3.2.1 The Integrated Internal Control Framework and Prior Research 
Internal control helps firms achieve important objectives, and sustain and 
improve performance. According to COSO’s integrated framework (1992), internal 
control is broadly defined as:  
A process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and 
other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the 
achievement of objectives in the following categories: effectiveness and 
efficiency of operations; reliability of financial reporting; compliance 
with applicable laws and regulations(emphasis added). 
(COSO, 1992) 
An effective internal control system provides reasonable assurance regarding 
the achievement of the above three objectives, while an internal control deficiency or 
combination of deficiencies can reduce the likelihood that an entity can achieve its 
objectives. Internal control is a complex system and the three objectives of the internal 
control system overlap to some degree. To support the achievement of these three 
objectives, each internal control component should be present and functioning.11 If any 
of those components is not working well, all three objectives can be affected. For 
example, channel stuffing by a poorly managed sales force is detrimental to the 
company’s achievement of all the three internal control objectives. First, this 
misconduct may render the company vulnerable to litigation by not adhering to laws 
and regulations to which the firm is subject. Second, financial reporting will not be 
reliable because respective accounts and disclosures will not reflect the nature of the 
improper activities. Third, it results in inefficiency and ineffectiveness of operation 
                                                 
11 According to COSO (1992, 2013), internal control components include Control Environment, Risk 
Assessment, Control Activities, Information and Communications, and Monitoring. 
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because of reduced negotiating power with distributors. Meanwhile, when inventory is 
not properly tracked, operational decisions based on these faulty internal management 
reports will lead to poor inventory management (Feng et al., 2013;Goh and Kim, 2013).  
Although the three aspects of the internal control system overlap, regulators and 
researchers who seek to understand internal control focus mainly on ICFR. The Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977 was the first statutory regulation for internal 
control. It focuses on ICFR by requiring management of SEC registrants to maintain 
books and records that would protect corporate assets and facilitate GAAP-based 
financial reportings; and SEC registrants are required to disclose significant internal 
control deficiencies (ICD) when they change auditors under FCPA. Following a series 
of financial frauds at the beginning of the century, the US Congress enacted SOX which 
includes milestone-rules with regard to internal control disclosures about ICFR. 
Specifically, Section 302 and Section 404 of SOX provide compulsory requirements for 
internal control disclosures by management and auditors, respectively, although SOX 
302 is typically viewed as voluntary disclosure (Ge and McVay, 2005;Doyle et al., 
2007a;Leone, 2007).12 To my knowledge, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act (FDCIA) of 1991 is the only regulation which requires institutions to 
disclose internal control effectiveness regarding both ICFR and compliance. It requests 
firms to file an annual report with regulators in which management attests to the 
effectiveness of ICFR and compliance with designated laws and regulations, as well as 
the auditor’s attestation report on ICFR.13 However, since the regulation appeals only 
                                                 
12 With respect to SOX 404’s application, accelerated filers and non-accelerated filers have different 
requirements. Accelerated filers were required to comply with the SOX 404 requirements for the first 
time for their fiscal years ending on or after November 15, 2004. However, as part of the financial reform 
legislation, non-accelerated filers received exemption from auditor’s attestation on the strength of internal 
controls (SOX 404 (b)) in 2010 (U.S. Congress, 2010) after a heated debate related to the implementation 
cost. Accelerated filers generally include public firms with a public float of at least $75 million, among 
other criteria. 
13 FDICIA exempts institutions with assets less than $500 million from its internal control monitoring 
and reporting requirements. 
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to the banking industry and it does not require an independent party’s attestation on 
internal controls over compliance, it has not been influential. 
Partially due to the regulatory emphasis on ICFR and partially due to the 
intuitive association between ICFR and financial reporting quality, and the machine-
readable nature of the data, the majority of extant research focuses on the association 
between ICFR and financial reporting quality. For example, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
(2008) investigate the effect of ICDs and their remediation on accrual quality. Their 
cross-sectional and intertemporal change tests provide strong evidence that the quality 
of internal control affects the quality of accruals. Doyle et al. (2007a) find firm-level 
internal control material weaknesses result in lower quality of accruals than account-
specific material weaknesses. Bedard et al. (2012) investigate whether specific types of 
internal control weaknesses differ in the likelihood of remediation and in the association 
of remediation with earnings quality. They find that the remediation of entity-level 
problems in reconciliation and information technology, along with account-specific 
problems in revenue and tax, are significantly associated with changes in abnormal 
accruals. Lu et al. (2011) investigate the association between the strength of internal 
control and accrual quality by incorporating the role of auditors in internal control 
monitoring, their results imply that auditors cannot fully compensate for poor internal 
control by increased substantive work.  
Studies on ICFR provide much more understanding of internal control quality 
which has traditionally required researchers to overcome several difficulties, such as 
the inherent complexity of the internal control process and the lack of access to data 
(Kinney, 2000). However, all studies use disclosed ICDs under SOX as a proxy for the 
effectiveness of internal control, and then further explore its relation with financial 
reporting quality. According to SOX’s requirements, the disclosed effectiveness of 
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internal control is assessed by ‘a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of 
the company’s annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected 
on a timely basis’ (PCAOB, 2007). Even if ICFR weaknesses can be fully detected and 
truthfully reported, disclosed ICDs can only manifest the deficiencies in accounting 
controls while other possible factors are ignored. In addition, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
(2007) suggest that ICDs disclosed under SOX do not fully reflect ICDs in the firm. 
Rice and Weber (2012) provide evidence on this conjecture. They posit that although 
restatement firms are likely to have had control weaknesses at the time of the 
misstatement, only 32.4 percent of restating firms report the existence of a material 
weakness in their SOX 404 reports during the misstatement period, and this proportion 
has declined over time. Since financial reporting problems are actually the outcome of 
the integrated internal control system, ICDs in accounting controls are insufficient to 
capture all the problems in the control system. I argue that noncompliance with non-
accounting regulations, as a broader concept, could have indications for financial 
reporting problems such that ICDs disclosed under SOX are not sufficient indicators for 
financial reporting quality.  
3.2.2 Hypothesis Development 
Compliance controls help to ensure that the firm complies with laws and 
regulations, thus avoiding damage to its reputation and other negative consequences. 
Compliance will not be achieved if records and practice do not meet the external 
regulatory requirements such as production standards, accounting standards, tax 
requirements, and further legal requirements (Kinney, 1999).14 In setting its compliance 
objectives, management exercises discretion (COSO, 2013). Empirical evidence 
suggests that noncompliance is a strategic choice that management makes after 
                                                 




weighing the costs and benefits of noncompliance (Robinson et al., 2011). Meanwhile, 
personal characteristics, such as CEO tenure and age, are suggested to have 
entrenchment effects on corporate issues  (Ozkan, 2011). Similarly, Ryan and Wiggins 
(2001) find managerial horizon and incentives influences management on risk taking. 
Therefore, all compliance-related risks and controls are derived from the applicable 
external laws and regulations and management’s tolerance for risk or their ability to 
assess risk. Therefore, noncompliance with external regulatory requirements represents 
a broader measure of ICDs than do ICDs in ICFR. Generally, a failure to comply with 
external regulators’ law/rules represents an ICD at the firm-level and firm-level ICDs 
have more severe consequences for financial reporting quality than an account-specific 
ICD (Ge and McVay, 2005;Doyle et al., 2007a).15  
Prior research on noncompliance focuses largely on the event revelation effects 
from noncompliance. For example, research analyses the effects of noncompliance on 
a firm’s reputation, market value, and the CEO’s personal finances, reputations, and 
criminal risk etc. by analysing firm’s noncompliance with environmental regulation 
(Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004;Karpoff et al., 2005), false advertising (see, for example, 
Peltzman, 1981), product recalls (see, for example, Jarrell and Peltzman, 1985), and 
financial misrepresentation (Karpoff et al., 2008a;Desai et al., 2004), etc. A small 
literature also explores the determinants of different noncompliance behaviour (see, for 
example, Robinson et al., 2011;Schwartz and Soo, 1996), and relatively few studies 
examine reputational penalties, legal penalties, and firm financial performance 
                                                 
15 One of the examples Doyle et al. (2007a) provide as firm-level ICD is ‘the material weakness in the 
company’s internal control systems relating to the company’s control over non-accounting documents 
to the extent this information is communicated to the Chief Financial Officer’(emphasis added). Though 
the ICD in this example is disclosed from an ICFR aspect, it actually illustrates that the documents 
generated from non-accounting noncompliance behaviour could have an impact on financial reporting 
quality through internal communication. 
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associated with firms’ misconduct using comprehensive measures of noncompliance 
behaviour (Karpoff and Lott, 1993;Murphy et al., 2009).  
However, neither stream of research tries to understand the effects of 
noncompliance on financial reporting quality nor do they perceive noncompliance as a 
proxy for ineffective internal control despite compliance being a primary internal 
control objective. One possible reason for this omission is that people may believe 
accounting, control, risk management and asset preservation are the province of the 
CFO and information quality and control rationalization are top-of-mind issues for a 
CFO (Deloitte & Touche’s Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Center, 2014). Consistent 
with this, Jiang et al. (2010) argue that the CFO does not merely act as the CEO’s agent 
and find that CFO’s influence on firms’ earnings management activities may even be 
greater than that of CEO’s. In addition, Li et al. (2010) show that CFO qualifications 
are an important determinant of internal control quality and better qualified CFOs 
improve internal control quality.  
In contrast, I predict that financial reporting problems are unlikely to be purely 
the outcome of poor-quality ICFR, and that noncompliance should also impact financial 
reporting problems. Thus, I explore whether an explicit link exists between 
noncompliance and financial reporting problems by investigating the association 
between non-accounting noncompliance with securities laws and 
restatements/accounting frauds. Noncompliance with securities laws provides a good 
setting for examining the effects of noncompliance, so my findings could apply to other 
noncompliance settings as well.  
First, control over compliance with securities laws and ICFR are two aspects 
within one integrated internal control system. The general factors that affect the 
effectiveness of the integrated internal control system, such as a systematically weak 
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control environment, resource constraints, weak ‘tone at the top’, or poor managerial 
ability, etc., are likely to affect compliance control and accounting control 
simultaneously. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) and Choi et al. (2013) find that the 
availability of fewer resources to invest in internal control is associated with the 
weaknesses in a firm’s internal controls, which suggests that compliance control and 
ICFR could both be negatively affected by resource constraints. 
The following example from Sequenom, Inc. shows how noncompliance with 
securities laws (where financial reporting problems are not involved) and financial 
reporting problems are associated. 16 
Sequenom, Inc., between June 2008 and January 2009, disclosed 
materially misleading scientific data regarding a prenatal screening test 
for Down syndrome through its senior Vice President of R&D. The 
company’s stock price rose significantly based on its announcements 
regarding the Test and statements made by representatives of the 
company. Contrary to Sequenom’s public statements, the Test was far 
less accurate than disclosed, making it much less marketable. The 
company’s stock price dropped 76% relative to its price before these 
misleading statements when Sequenom finally announced that the Test 
would not be launched by the time it advocated. Based on this event, 
Sequenom’s CEO and Vice President of R&D had been terminated, and 
its CFO and Vice President of marketing had resigned, while there were 
neither requirements for restatements nor allegations for accounting 
frauds. In 2013, however, Sequenom did restate its financial reports for 
the fiscal years of 2009, 2010 and 2011 due to ‘material accounting 
classification error and a material weakness in internal control over 
financial reporting’. 
 
In this case, noncompliance emerged in the R&D sector. Given the company’s business, 
R&D had significant firm-level influence and should be carefully monitored. In this 
case, either management did not exercise proper oversight (which might be associated 
with poor managerial ability), or management did not establish an appropriate ‘tone at 
the top’, which typically results in a weak control environment. Both of the explanations 
                                                 
16
 Noncompliance information comes from the SEC’s enforcement action: Administrative Proceedings 
No. 3-14524 (34-65247), filed on September 1, 2011. Restatement information comes from 
Sequenom’s 8-k filing on March 7, 2013. 
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result in weak firm-level internal controls. As abovementioned, firm-level ICDs have 
more severe consequences for financial reporting quality than account-specific ICDs 
(Ge and McVay, 2005;Doyle et al., 2007a), and  the remediation of firm-level problems 
helps to improve financial reporting quality (Bedard et al., 2012).  Therefore, rooting in 
this weak environment, financial reporting problems are more likely to occur.  
Second, compliance and ICFR are two overlapping aspects of an integrated 
internal control system, and thus the two interact. The accounting system records firm 
behaviours/activities. When noncompliance behaviours occur, incorrect internal 
information is incorporated into the firm’s accounting system. Therefore, following 
noncompliance behaviours, the respective accounts and disclosures will not properly 
reflect the nature of these noncompliance behaviours. These accounting problems can 
result from unintentional errors and poor judgments as well as intentional actions to 
conceal wrongdoings. This conjecture about how internal communication affects the 
interaction between different aspects of an internal control system is consistent with 
recent research. For example, Feng et al. (2013) and Goh and Kim (2013)’s results 
illustrate internal communication within the internal control system by showing that 
how operation control (which is another aspect of internal control system) interacts with 
ICFR.  
Based on these analyses, I predict that firms violating securities laws are more 
likely to experience financial restatements or accounting frauds.  
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3.3 Identifying Noncompliance with Securities Laws and Financial Reporting 
Problems 
3.3.1. Noncompliance with Securities Laws17 
I collect information on noncompliance with securities laws using SEC’s 
enforcement actions. For the purpose of briefness, I do not specifically refer these firms 
as “firms not complying with securities laws” but rather refer to them as “noncompliant 
firms”. Similarly, “noncompliance events” in this section refer to noncompliance with 
securities laws. 
In the case of noncompliance with SEC’s regulations, there are two types of 
actions that the SEC can take: Federal Court Actions (civil actions) and Administrative 
Proceedings. The former are litigation releases concerning civil lawsuits brought by the 
SEC in a federal court while the latter are orders and related materials released by the 
SEC when it brings non-judicial actions before an administrative law judge. The SEC’s 
decision to bring a civil action or administrative action may depend upon the type of 
sanction or relief that is being sought.18 When the misconduct warrants it, the SEC can 
bring both types of proceedings. The SEC maintains an online publicly searchable 
database on litigation releases (hereinafter ‘LR’) and administrative proceedings 
(hereinafter ‘AP’) in the form of annual archives from 1995 onwards. I use this database 
to identify firms that violated securities laws.19 20 
                                                 
17 The full discussion of noncompliance dataset is presented in Chapter 2. For the purpose of keeping 
integrity and applicability, I repeat or rephrase some of the discussion in this chapter.  
18 For example, the SEC may bar someone from the brokerage industry in an administrative proceeding, 
but an order barring someone from acting as a corporate officer or director must be obtained in federal 
court (see http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml#.UyrILqh_uE4). 
19 There are two additional types of enforcement actions: opinions issued by Administrative Law Judges 
in contested administrative proceedings (ALJ Decisions) and opinions issued by the Commission on 
appeal of Initial Decisions or disciplinary decisions issued by self-regulatory organizations such as NYSE 
or NASD (Commission Opinions). Since these two types of actions are not original enforcement actions 
related to firm misconduct, I do not include them in my sample. 




My sample includes enforcement actions brought by the SEC from 2003 through 
2012. I collect noncompliance data from January 1, 2003 onwards because I expect ICD 
data are available from 2003 onwards since Section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act was 
required for any period on or after August 29, 2002.21 The data collection process for 
securities laws noncompliance consists of five steps. For the purposes of identifying 
firms’ non-accounting noncompliance events, I exclude enforcement actions classified 
as Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs), those against individuals 
rather than firms, and those that do not permit firm identifications.  
Table 1 describes the process of identifying relevant releases. Please refer the 
detailed description of data collection in Chapter 2. 22 The final sample comprises 126 
noncompliance events for 123 firms, of which 96 firms have complete financial 
statement and market data available. Noncompliance events may violate multiple 
sections of laws. The most common areas of noncompliance in my sample include 
insider trading, foreign bribery, kickback payments, misleading press releases, 
misleading information on business, fraudulent sales transactions, unregistered security, 
stock manipulation, related party transactions, and stock option backdating.  
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the noncompliance events and firms. 
Panel A describes the distribution of the 126 noncompliance events across calendar 
years based on the violation-beginning years and violation-ending years. Relatively few 
noncompliance events were initiated prior to 1995 and after 2009 in my sample. 
However, this does not necessarily mean noncompliance rarely happened in these years. 
Since my sample collection covers the releases filed from 2003 through 2012, it is likely 
that noncompliance events occurring before 2003 were filed in years prior to 2003, thus 
                                                 
21 However, my results do not include this ICD information disclosed under SOX because there is no 
sufficient data for analysis. 
22 Table 1 to Table 3 in this chapter are the same as those reported in Chapter 2. 
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being omitted by my sample. Likewise noncompliance events that were initiated in 
more recent years may have not yet been investigated by the SEC, and are thus not 
included in my sample. The period from 1999 through 2003 includes the initiation of 
more than half (59.5%) of the noncompliance events. 
 Panel B in Table 2 reports the industry distribution of the 123 noncompliant 
firms. The industry classification scheme follows Frankel et al. (2002) and Dechow et 
al. (2011). Noncompliant firms cluster in certain industries. For example, 57.73% of the 
noncompliant firms come from three industries: Durable Manufacturers (21.14%), 
Banks & Insurance (20.33%), and Computers (16.26%). Since Banks & Insurance have 
20.13% proportion of COMPUSTAT population, this industry is not overrepresented in 
the noncompliance sample. However, both Durable Manufacturers and Computers 
comprise only approximately 11% of the population on COMPUSTAT whereas the 
noncompliance rate is relatively higher. Meanwhile, Chemicals also has a higher 
noncompliance rate relative to its representation in the COMPUSTAT population. 
These results are roughly consistent with the higher litigation risk industries from 
Francis et al. (1994a; 1994b) where they treat the biotechnology, computers, electronics, 
and retail industries as industries with higher litigation risk. 
Table 3 reports summarized details for the 126 (123) noncompliance events 
(firms). Panel A shows that approximately 60% of the noncompliance events have a 
violation period of less than 1,000 days while about 25% of the events have a duration 
between 1,000 days and 2,000 days. The mean (median) of the noncompliance event 
duration is 1,052 (653) days. Four acts form the basis for the SEC’s investigations: the 
Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment Company 
Act of 1940, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. Noncompliance events can 
involve multiple acts and multiple subsections under one act. Table 3, Panel B reports 
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the distribution of violation events by securities acts. Most of the violation events 
involve the Securities Act of 1933 (45.2%) and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(85.7%). As shown in Panel C of Table 3, the mean (median) noncompliance event 
involves 2.44 (1.59) subsections of securities laws, and 42 events involve violations of 
a single subsection while the highest number of subsection violations is 8 (three cases). 
3.3.2 Identifying Financial Reporting Problems 
I use two measures (indicators) of financial reporting problems. The first is an 
indicator for the presence of an accounting restatement. Data on accounting 
restatements are collected from Audit Analytics. The second indicator relates to 
accounting fraud. Here I rely on the dataset from Karpoff et al. (2008a; 2008b) which 
Karpoff et al. subsequently extended to December 31, 2012. 23  
The restatement sample covers all SEC registrants that have disclosed at least 
one financial statement restatement since 1 January 2001. Audit Analytics defines 
restatements as a ‘revision of previously filed financial statements as a result of an error, 
GAAP failure or fraud’. Technical revisions such as the revision caused by mergers and 
changes in accounting principles are not considered restatements involving errors or 
irregularities in approach, theory or calculation, and hence are excluded by Audit 
Analytics from their restatement sample. I further impose the restriction that the 
restatements were not due to adoption of Interpretation No. 48 Accounting for 
Uncertainty in Income Taxes – an interpretation of FASB statement No. 109 (FIN 48) 
or SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 108 (SAB 108). The final restatement sample 
includes 5,363 restatements filed from 1 January 2001 through 30 June 2013.24 
                                                 
23 I am very grateful to Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee, and Gerald S. Martin for providing me access 
to their hand collected data. 
24 Since Audit Analytics constantly updates the restatement dataset, trying to get the largest scope of 
restatements, I downloaded the most recently updated restatement sample from Audit Analytics right 
before I estimated my main tests, which was 27, July 2013. 
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FIN 48 was issued in July 2006. Prior to the adoption of FIN 48, accounting for 
uncertainty in income taxes was governed by FAS 5’s Accounting for Contingencies 
where uncertain tax contingencies were rarely reported as separate line items or even 
disclosed. FIN 48 required firms to disclose the balance of the tax contingency in their 
financial statement footnotes when it is “more-likely-than-not” that this tax position 
could be sustained if examined by a tax authority. I exclude restatements due to the 
adoption of FIN 48 because the previous principle contained no specific guidance on 
how to address uncertainty in accounting for income tax assets and liabilities. Therefore, 
restatements due to FIN 48 could be viewed as a change in accounting principles. In 
addition, there is no restatement period reported in Audit Analytics for FIN 48-related 
restatements, which makes my analysis infeasible. 
SAB 108 was issued in September 2006. It provides guidance on how errors 
built up over time in the balance sheet should be considered from a materiality 
perspective and corrected. Prior to SAB 108 two techniques (known as the “rollover” 
and “iron curtain” approaches) were commonly used to accumulate and quantify 
misstatements. SAB 108 requires a registrant’s financial statements to be adjusted when 
either approach results in quantifying a misstatement that is material, after considering 
all relevant quantitative and qualitative factors. Since both techniques were accepted by 
the SEC before SAB 108, and actually there is no “effective date” since they represent 
the SEC Staff’s views of the proper interpretation of existing rules, I consider 
adjustments due to SAB 108 as being inconsistent with my definition of financial 
reporting problems.  
Accounting fraud data are collected from all enforcement actions initiated by 
the SEC and the Department of Justice (DOJ) for violations of one or more of three 
provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934: (i) Section 13(b)(2)(a), which 
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requires firms to keep and maintain books and records that accurately reflect all 
transactions; (ii) Section 13(b)(2)(b), which requires firms to devise and maintain a 
system of internal accounting controls; and (iii) Section 13(b)(5), which prohibits 
knowingly circumventing or failing to implement a system of internal accounting 
controls, or knowingly falsifying any book, record, or account. These data represent 
unambiguous financial reporting violations because all the firms covered in it are firms 
that were caught violating books, records or internal accounting control provisions by 
the SEC or the DOJ. Being caught by the regulators is one of the most important criteria 
by which to identify an accounting fraud (see, for example, Dechow et al., 2011;Hennes 
et al., 2008). Fraud cases compliment restatements because not all frauds trigger 
restatements and vice versa (Karpoff et al., 2008b). The full sample contains 1,105 
frauds filed from 1978 through 31 December 2012. Table 4 reports summary details of 
my restatement and accounting fraud samples.  
3.4 Research Design 
3.4.1 Overview Design 
My sample of noncompliance with securities laws is based on observed 
noncompliance behaviour, which creates a risk of selection bias because firms’ 
noncompliance is a strategic choice that management make after weighing the costs and 
benefits of noncompliance (Robinson et al., 2011). A challenge in the observational 
studies is that while treated outcomes are observed, we do not observe what these 
outcomes would have been in the untreated state (i.e. the absence of counterfactuals). 
This problem means that researchers are unable to compare the outcome difference 
between treated and untreated for a given firm to evaluate the effects of its treatment 
[(see more details in Peel and Makepeace (2012);and Tucker (2010))]. 
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Matching is one possible solution to the selection problem. The aim is to create 
a random setting by identifying a group of control firms that are identical or as similar 
as possible to the group of treated firms with respect to all relevant covariates except 
for the treatment effect. Given an appropriate control group, differences in outcomes 
between the control group and treated group can be attributed to the treatment effect. 
However, as the number of matching dimensions increases or non-binary variables are 
included, covariate matching becomes either difficult or infeasible. Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983) suggest matching on one variable only, known as the balancing score b(X). 
This balancing score is a function of the relevant observed covariates X such that the 
conditional distribution of X given b(X) is independent of assignment into the treatment. 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that matching on b(X) is sufficient to obtain 
equivalent matching on the individual explanatory variables that determine the outcome 
variable. One possible balancing score is the propensity score, defined as the probability 
of being treated given observed characteristics X. Matching methods based on this 
propensity score are known as Propensity Score Matching (PSM), which aggregates all 
covariates into one score using a likelihood function. PSM has become widely applied 
in accounting and finance research [See the review in Tucker (2010)]. To control for 
selection bias, I employ PSM. Specifically, I match each noncompliant firm to a control 
firm using PSM. I then perform Fisher’s Exact Test to analyse the difference in 
occurrence of financial reporting problems between the noncompliant firms and control 
firms.  
The application of PSM is valid under three conditions (Tucker, 2010). The first 
condition requires that after matching by propensity scores, the selection of treated and 
non-treated cases can be considered random, referred as “conditional independence” 
(Heckman et al., 1998) or the “unconfoundedness” condition (Zhao, 2004). The second 
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condition requires that both treatment and non-treatment selections are possible at the 
propensity scores used in matching. The condition fails at a given score if only treatment 
firms are observable at that score. This condition is referred to as the common support 
condition. I retain only valid matched pairs in my analysis, dropping noncompliance 
observations that do not satisfy the common support condition. The third condition is 
balancing, whereby the distributions of covariates are approximately similar for the 
treatment and control groups after PSM. By summarizing and interpreting previous 
research, Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) suggest using several measures to assess the 
matching quality, including standardized bias, a two-sample t-test, joint significance, 
and Pseudo-R2. I apply these tests to the before and after-matching samples. I also 
conduct a Wilcoxon Test to check if the means of differences in the two samples are 
significantly different.25 
Since noncompliance events usually extend beyond one year in duration (see 
Panel A of Table 3), I analyse the occurrence of financial reporting problems by centring 
on the noncompliance beginning year. Since there is no literature or theory suggesting 
the length of window within which noncompliance and financial reporting problems are 
associated， I employ a range of windows to examine the occurrence of financial 
reporting problems. The maximum window is the 5-year period centred on the start year 
of the noncompliance period, i.e. [-2, 2]. Financial reporting problems also extend 
beyond one year in duration in many cases (see Table 4), so I check for the occurrence 
of a financial reporting problem for each year within the respective examined windows 
for each noncompliance event. I define the start year of the noncompliance period as 
                                                 
25 The Two-sample t-test examines the differences in mean for each covariate in the treatment and control 
samples, while my intention is to test how different each pair (with respect to each covariate) is between 
my treatment and control group. Therefore, the Wilcoxon Test for the mean of differences for each 
covariate in the two samples is more appropriate.  
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year 𝑡 and count the frequency of periods with financial reporting problems from 𝑡 − 2 
through 𝑡 + 2. Figure 1 illustrates this process. 
3.4.2 Propensity Score Matching to Identify Control Firms 
My matching procedure begins by extracting a subpopulation of potential 
control firms from COMPUSTAT. For each noncompliant firm, I collect all the firms 
in the same 2-digit SIC industry, and require that potential control firms have necessary 
financial data available for years 𝑡 − 2 through 𝑡 + 2. After excluding duplicate firm-
year observations, this possible control sample includes 15,472 firm-year observations. 
To reduce the influence of outliers on my tests, I winsorize each non-categorical 
variable at ±1% of the distribution for the combined samples of noncompliant firms 
and potential control firms. 
I use a logistic regression as the basis for computing propensity scores. 26  The 
dependent variable equals the log of the odds of securities laws noncompliance. 
Conditional probabilities (propensity scores) of securities laws noncompliance are 
calculated as the fitted value from the logistic regression. I match each noncompliant 
firm to its closest neighbor within the same industry and same year. I exclude 
observations that do not satisfy the common support condition.27  
In terms of the specification of the PSM model, the selection of variables is a 
trade-off between efficiency and bias. Brookhart et al. (2006) suggest that variables 
which are unrelated to the exposure (i.e., noncompliance in my context) but related to 
the outcome (i.e., financial reporting problems in my context) should always be 
included in a PSM model. Tucker (2010) also suggests that controlling for factors that 
                                                 
26
 When estimating the propensity score, various models, including logit, probit and linear probability 
models (LPM), can be employed. For the binary treatment case, where I estimate the probability, logit 
and probit models usually yield similar results (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). 
27 This technique drops treatment observations whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or 
less than the minimum propensity score of the controls. 
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affect the treatment outcome even if they do not affect the treatment selection can yield 
more efficient estimators. However, Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) explain that over-
parameterising the selection model with irrelevant covariates can aggravate the 
common support problem; although not biasing estimates or leading to inconsistencies, 
the inclusion of insignificant variables can inflate the variance of estimated treatment 
effects. In addition, Augurzky and Schmidt (2001) show that how different 
specifications of including covariates relevant to the treatment decision or the outcome 
variable might cause problems in small samples in terms of higher variance. They 
provide evidence that matching on an inconsistent estimate of the propensity score (i.e., 
a partial model including only the covariates relevant to both treatment decision and 
outcome variable) produces better estimation. Since my noncompliance sample is small 
relative to the control population, it is important not to over-parameterise the model. 
Therefore I include only the variables predicted to affect both the securities laws 
noncompliance decision and financial reporting quality. 
My logistic model includes several measures of firm performance and financial 
position highlighted by previous research as influencing the probability of firm 
misconduct, enforcement actions, financial reporting quality, and internal control 
problems (see, for examples, Dechow et al., 2011;Kedia and Rajgopal, 2011;Doyle et 
al., 2007b;Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007;Thevenot, 2012;Files, 2012;Rice and Weber, 




) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖+𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖 +
                                      𝛽5𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌                        (1) 
where 𝑝𝑖 is the latent probability that firm 𝑖 fails to comply with securities laws (𝑦𝑖=1). 
The vector of explanatory variables in equation (1) is calculated at year 𝑡. Definitions 
for the explanatory variables are as follows:  𝑅𝑂𝐴 is operating income divided by total 
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asset (COMPUSTAT item OIBDP/AT); 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 is the natural log of market capitalization 
(outstanding common stock times year-end share price (COMPUSTAT items CSHO ∗
PRCC_F); 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 is the sum of debt in current liability and long term debt divided 
by total assets (COMPUSTAT items (DLC + DLTT)/AT ); 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆  is an indicator 
variable taking the value of 1 if Income Before Extraordinary Items (COMPUSTAT 
item IB) is less than zero, and 0 otherwise; 𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑁 is an indicator variable taking the 
value of 1 if the firm engages Big Five auditor, and 0 otherwise (COMPUSTAT item 
AU); 𝐴𝐺𝐸 is the natural log of a firm age (calculated as the number of years to date that 
the firm appears on COMPUSTAT). I also include year and industry indicators in the 
regression to control for differences in securities laws noncompliance over time and 
across industries. 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Logistic Regression Results for Propensity Scores  
Table 5, Panel A reports parameter estimates and summary statistics for the 
logistic noncompliance model used to generate propensity scores for matching. The 
results are consistent with prior research. Coefficient estimates reveal that firms are 
more likely to violate securities laws if they are larger (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸), performing poorly (𝑅𝑂𝐴), 
audited by small auditors ( 𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑁 ), and are young ( 𝐴𝐺𝐸 ). The marginal effects 
(calculated as proportionate change in implied probability) reported alongside the 
coefficients quantify the economic effect for each covariate. The probability of 
noncompliance declines by 10% when 𝑅𝑂𝐴 increases from its first quartile to third 
quartile and all remaining covariates are set to their median values. The probability of 
securities laws noncompliance increases by 108% when 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸  (logarithm of market 
capitalization) increases from first quartile to third quartile and decreases by 58% for a 
comparable increase in 𝐴𝐺𝐸 (logarithm of firm age). The likelihood of securities laws 
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noncompliance is almost 50% lower for firms with BIG 5 auditors. These effects are 
also statistically significant at the 1% level. Consistent with Panel B of Table 2, 
untabulated results also demonstrate that industry unevenly influences compliance with 
securities laws. The Pseudo R2 of the logistic regression is 14% and the likelihood ratio 
chi-square of it is statistically significant at the 0.001 level. Results from tests of 
covariate balance are reported in Table 6. These are discussed in section 3.5.2. 
Panel B of Table 5 reports the distribution of propensity scores for the securities 
laws noncompliance sample and the entire control group population prior to matching. 
Comparing the two distributions reveals that noncompliant firms and control firms 
significantly differ in the probability of noncompliance before matching. 
3.5.2 Validity of Common Support and Balancing of Covariates 
As discussed in the Section 3.4.1, PSM is valid where the conditional 
independence, common support, and covariate balancing conditions are satisfied 
(Tucker, 2010). Because conditional independence can only be examined using the 
boundary approach after the estimated treatment effect is achieved, I present results for 
this examination after the main results in Section 3.5.4. The common support condition 
is satisfied because I drop the noncompliance observations where similar propensity 
scores for control firms are unavailable. Imposing this condition leads to the loss of 2 
observations from the noncompliance sample, resulting in 94 noncompliant firms and 
94 control firms for my empirical analyses. This section presents the results of 
examining the covariate balancing conditions for the 188 matched firms (94 
noncompliant firms and 94 control firms) in Table 6. 
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 report the means of the covariates for the 
noncompliance and control groups, respectively. Column (5) presents the standardized 
bias for each covariate in the pre-matching and post-matching samples while column 
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(6) presents the percentage reduction in covariate bias. 28 The t-tests are the parametric 
tests of differences in the covariate means between the samples while the Wilcoxon test 
provides nonparametric comparisons. The t-tests reveal that, while 𝑅𝑂𝐴, 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸, 
𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑁, and 𝐴𝐺𝐸 differed across the two samples prior to the matching, subsequent to 
matching, the means are not statistically different. I follow Peel and Makepeace (2012) 
in considering standardized bias less than ±10% after matching as acceptable, although 
the lower is the post-matching bias of each covariate, the better. All the covariates meet 
this criterion after the matching, with the exception of AGE, which has a standardized 
bias of -20.6%. However, because AGE is the natural log of firm age, what I really want 
to achieve through this matching is that firm age is indifferent between noncompliant 
and control firms. I, therefore, recheck the differences in firm age between the after-
matched two groups. Columns (9) to (11) show that the mean of differences in ages of 
paired noncompliant and control firms is as small as -0.309, and it is statistically 
insignificant. This indicates that my matching quality is good regarding all the variables 
incorporated in the model.  
The pseudo-R2s before and after matching are 0.138 and 0.046, respectively, 
indicating that the covariates explain the participation probability well before matching. 
After matching, there should be no systematic differences in the distribution of 
covariates between the two samples and therefore the pseudo-R2 should be low 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Furthermore, the likelihood ratio tests on the joint 
significance of all regressors in the logistic model are not rejected prior to matching but 
are rejected after the matching has been implemented. This also suggests that the quality 
of matching is good. The Wilcoxon tests provide similar evidence.  
                                                 
28
 For each covariate x, the standardized bias is defined as the difference between the sample means for 
the treatment and matched control samples as a percentage of the square root of the average of the 
sample variances of the two samples. 
58 
 
Collectively, the results in Table 6 demonstrate a substantial reduction in the 
differences between the pre-matched samples, providing confidence that my subsequent 
tests can be used to model the occurrence of accounting problems for firms with similar 
observed characteristics.  
3.5.3 Univariate Comparisons 
I use three sets of samples to conduct my main analyses. First, I examine the 
occurrence of financial reporting problems around noncompliance events by merging 
the restatements dataset with the PSM matched dataset. Second, I merge the accounting 
frauds dataset with the PSM matched dataset. Third, I examine the combined 
restatement and accounting fraud dataset, retaining restatement observations with 
overlapping events.  
Table 7 reports the results from Fisher’s Exact Test for the three datasets, i.e. 
restatement, accounting fraud and the non-overlapped combination of restatement and 
accounting fraud. 29 Panel A of Table 7 reveals that restatement rates are higher in the 
noncompliance group relative to the control group in six of the eight windows: window 
[-2, 2] (rates are 20.21% and 15.96%, respectively), window [-2, 1] (rates are 20.21% 
and 9.57%, respectively), window [-1, 1] (rates are 19.15% and 5.32%, respectively), 
window [0] (rates are 9.57% and 1.06%, respectively), window [1, 2] (rates are 13.83% 
and 7.45%, respectively) and window [1] (rates are 11.7% and 1.06%, respectively). 
Except for the first five-year window, the results are all statistically significant at the 
10% level or less. However, the two pre-noncompliance windows, window [-2, -1] and 
window [-1], reveal the opposite results, where restatement rates are higher in control 
                                                 
29 This test is more appropriate than a Chi-square test because the latter requires each cell to have an 
expected frequency of five or more observations but, in my data sample, I observe several cells with 
frequency of less than five. 
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group relative to noncompliance group {8.51% versus 6.38% for window [-2,-1], and 
4.26% versus 2.13% for window [-1]} but the differences are not statistically significant. 
Reported in Panels B and C of Table 7, I find stronger results in accounting 
frauds data and combined restatement-accounting fraud data for these six non pre-
noncompliance windows. Accounting frauds rates are 37.23 and 4.26 for noncompliant 
firms and control firms, respectively for window [-2, 2]; 35.11 and 4.26 for 
noncompliant firms and compliance firms, respectively for window [-2, 1]; 31.91 and 
3.19, respectively for window [-1, 1]; 23.4 and 2.13, respectively for window [0]; and 
9.57 and 0, respectively for window [1, 2]. These results are all significant at the 1% 
level. The year [1] rates are 6.38 and 0, respectively for noncompliant firms and control 
firms, and the difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. The rates of 
combination of accounting frauds and restatements are also significantly different at the 
1% level for 5 windows: 43.62 and 18.09, respectively for window [-2, 2]; 42.55 and 
12.77, respectively for window [-2, 1]; 40.43 and 8.51, respectively for window [-1, 1]; 
30.85 and 3.19, respectively for year [0]; and 15.96 and 1.06, respectively for year [1]. 
Window [1, 2] observes the rates as 20.21 and 7.45, respectively for noncompliant firms 
and control firms, and it is statistically significant at the 5% level. However, when 
looking at the two windows which merely cover one/two years before noncompliance 
beginning year without including subsequent years, i.e. year [-1] and window [-2,-1], I 
do not observe any significant difference between the noncompliant and control firms 
across these two Panels. 
It is not a surprise to see that the association is stronger for firms with accounting 
frauds or combination of accounting frauds and restatements than restatement firms. 
Restatement samples contain both errors (i.e., unintentional misapplication of GAAP) 
and irregularities (i.e. intentional misreporting) as defined by SAS No.53 (AICPA 1988). 
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The causes and consequences of errors and irregularities in restatement samples are 
different (Hennes et al., 2008), and the risk factors differ as well. Specifically, 
restatements due to errors are more likely to reflect account-specific control risk while 
restatements due to irregularities are more likely to reflect general control environment 
issues (SAS No.82, AICPA 1997). Therefore, relative to errors, irregularities are more 
likely to be associated with noncompliance because general control risk factors are more 
likely to affect ICFR and compliance simultaneously. As oppose to restatements (which 
combine errors and irregularities), the accounting fraud samples contain firms that have 
been investigated or charged by the SEC with violating accounting regulations. Theses 
financial reporting problems are usually treated as irregularities (see, for example, 
Hennes et al., 2008). The descriptive summary in Table 4 (in Section 3.3.2) also reveals 
that the duration for accounting frauds is longer than that for restatements. Therefore, 
accounting frauds can be considered a more severe type of accounting problem,30and 
are likely to be the consequence of more severe firm-level internal control weaknesses. 
Thus, it is reasonable that the association between noncompliance and financial 
reporting problems is stronger for accounting frauds than for restatements. 
Overall, I find that noncompliant firms have a significantly higher rate of 
financial reporting problems than do control firms. While some of this effect is due to 
firms with restatements, the relation is much stronger for accounting fraud firms and is 
more pronounced for the post-noncompliance windows.  
3.5.4 MHBounds Test 
While PSM deals with the selection bias due to observable factors, it does not 
alleviate the selection bias due to unobservable factors (Tucker, 2010), and the 
                                                 
30 I do not distinguish irregularities and errors within my restatement sample because, first, we cannot 
observe manager’s intention. In addition, distinguishing between these two is not the focus of my study 
and I have a relatively clean data set for accounting frauds. 
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inferences from PSM are based on the conditional independence assumption. If there 
are unobserved variables that simultaneously affect selection into groups of the 
noncompliance and financial reporting problems, a hidden bias could exist. That is, if 
we have a positive unobserved selection, in which those firms most likely to violate 
securities laws also have a higher probability of having financial reporting problems, 
then the estimated treatment effects overestimate the true noncompliance effects. Thus, 
as discussed in Section 3.4.1, I conduct a bounding approach to test how strongly an 
unobserved variable must influence the assignment process to undermine the 
implications of the matching analysis. Here, following suggestions in Peel (2014),  I 
implement the MHbounds test in Stata using Becker and Caliendo’s (2007)  algorithm.  
Having controlled for observed bias via matching, the MHbounds technique 
allows me to gauge the impact that potential hidden bias has on the matched treatment 
effect with reference to a parameter  Γ.31 When  Γ = 1, it is assumed that the treatment 
effect is bias free. If, for example, Γ = 2, firms which appear to be similar (in terms of 
matching covariates) may differ in their odds of receiving the treatment by as much as 
a factor of 2. Higher values of  Γ show deviations from “randomised distribution”. To 
assess the extent to which this deviation affects the inference from significant treatment 
effects requires statistics that have desirable properties in this respect. For binary 
outcomes, Aakvik (2001) suggests using the Mantel and Haenszel (1959) test statistic 
(𝑄𝑀𝐻), which compares the successful number of individuals in the treatment group 
with the same expected number, assuming that the treatment effect is zero. The test-
statistic 𝑄𝑀𝐻 can be bounded by two known distributions, 𝑄𝑀𝐻
+  and 𝑄𝑀𝐻
− (Rosenbaum, 
2002). 𝑄𝑀𝐻
+  is the test statistic given that the treatment effect is overestimated and 𝑄𝑀𝐻
−  
is the test statistic given that the treatment effect is underestimated. When  Γ = 1, the 
                                                 
31 See Appendix 1 for detailed discussion. 
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two bounds are equal, and there is no hidden bias. When  Γ increases, the bounds move 
apart reflecting uncertainty about the test statistics in the presence of unobserved 
selection bias.32  
I calculate the test statistic  𝑄𝑀𝐻  for the outcomes in every window with a 
significant noncompliance effect in my main tests. As an example, I present the 
MHbounds statistics for the three-year window [-1, 1] using the restatement data in 
detail in Panel A of Table 8, with the key parameters highlighted in bold. Because I 
estimate positive treatments effects, my focus is on the upper bound (𝑄𝑀𝐻
+ )  and its 
significance level (𝑝𝑚ℎ
+ ) in columns 2 and 4, respectively. The table reveals that for this 
three-year window, under the assumption of no hidden bias (Γ=1), there is a significant 
noncompliance effect ( 𝑝𝑚ℎ
+ = 0.004 ). At a 5% significance level, a hidden 
bias/confounding variable would need to raise the odds to 1.7 times (Γ = 1.7) the odds 
of exposure to noncompliance (based on the covariates incorporated in the PSM model) 
to affect the estimation of noncompliance effects. At a 10% significance level, a 
confounding variable would need to raise the odds to double the odds of exposure to 
noncompliance (Γ = 2) to affect my inferences from this restatement data.  
Since my prime interest is the critical MHbounds parameters (Γ) at which the 
estimated noncompliance effect becomes questionable, I omit the detailed Γ values and 
just report the critical values of Γ (i.e., the values at which the noncompliance effects 
are no longer statistically significant) at the 5% and 10% significant levels for the other 
windows where I observe significantly high rate of financial reporting problems in 
                                                 
32 It should be noted that the bounding approach does not test the conditional independence assumption 
itself because this would amount to testing that there are no (unobserved) variables that influence 
selection into treatment sample. Instead, the bounding approach provides evidence about the degree to 
which any significant results hinge on the untestable assumption of conditional independence (Becker 




Panel B of Table 8. As revealed in the second column (p=5%), across all the windows, 
the smallest value of Γ is 1.5 which appears in the year [1] window for the accounting 
fraud sample. That means, after having controlled for observed bias using PSM, an 
unobserved confounding variable would have to increase the likelihood of selection into 
the noncompliance sample by 50% to make my reported inferences invalid. For all other 
windows, an unobserved confounding variable would need to increase the likelihood of 
selection into the noncompliance sample by an even higher degree to affect the results.  
Although this test cannot directly justify the conditional independence assumption, it 
gives some insights into the sensitivity of my results and suggests that, for all windows, 
the significant noncompliance effects in the main tests are reliable.  
3.5.5 Additional Test  
In my main tests, I analyse the occurrence of financial reporting problems in 
noncompliant firms versus their matched control firms, and observe significant 
difference in most of the post-noncompliance windows and the windows centred on the 
first year of noncompliance. The results are much stronger for the accounting fraud 
sample than for the restatements sample. Since my accounting frauds data, like data on 
noncompliance with securities laws, are collected from SEC’s enforcement actions, it 
is possible that my results relating to accounting frauds are driven by the fact that 
noncompliance with securities laws are actually capturing accounting frauds. This 
occurs for two reasons. First, the US SEC’s main focus is on financial reporting issues. 
The SEC’s Year-by-Year SEC Enforcement Statistics (SEC, 2013) classify 
enforcement actions into 10 categories: Broker-Dealer, Delinquent Filings, FCPA, 
Financial Fraud/Issuer Disclosure, Insider Trading, Investment Adviser/Investment Co., 
Market Manipulation, Securities Offering, and Other (see Appendix 2 for details). Most 
of the enforcement actions relate to financial reporting problems, such as delinquent 
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filings, financial fraud, and FCPA (which is identified as a separate type of misconduct 
starting in 2011). The actions classified as ‘broker-dealer’, ‘insider trading’, and 
‘investment adviser/investment Co.’ tend to involve individuals rather than firms. For 
the remaining types of enforcement actions (e.g., market manipulation and securities 
offering), it is likely that accounting problems occur as well. Therefore, it is extremely 
difficult to identify a set of compliance problems that are not with any accounting issues.  
Second, the difference between accounting fraud and noncompliance with 
securities laws datasets is that the former is collected under three specific provisions 
regarding the SEC’s accounting regulations while the latter is collected from a 
comprehensive archive but excluding enforcement actions which are categorized by the 
SEC itself as AAERs. Though the SEC has its own method to designate an enforcement 
action as an AAER (as discussed in Section 3.3.2), identifying a non-accounting 
noncompliance event under the SEC’s regulatory framework is not a straightforward 
task. My review of the SEC’s enforcement actions reveals that it is sometimes difficult 
to identify the nature of the noncompliance behaviour.33 Therefore, although I attempt 
to rigorously exclude accounting problems from my noncompliance dataset, my main 
method of excluding AAERs from noncompliance sample does not necessarily result in 
a sample that is free of accounting frauds.  
To address this concern, I repeat my analyses after excluding observations (from 
my noncompliance with securities laws sample) which only involve any one of the three 
provisions by which I identify accounting frauds. 34 In total, out of the 94 noncompliant 
                                                 
33 For example, some of the FCPA cases are sub-classified as AAERs while some are not, even though 
they may all be improper payments to foreign governments. Magyar Telekom Plc. and Aon Corporation 
are two examples of bribery plans, only one of which is categorized as an AAER.See details from 
Litigation Release No. 22213 / December 29, 2011 at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-279.htm 
and from Litigation Release No. 22203 / December 20, 2011,  AAER No. 3348 / December 20, 2011 at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr22203.htm) .     
34 The three provisions are: (i) Section 13(b)(2)(a), (ii) Section 13(b)(2)(b), and (iii) Section 13(b)(5).  
See detailed discussion on these three provisions in Section 3.3.2. 
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firms, there are 10 cases that only involve accounting regulations (and not other 
regulations). Specifically, my review of these 10 cases reveals that they are all FCPA-
foreign corruption cases. This is not surprising because the FCPA prevents corporate 
bribery of foreign officials mainly according to these three principal provisions 
(Seitzinger, 2010). Consistent with this, Karpoff et al. (2015) find that for their 143 
bribery-related actions (from 1978 through May 2013), 110 and 102 involve provisions 
13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B), respectively. 35  
However, my in-depth investigation on these 10 cases reveals that their nature 
is actually more consistent with the non-accounting noncompliance criteria because 
they were initiated from sales procedures, operation aspects, or marketing departments 
rather than the financial accounting system. Given this, the financial accounting system 
simply recorded these real transactions and may not have had the ability to detect the 
nature of this wrongdoing or any intention to conceal the wrongdoings. It especially 
manifests a systematically weak internal control system when the bribery is inspired by 
the top management. Therefore, these 10 cases won’t affect my inferences about the 
association between non-accounting noncompliance and financial reporting problems.  
Nevertheless, I replicate my main tests excluding these 10 noncompliance 
events which could arguably be classified as accounting frauds. Table 9 reveals that the 
results for the accounting fraud sample from Table 7 remain significant but with slight 
changes to the rates of financial reporting problems. These are 32.14 and 3.57, 
respectively for window [-2, 2]; 29.76 and 3.57, respectively for window [-2, 1]; 27.38 
and 2.38, respectively for window [-1, 1]; 17.86 and 2.38, respectively for window [0]; 
10.71 and 0, respectively for window [1, 2]; and 7.14 and 0 respectively for window [1]. 
In addition, one pre-noncompliance window (i.e., window [-2, -1]) also observes 
                                                 
35 These are the two of the three provisions according to which accounting frauds are identified. 
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different accounting frauds rates 5.95 for noncompliance sample, and 1.19 for control 
sample, which is at the 10% significant level. 
3.6 Conclusions  
Prior studies of the effects of internal controls focus mainly on the ICFR. My 
study extends the research to another important aspect of internal control, namely, 
compliance. I examine the association between noncompliance with securities laws and 
financial reporting problems to draw inferences about whether non-accounting 
noncompliance with external regulations has implications for financial reporting quality. 
This question has not been studied previously because presumably, regulators 
emphasize the importance of ICFR aspect for financial reporting quality, and prior 
research suggests that the responsibility for financial reporting quality mainly lies with 
the CFO and/or accounting controls. 
I argue that noncompliance with (non-accounting) external regulations can 
provide information about financial reporting quality. Using noncompliance with 
securities laws, I hypothesize that general factors that affect the effectiveness of the 
integrated internal control system are likely to simultaneously affect compliance control 
and accounting control. In addition, compliance and ICFR are two overlapping aspects 
of one integrated internal control system, so compliance could influence financial 
reporting quality through internal communication. Therefore, I predict and find the rates 
of financial reporting problems will be higher in noncompliant firms than in compliance 
firms. This association is much stronger for accounting frauds than for restatements. 
Furthermore, the effect is more pronounced in the post-noncompliance windows. These 
findings are important because they further our understanding of integrated internal 
control systems, noncompliance effects, and financial reporting quality. 
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My study has limitations, some of which suggest future research. First, there is 
a casual element in the association between noncompliance and financial reporting 
quality theoretically and in the empirical indication from my results, but my data and 
research design do not allow me to specify this causal effect. It leaves spaces for future 
exploration. Second, as the integrated internal control framework suggests, it is possible 
that all the three aspects of internal control (i.e. compliance control, ICFR and operation 
control) would have influence on financial reporting quality. However, given the data 
constraints, I do not control for the other two dimensions in my empirical analysis. Third, 
I examine only the setting of securities laws violations as noncompliance. Further 
research can verify whether the associations I document persist for other types of 
noncompliance behaviour. Third, a factor that could affect my results is the possibility 
that monitoring intensity increases once noncompliance is detected. My research 
method and data availability do not allow me to rule out the role of monitoring intensity 
because my research is based on observed behaviour and the measures are external 
indictors which depend on external parties’ criteria. This type of research might 
introduce a potential bias by selection criteria used by the external parties, though it has 
the greatest advantage of identifying the problems with quality (Dechow et al., 2010).36 




                                                 
36 ‘Quality’ means it is less likely that my sample of noncompliance includes the firm that actually 
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Figure 1. Identifying Financial Problem Years and Windows  
 
Notes: Figure 1 shows the way I identify financial reporting problems in each year and each window. 
The start year of the noncompliance period is defined as year (0). One year before (after) that is year (-
1) (year (-1)) and two year before (after) the start year is year (-2) (year (2)). If a financial reporting 
problem occurred in year (0), then year (0) is counted as one, which stands for a year with a financial 
reporting problem initiated. Similarly, if a financial reporting problem occurred in year (1), then year 
(1) is counted as one, and so on. In the respective windows, the number of years with financial 
reporting problems is counted. The window is identified as a window with financial reporting problems 

























 Sample Selection of Enforcement Action Releases 
Panel A: Sample selection of Enforcement Action Releases 
Number of Releases 
Total releases (2003-2012) 10,923 
        Total_LR(2003-2012) 4,675 
        Total_AP(2003-2012) 6,248 
       less: releases towards individual and categorized as AAER 5,904 
       less: other releases 1,212 
Indexed releases  3,754 
Panel B: Sample selection of firms against by Enforcement Actions  
Number of Firms 
Number of firms referred by indexed releases 4,129 
Number of firms found in EDGAR 2,417 
Number of firms with Compustat financial data 768 
Panel C: Sample selection of relevant Enforcement Action Releases 
Number of Releases 
Indexed releases  3,754 
Releases traced back from Compustat matched firms 1,551 
      less: duplicated releases 651 
Unique releases traced back from Compustat matched firms 900 
      less: releases against firms delinquent  in financial reports 368 
Releases checked manually 532 
 Comprising:   Total_LR 142 
                        Total_AP 390 
Panel D: Final sample of noncompliant firms 
Noncompliance events  126 
Noncompliant firms  123 
Note  
This table reports the process of identifying relevant SEC’s enforcement actions releases. 
Total_Releases: the sum of SEC's enforcement releases in each year for the period from 2003 to 2012. 
Releases_Indexed: the number of SEC's enforcement releases covered in our index file. 
INDIV&AAER: the number of releases which are purely against individuals or which are categorized as AAER 
by the SEC. 
Other Releases:  the number of releases which are not relevant for identifying firms' non-compliance 












Table 2  
Summary Statistics for Frequency of Noncompliance Events/Firms by Year and Industry 
Panel A: Year Frequency of 
Noncompliance Events 
 Panel B: Industry Frequency of Noncompliant firms 
Vio_Beg Freq Vio_End Freq  Industry Freq Percent Compustat 
1986 1     Mining & Construction 3 2.44 11.04 
1994 2     Refining & Extractive 4 3.25 7.18 
1995 1     Food & Tobacoo 4 3.25 1.93 
1996 5 1996 1  Chemicals  7 5.69 1.84 
1997 5     Pharmaceuticals 7 5.69 9.46 
1998 4     Durable Manufacturers 26 21.14 11.24 
1999 13 1999 5  Computers 20 16.26 11.18 
2000 15 2000 2  Transportation 4 3.25 5.06 
2001 22 2001 9  Utilities 4 3.25 4.26 
2002 15 2002 24  Retail 7 5.69 6.49 
2003 10 2003 23  Banks & Insurance 25 20.33 20.13 
2004 7 2004 14  Service 12 9.76 7.25 
2005 4 2005 10      
2006 8 2006 11      
2007 5 2007 8      
2008 3 2008 4      
2009 1 2009 6      
2010 2 2010 4      
2011 2 2011 3      
2012 1 2012 2      
Total 126   126   Total 123 100.00 97.06 
Note 
This table reports summary statistics for frequency of securities laws noncompliance events/firms by 
year and industry.Following Dechow et al (2011), Industries are based on the following SIC codes: Agriculture: 
0100–0999; Mining & Construction: 1000–1299, 1400–1999; Food & Tobacco: 2000–2141;Textiles and Apparel: 
2200–2399; Lumber, Furniture, & Printing: 2400–2796;Chemicals: 2800–2824, 2840–2899; Refining & 
Extractive: 1300–1399,2900–2999; Durable Manufacturers: 3000–3569, 3580–3669, 3680–3828, 3852-
3999;Computers:3570–3579, 3670–3679, 7370–7379; Transportation: 4000–4899; Utilities: 4900–4999; Retail: 
5000–5999; Services: 7000–7369, 7380–9999; Banks& Insurance: 6000–6999; Pharmaceuticals: 2830–2836, 
3829–3851.  
The calculation of Compustat industry proportion is based on the firms which have valid financial statement data 
in year 2012. I do a small correction for Dechow et al (2011), where they include 3829-3851 in both Durable 






Table 3  
Summary Statistics for Noncompliance Events 
Panel A: Frequency of Violation Days   Panel B: Frequency of Violated Acts  Panel C: Frequency of Violated Subsections of Acts 
Vio_Days Frequency Percentage  Vio_Acts Vio_ dummy Total  Num_Vio_Subsections Frequency Percentage 
1-999 75 59.52   0 1 .*   1 42 33.87 
1000-1999 31 24.6  Vio_33 67 57 2 126  2 36 29.03 
2000-2999 13 10.32  Vio_34 16 108 2 126  3 22 17.74 
3000-3999  4 3.17  Vio_ ICA40 119 5 2 126  4 12 9.68 
4000-4999 1 0.79  Vio_ IAA40 120 4 2 126  5 4 3.23 
5000-5999  1 0.79        6 5 4.03 
>6000 1 0.79        8 3 2.42 
mean 1052.45         . * 2 1.59 
median 653.00                
Total  126 100         Total 126 100 
Note 
This table reports summarized details for the 126 (123) noncompliance events (firms). 
Vio_  dummy indicates if a specific Act was violated or not. 
Vio_Acts indicates what Act was violated. 
Vio_33 stands for the violated law was Securities Act of 1933. 
Vio_34  stands for the violated law was Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
Vio_ICA40 stands for the violated law was Investment Company Act of 1940. 
Vio_IAA40 stands for the violated law was Investment Advisers Act of 1940.  
Num_Vio_Subsections is the number of subsections of Acts that a non-compliance event violated. 
* For one of the two missing cases, the SEC issued a formal order of private investigation therefore this information is not publically available. For the other case which involves insider trading, the 
violated acts information is missed without known reason.  
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Table 4  
Summary Details of Restatement and Fraud Samples 
  RESTATEMENT FRAUD 
Panel A: Sample Composition and Summary Details 
No. of Observations 5,363 1,105 
First filing year 2000 1976 
Firms involved 3,369 947 
Duration(days)    
mean 756 1,080 
median 562 819 
minimum 42 60 
maximum 8,035 9,038 
Panel B: Beginning Years' Distribution 
Year 
RESTATEMENT FRAUD 
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
1968     3 0.27% 
1970     2 0.18% 
1971     3 0.27% 
1972     4 0.36% 
1973     1 0.09% 
1974     1 0.09% 
1975     2 0.18% 
1976     9 0.81% 
1977     7 0.63% 
1978     4 0.36% 
1979     5 0.45% 
1980     18 1.63% 
1981     21 1.90% 
1982     23 2.08% 
1983     26 2.35% 
1984     22 1.99% 
1985 1 0.02% 29 2.62% 
1986     25 2.26% 
1987     23 2.08% 
1988     33 2.99% 
1989     40 3.62% 
1990 3 0.06% 36 3.26% 
1991 1 0.02% 40 3.62% 
1992 3 0.06% 42 3.80% 
1993 3 0.06% 44 3.98% 
1994 6 0.11% 37 3.35% 
1995 20 0.37% 28 2.53% 
1996 24 0.45% 42 3.80% 
1997 45 0.84% 56 5.07% 
1998 88 1.64% 64 5.79% 
1999 139 2.59% 85 7.69% 
2000 299 5.58% 102 9.23% 
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2001 485 9.04% 65 5.88% 
2002 537 10.01% 46 4.16% 
2003 538 10.03% 35 3.17% 
2004 547 10.20% 25 2.26% 
2005 509 9.49% 21 1.90% 
2006 447 8.33% 14 1.27% 
2007 388 7.23% 9 0.81% 
2008 325 6.06% 8 0.72% 
2009 360 6.71% 5 0.45% 
2010 289 5.39%   
2011 200 3.73%   
2012 105 1.96%   
2013 1 0.02%   
Total 5363 100% 1105 100% 
Note 





Logistic Regression for Propensity Score 
Panel A: Regression Results 
Noncompliance Coef. Marginal  effects  Pr > ChiSq 
ROA -0.494 -0.097  0.001 
SIZE 0.245 1.078  0.001 
LEVERAGE -0.089 -0.024  0.670 
LOSS 0.050 0.044  0.854 
BIGN -0.731 0.474  0.009 
AGE -0.913 -0.578  0.001 
_CONS -3.404   0.018 
YEAR  Included    
INDUSTRY Included    
N 15,568    
Likelihood ratio    160.647    
(p-value) (0.001)    
Pseudo R2 0.138      
Panel B: Distribution of Fitted Conditional Probabilities (P-scores) 
Sample N Mean 1st pct. 25th pct. median 75th pct. 99th pct.                 
Control Group 
Noncompliance  
15,472 0.0059 0.0004 0.0016 0.0029 0.0058 0.0528 
96 0.0472 0.0005 0.0037 0.0133 0.0405 0.5376 
Note 
This table reports logistic regression results for propensity scores. 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the odds of noncompliance. Noncompliance equals 1 if a firm is against by the 
SEC's enforcement actions; equals 0 if a firm is from COMPUSTAT potential control group. 
All variables are measured at the fiscal year (COMPUSTAT identification) where the noncompliance beginning date lies. 
Panel A contains regression results. Panel B provides distributional information of the fitted conditional probabilities (i.e. 
propensity scores) for two samples: the whole population for control group before matched and the noncompliance 
sample. 
Marginal effects are calculated as proportionate change in implied probability for each variable changed from its quartile 1 
value to quartile 3 value and setting the covariates’ contributions to their median values. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
  𝑅𝑂𝐴               = operating income divided by total asset; 
  𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸              = the natural log of outstanding common stock times share price;  
  𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 = the sum of debt in current liability and long term debt divided by total assets; 
  𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆             = indicator variable taking the value of 1 if Income Before Extraordinary Items is less than zero,  
                               and 0 otherwise; 
 𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑁             = indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the auditor comes from Big Five, and 0 otherwise; 
 𝐴𝐺𝐸               = the natural log of firm’s age; 
 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅            = the dummy variable for noncompliance beginning year; 





Table 6   





%bias %reduct bias 
t-test Wilcoxon test 
Noncompliance Control t p>|t| mean of difference t p>|t| 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)     (7)     (8) (9) (10) (11) 
ROA Unmatched -0.634 -0.129 -41.6  -6.74 <.001    
 Matched -0.574 -0.554 -1.6 96.2 -0.09 0.931 -0.019 -0.143 0.887 
SIZE Unmatched 5.268 4.999 9.1  1.05 0.294    
 Matched 5.373 5.452 -2.7 70.6 -0.17 0.866 -0.079 -0.208 0.836 
LEVERAGE Unmatched 0.386 0.252 25.5  3.03 0.002    
 Matched 0.378 0.335 8.1 68.1 0.48 0.629 0.043 0.618 0.538 
LOSS Unmatched 0.479 0.454 5  0.5 0.62    
 Matched 0.468 0.436 6.4 -26.4 0.44 0.662 0.032 0.537 0.593 
BIGN Unmatched 0.615 0.727 -24.1  -2.47 0.014    
 Matched 0.628 0.585 9.1 62.2 0.59 0.553 0.043 0.705 0.482 
AGE Unmatched 2.100 2.538 -48  -5.97 <.001    
 Matched 2.130 2.318 -20.6 57.2 -1.37 0.174 -0.188 -2.114 0.037 
ExpAge Unmatched 13.802 16.44 -19.4  -2.02 0.043    
 Matched 14.053 14.362 -2.3 88.3 -0.15 0.88 -0.309 -0.226 0.822 
Pseudo R2 Unmatched 0.138  MeanBias Unmatched 28.2     
 Matched 0.046   Matched 8.3     
LR chi2 Unmatched 163.57  MedBias Unmatched 24.1     
 Matched 12.1   Matched 6.4     
p>chi2 Unmatched 0         
  Matched 0.208                 
Note 
This table reports the results for examining covariate balancing conditions for the matched 188 firms. PSM is based on one-one nearest neighbour match with common and without 
replacement. 94 noncompliant firms are matched. Variable definitions are the same as Table 3, except for ExpAge. 
ExpAge is the exponential form of the variable AGE, i.e. the true age of firms. 
%bias is standardized bias. 
    %reduct bias is the percentage reduction in covariate bias. 
    MeanBias is the mean of standardized bias. 




Financial Reporting Problems Occurrence of Noncompliance and Control Samples 





Fisher's Exact Test 
Table Probability(P) Two-sided Pr <=P 
Panel A: Restatements         
Windows centred on noncompliance beginning year 
(-2, 2) 20.21 15.96 0.113 0.570 
(-2, 1) 20.21 9.57 0.020 0.064 
(-1, 1) 19.15 5.32 0.003 0.007 
(0) 9.57 1.06 0.008 0.018 
Windows post noncompliance 
(1, 2) 13.83 7.45 0.070 0.236 
(1) 11.7 1.06 0.002 0.005 
Windows pre noncompliance 
(-2, -1) 6.38 8.51 0.188 0.782 
(-1) 2.13 4.26 0.236 0.682 
Panel B: Accounting Frauds    
Windows centred on noncompliance beginning year 
(-2, 2) 37.23 4.26 <0.001 <0.001 
(-2, 1) 35.11 4.26 <0.001 <0.001 
(-1, 1) 31.91 3.19 <0.001 <0.001 
(0) 23.4 2.13 <0.001 <0.001 
Windows post noncompliance 
(1, 2) 9.57 0 0.002 0.003 
(1) 6.38 0 0.014 0.029 
Windows pre noncompliance 
(-2, -1) 6.38 2.13 0.107 0.278 
(-1) 3.19 1.06 0.250 0.621 
Panel C:  Restatements-Accounting Frauds 
Windows centred on noncompliance beginning year 
(-2, 2) 43.62 18.09 <0.001 <0.001 
(-2, 1) 42.55 12.77 <0.001 <0.001 
(-1, 1) 40.43 8.51 <0.001 <0.001 
(0) 30.85 3.19 <0.001 <0.001 
Windows post noncompliance 
(1, 2) 20.21 7.45 0.007 0.019 
(1) 15.96 1.06 <0.001 <0.001 
Windows pre noncompliance 
(-2, -1) 11.7 9.57 0.167 0.814 
(-1) 5.32 5.32 0.253 1.000 
Note     
This table reports the occurrence of financial reporting problems around noncompliance events for three datasets: restatement, 
accounting fraud and combination of restatement and accounting fraud. 
Restatements data is collected from Audit Analytics's restatement dataset.  
Accounting Frauds data is hand-collected from the violation of SEC’s accounting regulation, and provided by Karpoff et al. 
(2008a, 2008b)  
Restatements-Accounting Frauds is referring the non-overlapped combination of restatements dataset and accounting frauds 
dataset. Restatement observation is kept when restatement and accounting frauds overlapped.  
(-2, 2) is a five-year window centred on noncompliance beginning year with a coverage of preceding two years to subsequent 
two years.  
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(-2, 1) is a four-year window centred on noncompliance beginning year with a coverage of preceding two years to subsequent 
one year.  
(-1, 1) is a three-year window centred on noncompliance beginning year with a coverage of preceding one year to subsequent 
one year.  
(0) is a one-year window covering noncompliance beginning year. 
(1, 2) is a two-year window starting with one year after noncompliance beginning year to subsequent one year.  
(1) is a one-year window covering one year after the noncompliance beginning year.  
(-2, -1) is a two-year window covering two years preceding to noncompliance beginning year.  





Table 8 Mantel-Haenszel (1959) Bounds for Noncompliance Effect Estimation 
Panel A: MHbounds for Restatements’ 3years window (-1,0,1)  Panel B: Summary of MHbounds Test for Windows with Significant Effect 
     Γ  𝑄𝑀𝐻
+    𝑄𝑀𝐻
−       𝑝𝑚ℎ
+        𝑝𝑚ℎ
−  Datasets &Windows  Critical Γ cut-off (p=5%) Critical Γ cut-off (p=10%) 
1*** 2.664 2.664 0.004 0.004 Restatement (-1,0,1) 1.7 2 
1.1*** 2.459 2.887 0.007 0.002 Restatement (0) 1.6 2.1 
1.2** 2.268 3.088 0.012 0.001 Restatement (1) 2 2.7 
1.3** 2.096 3.277 0.018 0.001 Accounting Frauds (-2,-1,0,1,2) 5 6 
1.4** 1.938 3.455 0.026 0.000 Accounting Frauds (-2,-1,0,1) 4.5 5.4 
1.5** 1.793 3.623 0.036 0.000 Accounting Frauds (-1,0,1) 4.7 5.7 
1.6** 1.659 3.784 0.049 0.000 Accounting Frauds (0) 3.7 4.7 
1.7* 1.534 3.937 0.063 0.000 Accounting Frauds (1,2) 2.5 3.5 
1.8* 1.417 4.084 0.078 0.000 Accounting Frauds (1) 1.5 2.2 
1.9* 1.307 4.225 0.096 0.000    
2 1.203 4.360 0.115 0.000    
Note         
This table reports MHbounds statistics for the estimation effects on the three-year window (-1, 0, 1) of restatement data as an example, and the summary of critical values of Γ for the windows 
where significant noncompliance effects are observed. 
Γ : odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
𝑄𝑀𝐻
+  : Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: over-estimation of treatment effect) 
𝑄𝑀𝐻
−  : Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: under-estimation of treatment effect) 
𝑝𝑚ℎ 
+ : significance level (assumption: over-estimation of treatment effect) 
𝑝𝑚ℎ
−  : significance level (assumption: under-estimation of treatment effect) 







Table 9  







Fisher's Exact Test 
Table Probability(P) Two-sidedPr <=P 
Windows centred on noncompliance beginning year 
(-2, 2) 32.14 3.57 <0.001 <0.001 
(-2, 1) 29.76 3.57 <0.001 <0.001 
(-1, 1) 27.38 2.38 <0.001 <0.001 
(0) 17.86 2.38 <0.001 <0.001 
Windows post noncompliance 
(1, 2) 10.71 0 0.002 0.003 
(1) 7.14 0 0.014 0.029 
Windows pre noncompliance 
(-2, -1) 5.95 1.19 0.091 0.210 
(-1) 3.57 0 0.123 0.246 
Note     
This table reports accounting frauds occurrence of noncompliance and control samples by excluding ten 
accounting frauds-suspected noncompliance events. 
Accounting Frauds data is hand-collected from the violation of SEC’s accounting regulation, and provided by Karpoff et al. 
(2008a, 2008b) 
(-2, 2) is a five-year window centred on noncompliance beginning year with a coverage of preceding two years to 
subsequent two years. 
(-2, 1) is a four-year window centred on noncompliance beginning year with a coverage of preceding two years to 
subsequent one year. 
(-1, 1) is a three-year window centred on noncompliance beginning year with a coverage of preceding one year to 
subsequent one year. 
(0) is a one-year window covering noncompliance beginning year  
(1, 2) is a two-year window starting with one year after noncompliance beginning year to subsequent one year. 
(1) is a one-year window covering one year after the noncompliance beginning year. 
(-2, -1) is a two-year window covering two years proceeding to noncompliance beginning year. 












Appendix 153 MHbounds Test 
The treatment probability for individual i with observed characteristics Xi  can be written 
as P (Xi) = P (Di = 1 | xi) =  F (βXi + γui),  where  ui  is  the  unobserved  variable  and  γ 
is  the  effect  of  ui  on the treatment decision. Clearly, if there is no hidden bias, γ will 
be zero and the treatment probability will solely be determined by Xi. However, if hidden 
bias exists, two individuals with the same observed covariates X have differing chances of 
receiving treatment. Assume we have a matched pair of individuals i and j and further 






exp (𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾𝜇𝑖)
exp (𝛽𝑋𝑗 + 𝛾𝜇𝑗)
                                                                      (1) 
If both individuals have identical observed covariates - as implied by the matching 
procedure - the X-vector cancels out, implying that: 
exp (βXi + γμi)
exp (βXj + γμj)
= exp{γ(μi − μj)}                                               (2) 
Now, individuals i and j only differ in their odds of receiving treatment by a factor that 
involves the parameter γ and the difference in their unobserved covariates u. The odds 
ratio equals one if either (μi = μj) or (γ = 0), which implies there is no hidden bias or 
unobserved selection bias. 
Assume that the unobserved covariate is a dummy variable with μi ∈ (0,1), the bounds 
on the log-odds ratio that either of the two matched individuals will receive treatment 









pi × (1 − pj)
pj × (1 − pi)
 ≤ eγ                                                 (3) 
If we donate  Γ = 𝑒𝛾 , then both matched individuals have the same probability of 
treatment only if  Γ = 1. Else, if for example, Γ = 2, individuals who appear to be 
similar (in terms of X) may differ in their odds of receiving the treatment by as much 
as a factor of 2. In this sense, Γ is a measure of the degree of departure from the 
estimation that is free of hidden bias, which requires statistics that have desirable 
properties in this respect. For binary outcomes,  Aakvik (2001)  suggests using the 
Mantel and Haenszel (1959) test statistic, which compares the successful number of 
individuals in the treatment group against the same expected number, given the 
treatment effect is zero. The basic idea then is to increase the influence of Γ and see if 
inference from the test statistic is changed.  
Mantel–Haenszel test statistic can be written like this: 
                                                 
53 This section mainly relies on Becker and Caliendo (2007), Caliendo et al. (2005) and Peel and Makepeace 





















          (4) 
N1s and N0sare the numbers of treated and nontreated individuals in stratum S, where 
Ns = N0s + N1s. 𝑌1𝑠 and  𝑌0𝑠are the numbers of successful individuals in treated and 
nontreated groups in stratum 𝑆, and 𝑌𝑠 = 𝑌0𝑠 + 𝑌1𝑠. The 0.5 is subtracted as a continuity 
correction.  
For fixed  eγ > 1 and μi ∈ (0,1), Rosenbaum (2002) shows that the test-statistic 𝑄𝑀𝐻 
can be bounded by two known distributions. As noted already, if eγ = 1  the bounds 
are equal to the ‘base’ scenario of no hidden bias. With increasing  eγ, the bounds move 
apart reflecting uncertainty about the test-statistics in the presence of unobserved 
selection bias. Two scenarios are especially useful. Let 𝑄𝑀𝐻
+  be the test-statistic given 
that we have overestimated the treatment effect and 𝑄𝑀𝐻
−  the case where we have 








                                                      (5) 
𝑄𝑀𝐻
− =






                                                     (6) 
Where Es̃ and Var(Es̃) are the large sample approximations to the expectation and 
variance of the number of successful individuals in treated group when μ is binary and 















Appendix 2 Year-by-Year SEC’s Enforcement Actions 
Enforcement 
Actions by Fiscal 
Year 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Broker-Dealer 82 137 140 94 75 89 67 109 70 112 
Delinquent Fillings n/a n/a n/a n/a 91 52 113 92 106 121 
FCPA* n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 20 
Financial Frauds/ 
Issuer Disclosure** 
163 199 179 185 138 219 154 143 126 89 
Insider Trading 59 50 42 50 46 47 61 37 53 57 
Investment Adviser/ 
Investment Co. 
52 72 90 97 87 79 87 76 112 146 
Market 
Manipulation 
42 32 39 46 27 36 53 39 34 35 
Securities Offering 119 109 99 60 61 68 115 141 144 124 
Other 81 80 50 98 49 65 21 27 32 31 
Total Enforcement 
Actions 
598 679 639 630 574 655 671 664 677 735 
Notes:  
Data source: The SEC (2013) ‘Year-by-Year SEC Enforcement Statistics’. 
*Prior to Fiscal Year 2011, FCPA was not a distinct category and FCPA actions were classified as Issuer 
Reporting and Disclosure. 
**Prior to Fiscal Year 2011, this category was reported as Issuer Reporting and Disclosure and 





Chapter 4 Director Turnover Surrounding Securities Laws 
Violations  
4.1 Introduction 
Directors are expected to play a disciplining role in monitoring firm misconduct. 
The Ryan and Wiggins (2001) suggests, in their Principles of Corporate Governance 
Code, that directors ‘maintain an attitude of constructive skepticism; they ask incisive, 
probing questions and require accurate, honest answers; they act with integrity and 
diligence; and they demonstrate a commitment to the corporation, its business plans and 
long-term shareholder value’. The U.K. Corporate Governance Code states that 
directors are ‘responsible for the governance of their companies […] The 
responsibilities include […] supervising the management of the business […].’ 
(Fahlenbrach et al., 2015;Grossman and Hart, 1983).  
However, the likelihood that a director can play such a disciplining role is 
questionable. Although sitting on the board brings many benefits to directors, such as 
reputation, business connections, compensation and additional board appointments 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983;Lorsch and MacIver, 1990;Perry, 2000;Yermack, 2004), sitting 
on the board of a firm that is involved in misconduct can impose costs on a director in 
several ways. For instance, they may face an increased workload; suffer the potential 
loss of their board seat if they disagree with the management; experience significant 
reputational loss once the problems are revealed; and even be named as a defendant if 
the company is involved in a lawsuit. Therefore, an important question to ask is whether 
directors are likely to leave a firm to protect their reputation and minimize costs if the 
management commences misconduct.  
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Extant research documents that directors of firms filing for bankruptcy (Gilson, 
1990), or involved in earnings restatements (Srinivasan, 2005), class action lawsuits 
(Langevoort, 2007), financial frauds (Fich and Shivdasani, 2007), internal control 
deficiencies (Johnstone et al., 2011), and stock-option backdating (Bereskin and Smith, 
2014), experience increased risk of turnover and a reduction in the likelihood of 
securing future board seats. Their evidence is based on the public announcement or 
revelation of, rather than the commencement of, the negative events. Given the time 
point upon which they focus, it is difficult to get any indication of whether or not 
directors are present to play the disciplining role, and how internal governance 
mechanisms work when management start to engage in misconduct, for several reasons.  
First, once a negative event is announced, it is most likely that a firm will be 
exposed to external governance systems, and it will be impossible to either manifest 
directors’ concern over the underlying problem of the firm or observe their reaction to 
it, since their decisions will now be under pressure from external sources such as 
regulatory, market or media pressure. Second, other unidentified effects might 
confound the observed effects if research is based on the revelation date. As depicted in 
Karpoff et al. (2008), there are several important points in time along the timeline of a 
regulatory event (in their discussion, a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
Enforcement Action – see Figure 1), such as the trigger date, the informal investigation 
date and the formal investigation date. It is possible that a director might react to any of 
the three information events rather than just the announcement event;1 therefore, the 
observed effects around the announcement date might be confounded by other 
unidentified events. 
                                                 
1  Some negative events may not involve regulatory interference, such as some of the financial 
restatements and the disclosure of internal control weaknesses, but relevant research on these events also 
focuses mainly on the announcement date. 
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In contrast to the extant research on the association between director turnover 
and negative events, which focuses mainly on the ex-post effects of negative events on 
director turnover, this study focuses on the time horizon of the start of firm misconduct, 
and aims to explore directors’ reactions to being confronted with it. Given the 
importance of the principal-agent relationship in modern corporations, this investigation 
helps us to understand whether or not a board of directors has the chance to play the 
expected disciplining role while management is doing wrong in the first place; and it 
contributes to our understanding of how internal corporate governance mechanisms 
work when management needs to be monitored intensively. 
A small but growing body of literature has tried to unscramble internal 
governance mechanisms around firms’ negative events and analyse the predictability of 
director departure for negative events (see, for example, Agrawal and Chen, 2011;Bar-
Hava et al., 2013). A piece of research closely related to mine is that of Fahlenbrach et 
al. (2015) who propose that outside directors have incentives to quit ahead of troubles, 
when they anticipate that the firm on whose board they sit is going to disclose adverse 
news. However, my research contributes to the understanding of internal governance 
mechanism whereas their contribution lies mainly in the area of external governance 
mechanisms. They aim to examine whether directors anticipate trouble and leave firms 
before they are affected. However, they examine the occurrence of negative events 
following director departure, and the identification of negative events is based on the 
announcement dates or publicly filed dates rather than the commencement of the 
troubles for the firms. Thus, the incentive or pressure for a director to leave most likely 
comes from external forces such as regulators, media press or market force, rather than 
concerns over the underlying problem or misconduct of the firm. Therefore, their 
conclusions are more useful for interpreting the director labour market, while the 
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inferences that can be drawn about directors’ attitudes towards misconduct per se, and 
the monitoring mechanism of internal governance, are limited. By focusing on the time 
point of the commencement of management misconduct, my paper is original in that it 
looks at whether there is an abnormal director turnover rate around the start of the 
misconduct period, to help us understand the presence of directors and whether they 
play the expected disciplining role when they are confronted with a serious principal-
agent issue.  
I exploit a unique setting in which the SEC implemented enforcement actions 
for firms that had not complied with security laws or regulations, to explore directors’ 
reaction to the misconduct of firms, surrounding the commencement of the problems. 
The time point of the commencement of noncompliance in my sample is identified by 
enforcement actions brought by the SEC. Corresponding to the timeline in Figure 1, the 
violation start date is the focus of my study. Focusing on this date has the advantages 
of possibly avoiding the ex-post intervention of external forces and other confounding 
events during the regulatory process, and public disclosure since most regulatory 
investigations and media attention will not occur until the misconduct has been 
underway for a while. 
I predict that, other things equal, directors have strong incentives to leave 
noncompliant firms around the beginning of the violation period, and that the departure 
is likely even without intervention from external forces. Those incentives include 
concerns about the increased workload necessary to prevent the firm from committing 
fraud, the possibility of being entangled in the misconduct and the consequent 
involvement in lawsuits, the potential damage to their reputation once the misconduct 




However, there are doubts about whether directors can detect and respond to 
fraudulent behaviour at the point when this behaviour first begins. In particular, given 
the time point of focus in my study, there is less chance for potential information from 
external forces to help a director anticipate negative events. If they can perceive the 
upcoming problems, there must be private information channels that enable them to see 
the warning signs of the misconduct. To relax this ‘private information’ restriction, I 
identify two event dates to examine my prediction. The first one is the original 
noncompliance start date. The second is a shifted event date, an arbitrary number of 
days after the start of the violation period but before the violation becomes public. Given 
that focusing on this date allows violation to get underway for a period of time and 
possibly excludes the effects of a public announcement, the results will help to indicate 
whether a director might detect and respond to fraudulent behaviour through private 
information channels.  
I find that, in general, firms not complying with securities laws (noncompliant 
firms) have a significantly higher director turnover rate around the start of 
noncompliance than control firms. Noncompliant firms are also more likely to have 
unexpectedly departing directors around the time of the start of noncompliance. 
However, when outside directors are examined separately, significantly higher director 
turnover is observed only for the pre-noncompliance period and not for the post-
noncompliance period. These results suggest that directors are more likely to leave a 
firm when they perceive wrongdoing, while outside directors tend to leave before they 
could possibly be involved in the firm’s wrongdoing.  
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, to my knowledge, 
this is the first study to focus on the time surrounding the commencement of 
noncompliance rather than the announcement or revelation of a negative event. It 
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extends the research that investigates negative events and director behaviour. Second, 
it contributes to our understanding of the internal governance mechanism between 
management and boards of directors, especially enhancing our observation of directors 
when a firm fails to comply with applicable regulations, laws or rules. Third, I exploit 
a unique data setting, i.e. the SEC’s non-accounting enforcement actions, to explore 
directors’ reaction to firms’ negative events. I then assemble a hand-collected corporate 
governance dataset for these noncompliant firms and their compliant propensity-score-
matched control firms. By applying comprehensive non-accounting data, I am less 
concerned about the capacity for generalizing the conclusion. Finally, my findings also 
have some policy implications. Dimmock and Gerken (2012) argue that there are 
shortcomings in the current governance system, wherein the majority of decisions 
regarding the fiduciary duty doctrine have developed in the director context but not on 
the exact nature and scope of officers’ fiduciary duties. Consistent with this argument, 
my findings suggest that directors tend not to fulfil their expected disciplining role when 
they are confronted with management misconduct. To prevent firms from misconduct, 
it might be more efficient to hold misbehaving managers accountable rather than 
emphasize directors’ disciplining role. 
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 4.2, I review the literature 
and develop my hypothesis. Section 4.3 provides a description of the sample, data and 
methodology employed in the analysis. Section 4.4 presents and discusses the results of 
the empirical tests on the relationship between director turnover and noncompliance. 
Section 4.5 examines and demonstrates several alternative explanations. Section 4.6 
concludes the chapter.  
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4.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
While directorships provide substantial benefits to directors, there are also 
innate incentives and external forces encouraging them to stop serving on boards. Prior 
research has uncovered several determinants of director departure. For example, 
director turnover is more likely to be associated with negative stock returns (Yermack, 
2004;Bar-Hava et al., 2013;Fahlenbrach et al., 2015); it tends to be the result of power 
struggles between management and director (Agrawal and Chen, 2011); it could be 
determined by directors’ time and energy constraints (Masulis and Mobbs, 2014) and 
other directorship commitments (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006); a firm’s poor operating 
performance, poor compensation and high risk are also found to affect director turnover 
(Bar-Hava et al., 2013;Asthana and Balsam, 2010).  
A stream of research has investigated how negative corporate events impact 
director turnover. Results are mixed. Agrawal et al. (1999) examine a sample of firms 
that were charged with or suspected of fraud. They compare those firms that had 
committed fraud with a matched control sample, and find no evidence that firms that 
commit fraud experience higher director turnover. Using a sample of firms with 
litigation filings, Fich and Shivdasani (2007) also find no association between the 
revelation of fraud and director turnover, though they find that directors at firms that 
have committed fraud are more likely to lose their directorships at other firms. Similarly, 
Ertimur et al. (2012) find weak evidence of an association between director turnover 
and the announcement of firms’ option backdating. 
In contrast, Johnstone et al. (2011) report a positive association between the 
revelation of a material weakness in internal control and director turnover.Fahlenbrach 
et al. (2015) find that surprise director departure is more likely to be followed by the 
announcement of financial restatement, a security class action lawsuit or a relatively 
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poor merger and acquisition. Srinivasan (2005) finds that firms reporting income-
decreasing restatements have higher director turnover than firms with income-
increasing restatements and those with technical restatements. 
Whether or not these studies find negative events to have an impact on director 
turnover, their findings are all based on the revelation, disclosure or announcement of 
the events. There are two potential concerns about this focus. First, since the revelation 
of these events is usually preceded by a long period of investigation, 2 it is possible that 
directors have taken action during the investigation period or even before the 
investigation when they anticipated it. As we can see from Figure 1, there are three 
important information events, i.e. the trigger date, informal investigation date and 
formal investigation date, after a violation of regulation or laws but before the 
announcement of the initial regulatory proceeding. This indicates that most of the 
research applying a negative event setting will potentially face problems in identifying 
the right event date. For example, as analysed by Karpoff et al. (2014), the initial dates 
associated with the events included in four popular databases (GAO, AA, SCAC, and 
AAER) 3  occur an average of 150 to 1,017 calendar days after the initial public 
disclosure of the financial misconduct.4 Therefore, there could be confounding factors 
if identifying director turnover surrounding negative event disclosure dates.  
                                                 
2 My untabulated results show that the average number of days between the end of noncompliance and 
the first enforcement action releases is 841, while the average length of time between noncompliance 
start and the first enforcement action releases is about 5.2 years. Similarly, Agrawal and Cooper (2014) 
document that the average (median) number of days between the first day of the quarter that is restated 
and the restatement announcement date is 733 days (586 days). 
3 GAO refers the Government Accountability Office’s database of restatements; AA refers to Audit 
Analytics’s database of restatements; SCAC refers to the Securities Class Action Clearinghouse database 
of securities class action lawsuits; AAERs refers to the SEC’s Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Releases. 
4 Those initial revelation announcements could include the announcement of regulatory proceedings by 
regulators, the announcement of internal investigations, the revelation of SEC investigations of 




Second, director turnover around the revelation of negative events is more likely 
to be driven by external forces, such as regulatory, market or media pressure. Public 
announcement dates are often preceded by several other dates on which the public 
initially becomes aware of the ongoing negative events through other channels, such as 
media coverage and investigation announcements (Karpoff et al., 2014). This puts 
external pressure on directors, which might drive their departure. Therefore, research 
focusing on such dates might be helpful for our understanding of external governance 
mechanisms and the director labour market, but is constrained in terms of generating 
inferences about directors’ response to management misconduct when the misconduct 
is actually ongoing.  
Prior research shows that allegations of misconduct result in significant 
penalties in the form of losses in the value of a firm’s equity (Murphy et al., 2009). 
Given the important role that a director is expected to play in disciplining managers, it 
is surprising that there is little research analysing directors’ presence surrounding the 
time at which the misconduct first starts. In this chapter, I focus on the time point of the 
start of firm misconduct and aim to explore the presence of directors when they are 
confronted with the misconduct. I hypothesize that, other things equal, directors have 
strong incentives to leave noncompliant firms around the beginning of the violation 
period, and that the departure is likely even without intervention from external forces. 
There are three main arguments supporting my conjecture. 
The first is that directors have strong incentives to maintain high reputations. 
Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) posit that directors have a primary incentive 
to preserve and enhance their reputations as experts in decision control and monitoring 
in the labour market, and that the market prices their services according to their 
performance as referees. Directors’ reputations will be harmed by being associated with 
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negative events, manifesting in a reduction in the current or future board seats (see, for 
examples, Srinivasan, 2005;Fich and Shivdasani, 2007;Fahlenbrach et al., 2015). If 
directors are serving on a board when the management is committing fraud, they may 
also be exposed to liability risk due to being involved in the misconduct or breaching 
their fiduciary duties in terms of monitoring. Brochet and Srinivasan (2014) show that 
about 11% of independent directors were named as defendants in a sample of securities 
class action lawsuits from 1996 to 2010. Therefore, to maintain reputation and avoid 
litigation risk, a director has an incentive to quit the board as soon as he/she notices that 
the firm is involved in wrongdoing. 
The second argument is that a director may want to quit the board of a firm with 
troubles if there is a significant increase in their workload. For example, Vafeas (1999) 
demonstrates that the frequency of board meetings increases following poor stock 
returns. Most directors have heavy demands on their time, and they make strategic 
decisions on where to spend their limited time and energy (Masulis and Mobbs, 2014). 
Given the directors’ dual role as advisers as well as monitors of management, a firm’s 
management face a trade-off in disclosing information to the board: if they reveal 
information, they receive better advice; however, an informed board will also monitor 
them more intensively (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). Therefore, when managers want to 
conduct wrongdoing, they are more likely to hide information and engage in a range of 
signal-jamming strategies, which makes scrutiny more difficult (González et al., 2014). 
In that case, if directors want to monitor effectively, they will need to invest more 
energy and time in obtaining the right information due to the information barrier set up 
by the management. Moreover, directors face not only a significant increase in their 
workload, but also a high risk of a loss of reputation should they not be able to turn 
things around when the firm has been guilty of misconduct.  
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Third, a director tends to lose the directorship if she/he disputes the management. 
Agrawal and Chen (2011) analyse cases in which management and directors disagreed 
and directors left amidst dispute, and conclude that the conflicts appeared to be power 
struggles between the management and directors. Furthermore, according to Marshall 
(2010), a director who leaves a firm amid a dispute tends to suffer a net loss of board 
seats at other firms. Therefore, instead of challenging management, a director might be 
more likely to leave the firm.  
Overall, I expect that these concerns about reputational cost, litigation risk, 
increased workload, and the consequence of disputing the management provide strong 
incentives for directors to leave firms that are guilty of misconduct. Therefore, I 
hypothesize that, other things equal, directors have strong incentives to leave 
noncompliant firms around the beginning of the violation period, and that departure is 
likely even without intervention from external forces.  
Further, I expect that higher director turnover rates in noncompliant firms could 
occur prior to the start of noncompliance, for the following reasons. Directors may want 
to quit ahead of any problems, since their reputation will be contaminated, the litigation 
risk will be increased, and their workload will rise if they are sitting on the board while 
the management is committing fraud. This would be the dark side of the directors if 
they depart when the firms need them the most. Fahlenbrach et al. (2015) find evidence 
that outside directors are more likely to leave before bad news is announced, and the 
evidence is consistent with a scenario in which the independent director anticipates 
deteriorating performance at the firm and leaves to protect her reputation or because she 
anticipates a significantly higher workload. Asthana and Balsam (2010) also find that 
independent directors are more likely to resign when they expect a company to run into 
financial difficulties in the future. In my data setting, by focusing on internal governance 
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mechanism, I want to test whether the dark-side incentives that drive directors’ 
departure prior to negative events exist or not. 
Fahlenbrach et al. (2015) use restatement announcements and class action 
lawsuits publicly filed during the 12 months following directors’ departure dates (or the 
annual meeting dates, whichever are available) to explore directors’ predictions of and 
reactions to firms’ negative events. However, a concern about their research design, 
which they acknowledge in their paper, is that directors who resign before a litigation 
or an earnings restatement could still see their reputations affected and even possibly 
suffer pecuniary losses and litigation risks, because quitting the board before 
noncompliance is revealed does not protect them from lawsuits if the misconduct 
occurred during their time on the board. Dou (2014) provides evidence to suggest that 
abandoning a firm before the disclosure of a negative event might not be a wise choice 
for a director since the penalties in the labour market for directors who leave are even 
higher than those for directors who remain. Therefore, the natural and rational response 
from directors should be to depart before they could possibly be entangled in the 
wrongdoing. However, in my data setting, in which I test this dark-side incentive prior 
to noncompliance, the key question that must be asked is whether directors can perceive 
upcoming wrongdoing that has probably not yet happened. 
Anecdotal evidence indicates that concerns over future noncompliance could be 
the reason for directors’ resignations. Two examples of reasons that directors gave for 
their resignation, which were disclosed publically in firms’ 8-K filings, reflect this 
incentive. One example is as follows: 
‘I hereby resign as a Director of Fair, Isaac effective immediately. I am 
resigning because I disagree with the rest of the Board's willingness to 
grant 100,000 stock options to Tom Grudnowski in fiscal 2001. This was 
an incorrect decision for two principal reasons. First, the Company's 1992 
Long-Term Incentive Plan limits the number of options which may be 
granted to any one employee to 50,000 a year. While it may be legal to 
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grant Mr. Grudnowski 100,000 options, doing so would violate the spirit 
of the agreement among the Company, the Board and the shareholders 
embodied in the plan…’.5 
Another example states that:  
 ‘Upon deliberation, I have decided to resign from the office of Chairman 
of the Board of Directors of AcuNetx, Inc., and as a member of the Board 
itself. My resignations will be effective immediately […] I have 
endeavored to coordinate and mediate concensus on the issues 
confronting us from time to time […] It does not work when the Board 
decides that it will not and cannot yet be fully Sarbanes-Oxley compliant, 
but allows the C.E.O. to announce to its shareholders that it will be 
Sarbanes-Oxley compliant and then reacts angrily when the Chairman 
notes that paying consulting fees to the Compensation Committee 
Chairman would be a violation of Sarbanes-Oxley…’.6  
 
Empirical evidence also shows that directors have a range of strategies for 
keeping themselves informed, such as taking the initiative to ask the CEO questions, 
accessing executives, seeking a second opinion, checking the reliability of information 
(Nowak and McCabe, 2003), and using insiders as an additional source of information 
for the board (Raheja, 2005). Since directors are privy to private information, it is 
reasonable to assume that they are able, at least, to sense any wrong tone from the top 
and to judge the internal control system. Meanwhile, managers are more likely to 
engage in a range of signal-jamming strategies when they have something to hide 
(González et al., 2014), which could further warn the directors of potential 
noncompliance. Therefore, they may make a decision to leave the board before serious 
noncompliance issues emerge.  
4.3 Sample Construction and Research Design7 
To explore the association between director turnover and firm misconduct, I 
hand-collect a dataset of cases of the SEC implementing enforcement actions for firms 
                                                 
5 Data source: the Form 8-K disclosed by the company on the SEC’s electronic filing system (EDGAR) on June 1, 
2001. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/814547/000095000501500212/0000950005-01-500212.txt 
6 Data source: the Form 8-K disclosed by the company on EDGAR on 5th May, 2006. 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1097575/000101968706001061/0001019687-06-001061.txt 
7 This section includes some discussion similar to that in Chapters 2 and 3, when necessary to ensure the 
integrity of this chapter. Data collection on noncompliance with securities laws or regulations is the same 
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that violated securities laws or regulations. This setting of noncompliance with 
securities laws provides several advantages for the investigation of my research 
question.  
First, noncompliance with securities laws is an influential component among all 
types of firm misconduct. Most of the common misconduct that leads to SEC 
investigations involves the related parties, such as investors and consumers, who do 
business with the violating firm, which means there is a directly-related party whose 
benefits will be damaged by this violating behaviour. 8   Relative to other types of 
misconduct which do not directly affect the parties with whom the firm does business 
(such as violation of environmental laws), the related parties’ misconduct usually 
triggers a larger loss of firm value (Karpoff and Lott, 1993;Karpoff, 2012;Murphy et 
al., 2009).9 Therefore, investors as well as directors have major concerns over the firm 
when it is not complying with securities laws. 
Second, identifying firm misconduct from external regulators gives the 
confidence that my research has a low Type I error rate.10 This means firms without 
violations are less likely to be falsely included in my sample as noncompliant firms. 
Identifying firms from other sources or modelling firms’ likelihood of committing fraud 
                                                 
as that in Chapter 2, but I have added some discussion on data fitting for my research question in this 
chapter. The strategy and method for identifying the control sample is similar to that in Chapter 3; 
however, there is a second propensity score matching process, given the data availability on corporate 
governance in the control sample.  
8 Common conduct that may lead to SEC investigations include: (1) misrepresentation or omission of 
important information about securities; (2) manipulating the market prices of securities; (3) stealing 
customers' funds or securities; (4) violating broker-dealers' responsibility to treat customers fairly; (5) 
insider trading (violating a trust relationship by trading while in possession of material, non-public 
information about a security); and (6) selling unregistered securities. Resources come from the SEC’s 
website: http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml.  
9 By reviewing different types of firms’ noncompliance behavior, Karpoff (2012) concludes that the loss 
of market value far exceeds direct costs such as fines, penalties, and lawsuit settlements for some types 
of misconduct, which impose cost on their counterparties such as investors, employees, customers, 
suppliers, etc. However, for some other types of misconduct, which does not directly affect the parties 
with whom the firm does business, such as environmental violation, there appear to be small or negligible 
losses on top of the cost imposed by regulators and courts.  
10  Dechow et al. (2010) reason the pros and cons by using the SEC’s Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Releases (AAERs) as a proxy for earnings quality.  The same analogy applies in my setting.  
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has more chance of incorporating Type I errors. Meanwhile, the SEC has resource 
constraints which will lead to its enforcement decisions against the firms most likely 
guilty of serious misconduct, not the ones with insignificant effects on the related parties. 
This provides a powerful setting to examine directors’ behaviour more clearly when 
they are confronted with severe principal-agent problems. Furthermore, the SEC’s 
website provides comprehensive information on firms’ noncompliance with security 
regulations and it is publicly available.11  
Third, the SEC has the same regulatory power towards all registrants regardless 
of industry or size, which provides a good chance to generalize the conclusion from this 
study. In contrast, other types of misconduct do not have a universal regulator because 
the regulatory framework to which firms are subject also depends on which industry 
they operate in and what products they are producing. For instance, noncompliance with 
environmental regulation is mainly from the utilities and manufacturing sectors while 
noncompliance with product quality standards (measured by product recalls) varies with 
different products. Therefore, conclusions from identified misconduct from these 
specific settings might be hard to generalize. 
There are three major stages for my data collection and sample construction. 
Collecting data on securities laws violation from the SEC’s website is the first stage. I 
then match each noncompliant firm with a firm without a noncompliance issue to 
construct a control sample by a propensity score matching (PSM) method to make sure 
noncompliant and compliant firms are as similar as possible regarding the observable 
factors that affect a firm’s misconduct and director turnover. Then I hand collect 
corporate governance data for both the noncompliance sample and control sample from 
                                                 
11 The detailed discussion of securities laws noncompliance data is provided in Chapter 2. 
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each firm’s proxy statements or 10-Ks and 10KSBs (in the case of small business issuers) 
when proxy statements are not available.12 
4.3.1 Noncompliance with Securities Laws13 
I collect information on noncompliance with securities laws using SEC 
enforcement actions. In the case of noncompliance, there are two types of action that 
the SEC can take: Federal Court Actions (civil actions) and Administrative Proceedings. 
The former are litigation releases concerning civil lawsuits brought by the SEC in a 
federal court, while the latter are orders and related materials released by the SEC when 
it brings non-judicial actions before an administrative-law judge. The SEC’s decision 
to bring a civil action or administrative action may depend upon the type of sanction or 
relief that is being sought.14 When the misconduct warrants it, the SEC can bring both 
types of proceedings. The SEC maintains an online publicly available database on 
litigation releases (hereinafter ‘LR’) and administrative proceedings (hereinafter ‘AP’) 
in the form of annual archives from 1995 onwards. I use this database to identify 
noncompliant firms (Please refer to Chapter 2 for information on sample selection). 15 
My sample includes enforcement actions brought by the SEC from 2003 to 2012. 
The data collection process for noncompliance events consists of five steps. The final 
                                                 
12 Originally, I tried to employ BoardEx or Riskmetrics’s corporate governance data instead of hand 
collection. However, only approximately 20% of my firms are covered by BoardEx. This is not a surprise 
because BoardEx initiated coverage of director and executive data for fewer than 100 U.S. companies in 
1999. It has increased its coverage over time. The first main expansion of the database in 2000 added 
more than 1,500 large U.S. companies. The second expansion in 2003 added more than 2,000 companies 
(Chidambaran et al., 2010). My noncompliance events start from 1986, and over half of them are before 
2003, therefore, I did not find a good coverage from BoardEx. Similarly, Riskmetic’s data does not have 
a good coverage of my sample either. 
13  The full discussion of the noncompliance dataset is presented in Chapter 2. For the purpose of 
maintaining integrity and applicability, I repeat or rephrase some of the discussion in this chapter.  
14 For example, the Commission may bar someone from the brokerage industry in an administrative 
proceeding, but an order barring someone from acting as a corporate officer or director must be obtained 
in the federal court (SEC: http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml#.UyrILqh_uE4). 
15 There are two additional types of enforcement actions: opinions issued by Administrative Law Judges 
in contested administrative proceedings (ALJ Decisions) and opinions issued by the Commission on 
Appeal of Initial Decisions or disciplinary decisions issued by self-regulatory organizations such as 
NYSE or NASD (Commission Opinions). Since these two types of actions are not original enforcement 
actions related to firm misconduct, I do not include them in my sample. 
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sample incorporates 126 noncompliance events for 123 noncompliant firms. Please see 
more detailed description of this data-collecting process in Chapter 2. Table 1 describes 
the process of identifying relevant releases and final sample. 
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the noncompliance events and firms. 
Panel A describes the distribution of the 126 noncompliance events across calendar 
years based on the violation-beginning years and violation-ending years. Relatively few 
noncompliance events commenced prior to 1995 and after 2009 in my sample. However, 
this does not necessarily mean noncompliance rarely happened in these years. Since my 
sample collection covers releases filed from 2003 through 2012, it is likely that 
noncompliance events occurring before 2003 were filed in years prior to 2003, thus not 
included in my sample. Likewise noncompliance events that commenced in more recent 
years have not yet been investigated by the SEC, and are thus not included in my sample. 
The period from 1999 through 2003 includes the commencement of more than half 
(59.5%) of the noncompliance events. 
Panel B in Table 2 reports the industry distribution of the 123 noncompliant 
firms based on the industry classification scheme in Frankel et al. (2002) and Dechow 
et al. (2011). Noncompliant firms cluster in certain industries. For example, 57.73% of 
the noncompliant firms come from three industries: Durable Manufacturers (21.14%), 
Banks & Insurance (20.33%), and Computers (16.26%). Since Banks & Insurance have 
20.13% proportion of COMPUSTAT population, this industry is not overrepresented in 
the noncompliance sample. However, both Durable Manufacturers and Computers 
compose only approximately 11% of the population on COMPUSTAT whereas their 
noncompliance rates are relatively higher. Meanwhile, Chemicals also has a higher 
noncompliance rate relative to its representation in the COMPUSTAT population.  
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Table 3 reports summarized characteristics for the 126 (123) noncompliance 
events (noncompliant firms). Panel A shows that approximately 60% of the 
noncompliance events have a violation period of less than 1,000 days while about 25% 
of the events have a duration between 1,000 days and 2,000 days. The mean (median) 
of the noncompliance event duration is 1,052 (653) days. Four acts form the basis for 
the SEC‘s investigations: the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, the Investment Company Act of 1940, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. 
Noncompliance events can involve multiple acts and multiple subsections under one act. 
Table 3, Panel B reports the distribution of violation events by securities acts. Most of 
the violation events involve the Securities Act of 1933 (45.2%) and Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (85.7%). As shown in Panel C of Table 3, the mean (median) 
noncompliance event involves 2.44 (1.59) subsections of securities laws, and 42 events 
involve violations of a single subsection while the highest number of subsection 
violations is 8 (three cases). Panel D shows that 62.61% of the noncompliance events 
involve CEO and/or president, and 18.26% also involve other top management. The 
cases that involve CFO and general counsel/compliance officer count for 16.52% and 
13.04%, respectively. 
4.3.2 Identifying a Control Sample for Noncompliant Firms 
My sample of noncompliant firms is based on observed, noncompliant 
behaviour, which creates a risk of selection bias because firms’ noncompliance is a 
strategic choice that management make after weighing the costs and benefits (Robinson 
et al., 2011). A challenge in observational studies is that, while treated outcomes are 
observed, we cannot observe what the outcomes would have been in the untreated state 
(i.e. the absence of counterfactuals). This problem means that researchers are unable to 
compare the outcome difference between being treated and untreated for a given firm 
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to evaluate the effects of treatment (for more details, see Peel and Makepeace, 
2012;Tucker, 2010).  
In an approach that is similar to the one implemented in Chapter 3, I apply 
propensity score matching (PSM) to identify control firms, and implement several tests 
to examine covariate balance, which is one very important precondition for the validity 
of PSM. In my matching model, PSM is based on one-one nearest neighbour match 
with common and without replacement. 
In terms of the specification of the PSM model, the selection of variables is a 
trade-off between efficiency and bias. 16  Since my noncompliance sample is small 
relative to the control population, it is important not to over-parameterize the model. 
Therefore, I only incorporate the factors predicted to affect both the noncompliance 
decision and director turnover. Masulis and Mobbs (2014) find that firm size is a natural 
source of directors’ reputation incentives. Therefore, it has a large effect on the supply 
of outside director services. Financial distress, firm performance and leverage have also 
been found to influence directorship (see, for examples, Gilson, 1990;Yermack, 
2004;Fich and Shivdasani, 2007;Johnstone et al., 2011;Fahlenbrach et al., 2015). 
Similarly, these factors have also been found to influence the probability of firm 
misconduct, the occurrence of lawsuits, and the quality of internal control (e.g. Dechow 
et al., 2011;Kedia and Rajgopal, 2011;Doyle et al., 2007;Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 
2007;Thevenot, 2012;Files, 2012;Rice and Weber, 2012;Nagy, 2010). Prior research 
also documents a positive association between litigation exposure and auditors’ 
incentives to provide high audit quality (Schwartz and Soo, 1996;Khurana and Raman, 
2004;Venkataraman et al., 2008). I also incorporate firm age into the model because a 
                                                 
16 Please refer to the discussion in Chapter 3 for model specification when applying PSM. 
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firm’s operating history is often treated as a financing risk factor (see, for example, 
Hanley and Hoberg, 2012).  




) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖+𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖 +
                                       𝛽5𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌,                     (1) 
where 𝑝𝑖 is the latent probability that firm 𝑖 fails to comply with securities laws (𝑦𝑖=1). 
The vector of explanatory variables in equation (1) is calculated at year 𝑡 . The 
definitions of the explanatory variables are as follows: 𝑅𝑂𝐴 is operating income divided 
by total assets (COMPUSTAT item OIBDP/AT); 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 is the natural log of market 
capitalization (outstanding common stock times year-end share price (COMPUSTAT 
items CSHO ∗ PRCC_F); 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 is the sum of debt in current liabilities and long-
term debt divided by total assets (COMPUSTAT items (DLC + DLTT)/AT); 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 is 
an indicator variable taking a value of 1 if Income Before Extraordinary Items 
(COMPUSTAT item IB ) is less than zero, and 0 otherwise; 𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑁  is an indicator 
variable taking a value of 1 if the firm engages a Big Five auditor, and 0 otherwise 
(COMPUSTAT item AU); 𝐴𝐺𝐸 is the natural log of firm age (calculated as the number 
of years to date that the firm has appeared on COMPUSTAT). I also include year and 
industry indicators in the regression to control for differences in securities law 
noncompliance over time and across industries. Tables 4 and 5 report the results from 
the logistic regression for PSM and the covariate balancing tests, respectively.  
Table 4, Panel A reports parameter estimates and summary statistics for the 
logistic noncompliance model used to generate propensity scores for matching. The 
results are consistent with prior research. Coefficient estimates reveal that firms are 
more likely to violate securities laws if they are larger (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸), performing poorly (𝑅𝑂𝐴), 
audited by small auditors ( 𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑁 ), and are young ( 𝐴𝐺𝐸 ). The marginal effects 
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(calculated as proportionate change in implied probability) reported alongside the 
coefficients quantify the economic effect for each covariate. The probability of 
noncompliance declines by 10% when 𝑅𝑂𝐴 increases from its first quartile to third 
quartile and all remaining covariates are set to their median value. The probability of 
noncompliance with securities laws increases by 108% when 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸  (logarithm of 
market capitalization) increases from first quartile to third quartile and decreases by 58% 
for a comparable increase in 𝐴𝐺𝐸  (logarithm of firm age). The probability of 
noncompliance with securities laws is almost 50% lower for firms with BIG 5 auditors. 
These effects are also statistically significant at the 1% level. Consistent with Panel B 
of Table 2, untabulated results also demonstrate that industries have uneven 
probabilities to violate securities laws. The Pseudo R2 of the logistic regression is 14% 
and the likelihood ratio chi-square of it is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Panel B of Table 4 reports the distribution of propensity scores for the securities 
laws noncompliance sample and the entire control group population prior to matching. 
Comparing the two distributions reveals that noncompliant firms and control firms 
differ significantly in their probabilities of noncompliance before matching.  
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 report the means of the covariates for the 
noncompliance group and the control group, respectively. Column (5) presents the 
standardized bias for each covariate in the pre-matching and post-matching samples, 
while column (6) presents the percentage reduction in covariate bias. 17 The t-tests are 
the parametric tests of differences in the covariate means between the samples, while 
the Wilcoxon test provides nonparametric comparisons. The t-tests reveal that, 
while 𝑅𝑂𝐴, 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸, 𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑁, and 𝐴𝐺𝐸 differed across the two samples prior to the 
                                                 
17 For each covariate x, the standardized bias is defined as the difference between the sample means for 
the treatment and matched control samples, as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample 
variances of the two samples. 
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matching, subsequent to matching the means are not statistically different. I follow Peel 
and Makepeace (2012) in considering standardized biases of less than ±10% after 
matching as acceptable, although the lower is the post-matching bias of each covariate, 
the better. All the covariates meet this criterion after matching, with the exception of 
AGE, which has a standardized bias of -20.6%. However, because AGE is the natural 
log of firm age, what I really want to achieve through this matching is that firm age is 
indifferent between noncompliant and control firms. I, therefore, recheck the 
differences in firm age between the after-matched two groups. Columns (9) to (11) show 
that the mean of differences in ages of paired noncompliant and control firms is as small 
as -0.309, and it is statistically insignificant. This indicates that my matching quality is 
good regarding all the variables incorporated in the model. 
The pseudo-R2s before and after matching are 0.138 and 0.046, respectively, 
indicating that the covariates explain the participation probability well before matching. 
After matching, there should be no systematic differences in the distribution of 
covariates between the two samples, and therefore the pseudo-R2 should be low 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Furthermore, the likelihood ratio tests on the joint 
significance of all regressors in the logistic model are not rejected prior to matching but 
are rejected after the matching has been implemented. This also suggests that the 
matching quality is good. The Wilcoxon test provides similar evidence.  
Collectively, the results in Table 5 demonstrate a substantial reduction in the 
differences between the pre-matched samples, providing confidence that the impact of 




4.3.3 Corporate Governance Data Collection 
Information on corporate governance for each noncompliant firm and its paired 
control firm is manually collected from proxy statements, or Form 10Ks or 10KSBs 
(Form 10KSBs in the case of small business issuers) when a proxy statement is not 
available. I extract corporate governance data for five years, centred on the start year of 
the noncompliance period. 
I use the director’s status on the board indicated in the proxy statements of 
consecutive years to identify director turnover for the years of my sample period.18 
Besides director turnover metrics, I also gather information on both individual 
characteristics of directors and firm-level corporate governance characteristics. 
According to Yermack (2004) and Srinivasan (2005), director age, gender, tenure, 
membership of key committees and stock ownership are associated with director 
turnover. Therefore, for individual-level data, I gather information including age, 
gender, years on the board, stock ownership, whether the director is the CEO, 
chairperson, CFO, an executive or non-executive, a member of a key committee. In 
addition, directors with legal expertise might respond differently to noncompliance than 
those without such expertise, as their natural focus of attention and interest may lead 
them to have a particular perception of legal risk (Langevoort, 2007); therefore, I also 
collect data on whether a director has a legal background from the director profiles 
disclosed in the proxy statements. 
Firm-level corporate governance characteristics, such as board size and board 
structure, are widely discussed or controlled in previous research on corporate 
governance and director turnover (see, for example, Agrawal and Chadha, 
2005;Hazarika et al., 2012). Therefore, I also collect data on key committees’ sizes, the 
                                                 
18 Please see the next section for a detailed discussion on how I measure director turnover. 
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duality of CEO and chairperson, whether the board is staggered, the number of outside 
directors with financial expertise, and the percentage of company shares that all 
directors and officers beneficially own. I also look for whether the reason for leaving is 
identified as ‘DEATH’ or ‘HEALTH’, because this is helpful for identifying directors’ 
incentives for their departure. 
During this process of collection, four noncompliant firms are dropped from my 
sample due to unavailable corporate governance data, resulting in 90 noncompliant 
firms with corporate governance data. Among their 90 paired control firms, only 76 
have corporate governance data available. To minimize the loss of available 
observations, I select the second closest firm using PSM if the closest firm has no 
corporate governance data available, which provides 11 more control firms.19 Thus, my 
final sample for analysis consists of 90 unique noncompliant and 87 unique control 
firms. The difference in the numbers of noncompliant firms and control firms means 
that there are three noncompliant firms with no matched control firm in any year within 
the five years that I collect data for. I keep these three firms in the analysis within the 
noncompliance sample, but exclude them when running paired tests. Since firms may 
not have data available for every year within the five-year window, my final sample 
includes 810 firm-year observations (390 for the noncompliance sample and 420 for the 
control sample), and 6,293 firm-year-director observations (3,034 for the 
noncompliance sample and 3,259 for the control sample). Panel A of Table 6 records 
this sample construction process. 
Panel B of Table 6 provides summary statistics for the noncompliance sample 
and the control sample, and the differences in their respective governance 
characteristics. The summary statistics are at the firm-year level for the five-year 
                                                 
19 I checked several alternative measures for the covariates balancing test. Untabulated results showed 
that the covariates balancing condition still held. 
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window, and are separately reported by firm-level governance structure and firm-level 
director attributes in rows (1) and (2). Both my noncompliance sample and my control 
sample have relatively smaller board sizes (7.3 and 7.4, respectively) than those in 
Fahlenbrach et al. (2015) and Duchin et al. (2010) (who report figures of approximately 
9 and 9.5, respectively). This is not a surprise, because the datasets they employed were 
provided by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), which mainly covers 
large firms.20 Generally, row (1) of Panel B shows that noncompliant firms and control 
firms do not differ in terms of multiple important measures of governance structure, 
such as board size, duality of CEO and chairperson, whether board selection is staggered 
or not, whether the firm has three key committees (audit committee, compensation 
committee, and nomination committee), the sizes of the three key committees, and the 
percentage of company shares that all directors and officers beneficially own. 
As shown in the last column of Panel B in Table 6, regarding firm-level directors’ 
characteristics, the boards of the noncompliant firms and the control firms are similar 
in most of the attributes, including average age, number of outside directors with 
financial expertise, the number or percentage of directors with a legal background, and 
whether there is legal expertise on board. The noncompliant firms seem to be more 
likely to have a higher percentage of female directors and outside directors than the 
control firms. Furthermore, the median of the percentage of outside directors is 66.7% 
in both the noncompliance and control samples. Over half of the firms in both samples 
have no female directors. 
                                                 
20 The IRRC’s universe is drawn from the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 as well as the annual lists of the largest 
corporations in the publications of Fortune, Forbes, and Businessweek. The IRRC’s sample expanded by several 
hundred firms in 1998 through the addition of some smaller firms and firms with high institutional ownership levels 




However, it is interesting to see that the noncompliant firms are more likely to 
have CFOs on their boards than the control firms. This difference is also economically 
meaningful. As we can see from row (2), 25.8% of the noncompliant firms have CFOs 
on their boards, while only 14.5% of the control firms have this attribute. It seems 
reasonable that there would be this difference, because the management will usually 
need a CFO on the board to facilitate and conceal their misconduct. This is consistent 
with the evidence in Feng et al. (2011), showing that CFOs are involved in accounting 
fraud because they succumb to pressure from CEOs. In general, the results from Panel 
B of Table 6 confirm that the noncompliance sample is very similar to the control 
sample regarding not only the covariates from the PSM model but also the overall 
corporate governance arrangement.  
4.3.4 Directors’ Turnover Measures 
I first generate five key indicators to describe a director’s status regarding their 
directorship on a board. The status each year is judged based on the records in the proxy 
statements from the previous year and the current year.21 Using these indicators, I 
construct three sets of director turnover measures. The five key indicators are ‘staying’, 
‘newly joining’, ‘unnominated’, ‘departing’ and ‘unexpectedly departing’. Figure 2 
provides a description of these indicators.  
A director is defined as ‘staying’, with no change in their directorship, if they 
are listed in proxy statements of the previous year and the current year, and are defined 
as ‘newly joining’ if they were not listed in the proxy statement of the previous year but 
do appear in that of the current year. Likewise, if a director is listed in the current year’s 
proxy statement but is mentioned as not having been nominated for board election for 
the following year, they are defined as ‘unnominated’ in the current year. A director 
                                                 
21 Though the data are actually collected from proxy statements, 10Ks, and 10KSBs as appropriate, for 
the purpose of briefness, hereafter I will refer to the data source as proxy statements only. 
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who is not nominated is expected to leave the board in the next year. If a director was 
listed in the previous year’s proxy statement but is not listed in the current year’s, they 
are defined as a ‘departing’ director. Finally, if a director leaves during their serving 
year without being mentioned as not having been nominated in the previous year’s 
proxy statement, and if the departure is not due to death or retirement, they are defined 
as an ‘unexpectedly departing’ director. Note that these categories are not mutually 
exclusive. For example, ‘unexpectedly departing’ directors are a subset of ‘departing’ 
directors, and ‘unnominated’ directors are a subset of ‘staying’ directors.  
With these key indicators, I define three sets of director turnover measures. The 
first set of measures includes two variables: the number of departing directors and the 
number of unnominated directors, without differentiating outside from executive 
directors. It is meaningful to look at the two figures separately since the first measure 
captures the number of the directors who are not serving on the board any more, while 
the second measure captures the number of directors who are scheduled to leave the 
board. 
The second set of measures proxies for unexpected director turnover, again 
without differentiating outside from executive directors. Directors have incentives to 
leave firms when they perceive that the latter are likely to violate laws. Since the 
penalties in the labour market are even higher for directors who serve on boards during 
firms’ misconduct, but abandon their firms before the wrongdoing is detected, than for 
directors who remain during the negative events (Dou, 2014), it would be a rational 
choice for directors to leave risky firms as soon as possible, before potentially becoming 
entangled in the violations. Therefore, a direct test to examine whether directors 
anticipate and leave firms before they are affected by negative events can be run by 
using a proxy for unexpected or surprise departure. This is consistent with Fahlenbrach 
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et al. (2015) proposal, in which they focus mainly on surprise departures. Therefore, I 
investigate the unexpectedly departing directors’ turnover as well.  
I use a different method for identifying unexpected departures from that of 
Fahlenbrach et al. (2015). The latter have a large sample of director departures, and 
apply Cox proportional hazard regression to predict the survival function for a director, 
before using an arbitrary cutoff to estimate unexpected director turnover. I read through 
the proxy statements for consecutive years to identify unexpected departures. Usually, 
a firm informs investors well ahead of the normal expected departure date, by 
mentioning that the director is not nominated for board election for the following year. 
If there is no information to say that the director’s service on the board will cease in the 
following year, but then the director is not on the following year’s board, I identify this 
director’s departure as unexpected. This set of variables includes a measure for the 
number of unexpectedly departing directors, as well as an indicator variable for them.  
There is a trend of corporate governance reform that emphasizes the role of 
outside directors more than before. Relative to executive directors, outside directors 
have loose bonds with the firm and face different trade-offs when deciding whether to 
stay on a board or resign (Fahlenbrach et al., 2015). Therefore, it is worth investigating 
how outside directors alone respond to fraudulent behaviour. My third set of proxies is 
thus used for measuring the unexpected turnover of outside directors only. It consists 
of a measure for the number of unexpectedly departing outside directors, and an 
indicator variable for their turnover.  
4.3.5 Research Design 
Based on the matched-pair sample, I perform paired t-tests to analyse the 
difference in the director turnover rates, which are respectively proxied by the three sets 
of key director turnover measures, between the noncompliant firms and the control 
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firms. To maximize the chances of capturing director departures, my examination 
covers five years surrounding the start of an event period, i.e. from two years prior to 
noncompliance to two years post noncompliance start. 
I identify two event dates in order to test my underlying prediction that directors 
have strong incentives to leave noncompliant firms around the start of the violation 
period, and that such departures are likely even without intervention from external 
forces. The first date is the year in which the violation period started. I apply this 
examination for the complete matched-pair sample. The second is the year of a shifted 
event date, which is defined as the violation start date plus six months. I apply this 
examination for the subset of cases in which the public announcement of the violation 
occurred at least two years after the violation start date.  
The reason for implementing this design to test my prediction is as follows. First, 
there is some concern over using the start of the violation period as the event date. 
Although both anecdotal and empirical evidence show that directors, as firm insiders, 
have several channels for achieving insider information (Nowak and McCabe, 
2003;Raheja, 2005), it might still be questionable whether directors can detect and 
respond to fraudulent behaviour at the point at which this behaviour first begins. 
Shifting the event date to a date after the noncompliance has started means that such 
fraudulent behaviour has been underway for a period of time, which means that the 
directors have a better chance of being aware of it. Furthermore, by requiring that the 
first public announcement of noncompliance occurred at least two years after the 
violation start date may exclude the effects of public announcements; therefore, the 
results will help us to understand whether directors detect and respond to fraudulent 
behaviour through private information channels. 
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For both of these focuses, I examine the difference in director turnover rates 
between noncompliant firms and control firms for four windows, i.e. window (t-2, t+2), 
window (t-2, t-1), window (t, t+1), and window (t+1, t+2). The first window provides 
the overall view on director turnover rates surrounding noncompliance events. Based 
on my prediction, I expect to see director turnover rates higher in noncompliant than 
control firms. Then, I separate the sample into observations prior to and post the start 
of noncompliance. The second window examines director turnover prior to the start of 
noncompliance while the other two windows examine director turnover post the start of 
noncompliance. If directors have private information alerting them to the risk that a 
violation will occur, and therefore choose to leave before that risk crystalizes to protect 
their reputations and minimize the costs to themselves, I expect to see that the higher 
director turnover rates in noncompliant firms are more pronounced prior to the start of 
noncompliance than afterwards. However, if directors cannot foresee upcoming 
violation events, they may choose to leave after the start of noncompliance but before 
it is publicly known about.  
4.4 Results 
This section reports the results for the two sets of matched-pairs univariate tests, 
by centring the analysis on the two different event dates mentioned in Section 4.3.5. 
The first set of tests reported in Table 7 examines a five-year window centred on the 
start year of the noncompliance period. For the second set of tests, I replicate the 
analysis in Table 7, focusing on the shifted event date.  
4.4.1 Original Event Date 
Table 7 reports mean values in the noncompliance and control samples, and the 
difference in means, for three sets of director turnover measures, focusing on the year 
in which the violation period started. I report the results in three panels: the number of 
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departing directors and the number of directors who were not nominated (Panel A); 
unexpectedly departing director turnover using both the number of such directors and 
an indicator of whether there was such a director in a given firm-year (Panel B); and 
unexpectedly departing outside director turnover, again using both the number of such 
directors and an indicator of whether there was such a director in the firm-year (Panel 
C).  
Panel A of Table 7 shows that the numbers of departing directors and 
unnominated directors are both higher in the noncompliance group relative to the 
control group for all four windows that I examine. For the window centred on the 
noncompliance start year, i.e. window (t-2, t+2), the noncompliant firms on average 
have 0.687 (0.786) departing directors (unnominated directors), while the control firms 
on average have 0.45 (0.566) departing directors (unnominated directors), and the 
differences in both measures are significant at the 1% level. When looking at the 
window prior to the start of noncompliance, i.e. window (t-2, t-1), the noncompliant 
firms on average have 0.428 (0.596) departing directors (unnominated directors), while 
the control firms on average have 0.228 (0.368) departing directors (unnominated 
directors), and the differences in both measures are significant at the 5% level. For the 
two post-noncompliance windows, i.e. window (t, t+1) and window (t+1, t+2), both 
measures of director turnover are higher in noncompliant firms than control firms, 
though the differences are not statistically significant in window (t, t+1). 
Panel B shows results for the differences in unexpected director turnover. 
Similarly to the results in Panel A, both measures, the number of unexpectedly departing 
directors and the indicator of whether there is an unexpectedly departing director in a 
given firm-year, are higher in the noncompliant than the control firms. Moreover, the 
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differences are significant at the 1% or 5% level, except in the case of one of the post-
noncompliance windows, (t, t+1). 
Panel C reports results for unexpected outside director turnover alone. 
Consistent with the other measures for director turnover shown in Panel A and Panel B, 
both the number and the indicator measure for unexpected outside director turnover for 
the window centred on the noncompliance start year are significantly higher in the 
noncompliant firms than in the control firms. Consistently, I find strong evidence (at 
the 1% significant level) using both measures for the window prior to the start of 
noncompliance. These differences are economically meaningful as well. For example, 
the chance of having an unexpectedly departing outside director in a noncompliant firm 
is 19.2%, while it is only 7.4% for control firms. The difference is more than 10%. 
However, interestingly, there is no significant difference in outside directors’ 
unexpected departures in either of the two post-noncompliance windows. This evidence 
suggests that, given their loose bonds with firms (Fahlenbrach et al., 2015), outside 
directors tend to leave problematic firms before there is any possibility of their being 
involved in the firms’ wrongdoings. This is consistent with the extant research showing 
that the labour market assigns greater penalties to pre-emptive directors who resign 
immediately before negative events become crystalized, than to directors who stay (Dou, 
2014).  
In general, those results are consistent with my prediction that, other things 
equal, directors have strong incentives to leave noncompliant firms around the start of 
the violation period. Furthermore, when looking at outside directors alone, the evidence 
of higher director turnover rates in noncompliant firms is more pronounced prior to the 
start of noncompliance than afterwards.  
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4.4.2 Shifted Event Date 
Shifting the event date to six months later than the violation start date for a 
subset of cases in which the first public announcement of noncompliance occurred at 
least two years after the violation start date, this set of tests replicates the analysis in 
Table 7, and reports the results in Table 8. 
In findings that are highly consistent with the results in Table 7, the 
noncompliant firms have significantly higher director turnover (regarding all six 
different measures) than the control firms in the window centred on the shifted event 
date [window (t-2, t+2)] and the window prior to the start of noncompliance [window 
(t-2, t-1)], and the evidence is in fact even more pronounced. For example, in the 
window (t-2, t+2), the number of departing directors increases to 0.763 for 
noncompliant firms in the shifted-event sample (Panel A of Table 8), from 0.687 for 
noncompliant firms in the original-event sample (Panel A of Table 7); in the window 
(t-2, t-1), the number of departing directors increases from 0.428 for noncompliant firms 
in the original-event sample (Panel A of Table 7) to 0.634 for noncompliant firms in the 
shifted-event sample (Panel A of Table 8). This trend happens for all the measures 
across the three panels in window (t-2, t+2) and window (t-2, t-1). Furthermore, all the 
results in the pre-event window become statistically significant at the 1% level, while 
some of the results in the same window in Table 7 were only significant at the 5% level.  
Again, consistent with Table 7, although noncompliant firms generally have 
higher director turnover rates in the post-event window, the differences in the measures, 
in Panels A and B, between the noncompliant and control firms, are not statistically 
significant for window (t, t+1). When looking at unexpected outside director turnover 
alone, in Panel C of Table 8, neither of the two measures shows a significant difference 
between the noncompliant and control firms in either of the two post-event windows.  
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These results in Table 8 address the concern over using the start of the violation 
period as the event date, given that it is questionable whether directors would be able to 
detect and respond to fraudulent behaviour at the point at which it first begins, and they 
further confirm my prediction. Since this set of tests is only conducted within a 
subsample for which the first public announcement/disclosure of the firm’s violation 
came two years after the start of the violation, it is more likely that the directors would 
have been informed through internal information channels and governance mechanisms, 
rather than through external forces. If the directors had been influenced by external 
forces and been better informed, we should have obtained more pronounced results in 
the full sample, where there was no requirement for the late release of public 
information, than in this subset. Further, we should not have seen much of a difference 
between the original and shifted event settings, if there were no internal information 
channel through which directors could be informed. However, I do find more 
pronounced results within this subsample, which provides confidence that my 
interpretation of the abnormal director turnover rates surrounding the start of the 
noncompliance event is grounded.  
4.5 Robustness Checks and Alternative Explanations 
4.5.1 Director Turnover and Corporate Changes  
There are several possible explanations for higher director turnover in 
noncompliant firms. For example, it could be that there are significant changes in 
corporate control or corporate restructuring around the noncompliance events, which 
drive the changes of directors. It could also be possible that there are significant 
corporate governance changes that drive the director departures. This section addresses 
these two concerns. 
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First, if there were significant corporate restructuring happening, it is likely that 
we would also observe significant changes in CEOs. Using the measures for unexpected 
director departures, I replicate the analyses in Tables 7 and 8 for the subset of 
noncompliance cases in which there are no CEO turnovers. The results are reported in 
Table 9.  
Panel A of Table 9 shows that, for the cases without CEO turnover, the numbers 
of unexpectedly departing directors and unexpectedly departing outside directors are 
both higher (mean differences are both 0.162) in the noncompliance group relative to 
the control group for the pre-noncompliance window, i.e. window (t-2, t-1), and the 
difference in the number of unexpectedly departing directors is statistically significant 
at the 5% level. Panel B of Table 9 reports the results from the tests conducted in a 
subset of the noncompliance sample and its matched-pair control sample. This subset 
of the noncompliance sample is filtered by the same criteria as used for Table 8, thus 
containing the cases for which the first public enforcement releases occurred at least 
two years after the start of noncompliance. The shifted event date in Panel B is six 
months after the violation start date, and Year t is defined as the year of the shifted event 
date. The results show that, for the cases without CEO turnover, the numbers of 
unexpectedly departing directors and unexpectedly departing outside directors are still 
both higher (on average, 0.326 more directors and 0.303 more outside directors depart 
from noncompliant firms) in the noncompliance group than in the control group for the 
pre-noncompliance window, i.e. window (t-2, t-1), and the difference is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. These findings are consistent with my main results in Tables 
7 and 8. 
For both of the subsamples in Panels A and B, not like the observed evidence 
without controlling CEO turnover in Table 7, the difference between the noncompliance 
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sample and the control sample is no longer significant for the post-noncompliance 
period. This indicates that, after noncompliance has started, both director turnover and 
CEO turnover are higher in the noncompliant firms than the control firms. This finding 
is consistent with Agrawal and Chen’s (2011) finding that board disputes rarely occur 
just among (outside) directors and usually involve a firm’s top management. The power 
struggle between the directors and the top management might result in internecine 
effects on both, explaining why the significantly higher director turnover rate in the 
noncompliant firms during the post-noncompliance period disappeared after controlling 
for CEO turnover. To further control for significant corporate events, such as 
restructuring and mergers and acquisitions, which may co-drive CEO and director 
turnover, I also follow Fahlenbrach et al. (2015)’s method of excluding firm-years in 
which more than five directors departed, as such departures are likely to have been due 
to a corporate control event. The inferences are not affected by the change. 
Next, I test the governance changes between the pre-noncompliance period and 
the post-noncompliance period to find out how likely it is that the director turnover was 
driven by systematic corporate governance changes. To examine the changes in 
corporate governance characteristics, I calculate the differences in key corporate 
governance variables between years t-1 and t+1 to allow for some variability within 
corporate governance. Table 10 reports these results. 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 10 report the t-tests for the changes in several 
governance measures in the noncompliance and control samples, respectively; column 
(3) reports the paired t-test for the changes in the noncompliance sample relative to the 
changes in the control sample.  
As shown in column (1), except for the two naturally time-variant variables, i.e. 
CEO’s time on the board and directors’ average time on the board, only two governance 
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characteristics changed from before to after the start of noncompliance at the 10% 
significance level. There are increases in the number of outside directors with financial 
expertise and in the percentage of female board members. However, when we compare 
these changes with the changes in the control samples, they are no longer significant. 
Interestingly, board size decreased post-noncompliance in the noncompliance sample, 
while it increased in the paired control sample, and this difference is significant at the 
10% level. This shrinkage in board size in noncompliant firms is consistent with 
González et al. (2013), who find that directors are often not replaced when they resign, 
if the management has some wrongdoing to hide. This further confirms my conclusion 
that director turnover is mostly likely due to the potential wrongdoing and not 
systematic corporate governance changes. All the other governance characteristics 
remain stable from before to after the start of noncompliance, relative to the control 
sample.  
4.5.2 Noncompliance with Different Levels of Severity 
Given the benefits directors reap from sitting on boards, they may not readily 
give up their directorships when they perceive problems. I assume that director turnover 
should have a stronger association with more severe noncompliance behaviour for the 
following two reasons. First, since more severe noncompliance has its origins in or is 
caused by the behaviour of top management, it might be identified more easily by 
directors. Second, once directors perceive upcoming wrongdoing, they may not find it 
easy to leave, or they may only leave if they believe the wrongdoing is severe enough 
to affect their reputation, increase their workload significantly, and/or lead to the loss 
of other board seats. 
I expect that violations over long periods will be related to more severe problems. 
Therefore, I divide the sample into two based on the median length of the violation 
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period. Column (1) in Table 11 presents the results for the paired sample for 
noncompliance events with a violation period longer than the median length (731 days) 
across all noncompliant firms, while column (2) presents those for the remainder of the 
noncompliance sample. 
Panel A, B, C and D report the results for a five-year window centred on the 
start of noncompliance, the pre-noncompliance window, and the two post-
noncompliance windows, respectively. Generally, across all the windows, 
noncompliant firms have higher director turnover than control firms in both the long-
violation-period and the short-violation-period noncompliance samples, for all 
measures of director turnover. However, most of the differences in the short-violation-
period noncompliance sample are no longer statistically significant. For the pre-
noncompliance window, I consistently observe firms with a long period of 
noncompliance having significantly higher director turnover than the control firms, for 
all measures of director turnover. This sensitivity to noncompliance severity further 
confirms that noncompliance impacts on director turnover.  
4.5.3 Other Alternative Explanations 
There could be another alternative explanation for the evidence of unusually 
high director turnover rates surrounding noncompliance. Directors may be dismissed 
by management if they are reluctant to condone or aid their misconduct. However, this 
interpretation is unlikely because I do not observe consistent evidence of a significantly 
positive association between the strength of the management and director turnover. 
Those proxies for management power include the dual role of chairman and CEO, the 
years that the CEO has been on the board, and whether the board is a staggered one. 
Nevertheless, this study aims to examine whether or not directors are present when 
firms are doing wrong, and whether they have the chance to play the disciplining role 
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as expected. Therefore, it would not affect the inference from my findings even if this 
interpretation stood. However, this issue could be a very interesting one to explore in 
more depth so as to provide a better understanding of internal governance mechanisms. 
Another alternative interpretation of my results is that director departures and 
the resulting disruption to board monitoring increases the probability that a violation 
will occur. This is true when management turnover is taking place. Usually, when a firm 
experiences management turnover, the new managers will want to implement new 
policies, and will not keep a close eye on previous policies. This creates loopholes in 
the management, which might result in noncompliance. However, since directors are 
not responsible for daily monitoring or the execution of policies, it is less likely that 
director turnover would have the same consequences. The disruption due to director 
turnover could result in weak or low-quality board monitoring with regards important 
investment strategies, but it is less likely that such departures would be severe enough 
to cause a firm to violate regulations. Meanwhile, if a firm has an unexpected departure 
of a director, it is likely to be more careful over complying with the regulations, since 
this unexpected departure might put the firm at the forefront of 
shareholder/media/regulator focus. Therefore, the chance of them violating regulations 
is small unless they already had the intention of doing so, in which case it would be 
very hard to argue that the subsequent violation was a result of the director’s departure.  
4.6 Conclusions  
I investigate noncompliance effects on director turnover using a sample of firms 
that violated securities regulations and were targeted by the SEC’s enforcement actions. 
I find, in general, that firms not complying with securities laws had significantly higher 
director turnover during the period in which noncompliance began than control firms. I 
also provide evidence to exclude several possible alternative explanations. These results 
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indicate that it is most likely that directors try to avoid any involvement when they 
perceive a risk of violations by insiders. Outside directors in particular tend to leave 
firms before becoming involved in any violations, rather than waiting until they are 
exposed to litigation risk.  
My findings, in line with several other studies, imply that directors do not remain 
tightly bonded with the firms whose boards they sit on when such firms get into trouble. 
To prevent firms from misconduct, we may need to think about the shortcomings in the 
current governance system and how to hold management accountable, rather than 
putting such heavy emphasis on developing doctrines for directors’ duties. Alternatively, 
from the perspective of optimal contracting theory where the spirit lies in finding 
theoretical ways to motivate agents to take appropriate actions (Grossman and Hart, 
1983), improving current governance mechanism to hold directors’ interests tightly 
bonded with the firm’s would be a contributory topic to explore. 
My study has limitations, which suggest some areas for future research as well. 
First, although the reverse causality, namely that director turnover causes violations 
rather than vice versa, does not stand up theoretically, I am limited by my data from 
actually providing empirical evidence to verify this. Further research could seek to rule 
such reverse causality out empirically. Second, there are several important points in 
time along the timeline of a negative event, such as the trigger date, the informal 
investigation date, the formal investigation date and the public announcement date. 
Given the burden of hand collection in this study, it was infeasible to test how directors 
reacted to each of these event dates. However, it could be a very interesting topic to 
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Figure1. Timeline of an SEC Enforcement Action as depicted in Karpoff et al. (2008a) 
 
Notes: The violation period is the period during which the firm is alleged to have fraudulently managed earnings. Karpoff et al.(2008a,b) define trigger 
date as dates on which firm-initiated or other events reveal the existence of potential problems at the firm. Following a trigger event, the SEC gathers 
information through an informal inquiry that, if warranted, grows to a formal investigation. During the investigation period, the targeted firm may 
voluntarily issue a press release indicating that it is the target of an SEC informal inquiry or formal investigation. After an investigation, the SEC can 
decide to drop the case, proceed with an administrative or civil action, and/or refer it to the DOJ for parallel criminal prosecution. The SEC’s decision to 
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 Sample Selection Process of Noncompliant Firms 
Panel A: Sample selection of Enforcement Action Releases 
Number of Releases 
Total releases (2003-2012) 10,923 
        Total_LR(2003-2012) 4,675 
        Total_AP(2003-2012) 6,248 
       less: releases towards individual and categorized as AAER 5,904 
       less: other releases 1,212 
Indexed releases  3,754 
Panel B: Sample selection of firms against by Enforcement Actions  
Number of Firms 
Number of firms referred by indexed releases 4,129 
Number of firms found in EDGAR 2,417 
Number of firms with Compustat financial data 768 
Panel C: Sample selection of relevant Enforcement Action Releases 
Number of Releases 
Indexed releases  3,754 
Releases traced back from Compustat matched firms 1,551 
      less: duplicated releases 651 
Unique releases traced back from Compustat matched firms 900 
      less: releases against firms delinquent  in financial reports 368 
Releases checked manually 532 
 Comprising:   Total_LR 142 
                        Total_AP 390 
Panel D: Final sample of noncompliant firms 
Noncompliance events  126 
Noncompliant firms  123 
Note  
This table reports the process of identifying relevant SEC’s enforcement actions releases and the final 
noncompliance samples. 
Total_Releases: the sum of SEC's enforcement releases in each year for the period from 2003 to 2012. 
Indexed_Releases: the number of SEC's enforcement releases covered in my index file. 
INDIV&AAER: the number of releases which are purely against individuals or which are categorized as AAER 
by the SEC. 
Other Releases:  the number of releases which are not relevant for identifying firms' noncompliant behaviours, 











Table 2  
Summary Statistics for Frequency of Noncompliance Events and Noncompliant Firms by Year and 
Industry 
Panel A: Year Frequency of 
Noncompliance Events 
 Panel B: Industry Frequency of Noncompliant firms 
Vio_Beg Freq Vio_End Freq  Industry Freq Percent Compustat 
1986 1     Mining & Construction 3 2.44 11.04 
1994 2     Refining & Extractive 4 3.25 7.18 
1995 1     Food & Tobacoo 4 3.25 1.93 
1996 5 1996 1  Chemicals  7 5.69 1.84 
1997 5    Pharmaceuticals 7 5.69 9.46 
1998 4    Durable Manufacturers 26 21.14 11.24 
1999 13 1999 5  Computers 20 16.26 11.18 
2000 15 2000 2  Transportation 4 3.25 5.06 
2001 22 2001 9  Utilities 4 3.25 4.26 
2002 15 2002 24  Retail 7 5.69 6.49 
2003 10 2003 23  Banks & Insurance 25 20.33 20.13 
2004 7 2004 14  Service 12 9.76 7.25 
2005 4 2005 10      
2006 8 2006 11      
2007 5 2007 8      
2008 3 2008 4      
2009 1 2009 6      
2010 2 2010 4      
2011 2 2011 3      
2012 1 2012 2      
Total 126   126   Total 123 100.00 97.06 
Note 
This table reports summary statistics for frequency of securities laws noncompliance events/firms by year 
and industry. 
Following Dechow et al (2011), Industries are based on the following SIC codes: Agriculture: 0100–0999; Mining & 
Construction: 1000–1299, 1400–1999; Food & Tobacco: 2000–2141;Textiles and Apparel: 2200–2399; Lumber, 
Furniture, & Printing: 2400–2796;Chemicals: 2800–2824, 2840–2899; Refining & Extractive: 1300–1399,2900–
2999; Durable Manufacturers: 3000–3569, 3580–3669, 3680–3828, 3852-3999;Computers:3570–3579, 3670–3679, 
7370–7379; Transportation: 4000–4899; Utilities: 4900–4999; Retail: 5000–5999; Services: 7000–7369, 7380–9999; 
Banks& Insurance: 6000–6999; Pharmaceuticals: 2830–2836, 3829–3851.  
The calculation of Compustat industry proportion is based on the firms which have valid financial statement data in 
year 2012. I do a small correction for Dechow et al (2011), where they include 3829-3851 in both Durable 








Summary Statistics for Noncompliance Events 
Panel A: Frequency of Violation Days  Panel B: Frequency of Violated Acts  
Panel C: Frequency of Violated 
Subsections of Acts   
Panel D: Frequency of Involved 
Parties 
Vio_Days Freq Percentage 
% 







1-999 75 59.52    0 1 .*    1 42 33.87  CEO/president 72 62.61 
1000-1999 31 24.6  Vio_33 67 57 2 126  2 36 29.03  Law_person 15 13.04 
2000-2999 13 10.32  Vio_34 16 108 2 126  3 22 17.74  CFO 19 16.52 
3000-3999  4 3.17  Vio_ ICA40 119 5 2 126  4 12 9.68  Other_Top 21 18.26 
4000-4999 1 0.79  Vio_ IAA40 120 4 2 126  5 4 3.23     
5000-5999  1 0.79         6 5 4.03     
>6000 1 0.79         8 3 2.42     
mean 1052.45          . * 2 1.59     
median 653                        
Total  126 100               Total 126 100   Total 115** .** 
Note  
This table reports summarized details for the 126 (123) noncompliance events (firms). 
Vio_  dummy indicates if a specific Act was violated or not. 
Vio_Acts indicates what Act was violated. 
Vio_33 stands for the violated law was Securities Act of 1933. 
Vio_34  stands for the violated law was Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
Vio_ICA40 stands for the violated law was Investment Company Act of 1940. 
Vio_IAA40 stands for the violated law was Investment Advisers Act of 1940. 
Sub-sections is the number of subsections of Acts that a noncompliance event violated. 
Law_person is an indicator for the existence of a general counsel or compliance officer in the company. 
Other_Top is an indicator for senior executives, senior officers, or vice presidents. 
* For one of the two missing cases, the SEC issued a formal order of private investigation therefore this information is not publicly available. For the other case which involves insider trading, the 
violated acts information is missed without known reason. 
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Logistic Regression for Propensity Score 
Panel A: Regression Results 
Noncompliance Coef. Marginal  effects  Pr > ChiSq 
ROA -0.494 -0.097  0.001 
SIZE 0.245 1.078  0.001 
LEVERAGE -0.089 -0.024  0.670 
LOSS 0.050 0.044  0.854 
BIGN -0.731 0.474  0.009 
AGE -0.913 -0.578  0.001 
_CONS -3.404   0.018 
YEAR  Included    
INDUSTRY Included    
N 15568    
Likelihood ratio    160.647    
(p-value) (0.001)    
Pseudo R2 0.138      
Panel B: Distribution of Fitted Conditional Probabilities (P-scores) 
Sample N Mean 1st pct. 25th pct. median 75th pct. 99th pct.                 
Control Group 
Noncompliance  
15,472 0.0059 0.0004 0.0016 0.0029 0.0058 0.0528 
96 0.0472 0.0005 0.0037 0.0133 0.0405 0.5376 
Note 
This table reports logistic regression results for propensity scores. 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the odds of noncompliance. Noncompliance equals 1 if a firm is against by the 
SEC's enforcement actions; equals 0 if a firm is from COMPUSTAT potential control group. 
All variables are measured at the fiscal year (COMPUSTAT identification) where the noncompliance beginning date lies. 
Panel A contains regression results. Panel B provides distributional information of the fitted conditional probabilities (i.e. 
propensity scores) for two samples: the whole population for control group before matched and the noncompliance sample. 
Marginal effects are calculated as proportionate change in implied probability for each variable changed from its quartile 1 
value to quartile 3 value and setting the covariates’ contributions to their median values. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
  𝑅𝑂𝐴               = operating income divided by total asset; 
  𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸              = the natural log of outstanding common stock times share price;  
  𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 = the sum of debt in current liability and long term debt divided by total assets; 
  𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆             = indicator variable taking the value of 1 if Income Before Extraordinary Items is less than zero,  
                               and 0 otherwise; 
 𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑁             = indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the auditor comes from Big Five, and 0 otherwise; 
 𝐴𝐺𝐸               = the natural log of firm’s age; 
 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅            = the dummy variable for noncompliance beginning year; 





Table 5   





%bias %reduct bias 
t-test Wilcoxon test 
Noncompliance Control t p>|t| mean of difference t p>|t| 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)     (7)     (8) (9) (10) (11) 
ROA Unmatched -0.634 -0.129 -41.6  -6.74 <.001    
 Matched -0.574 -0.554 -1.6 96.2 -0.09 0.931 -0.019 -0.143 0.887 
SIZE Unmatched 5.268 4.999 9.1  1.05 0.294    
 Matched 5.373 5.452 -2.7 70.6 -0.17 0.866 -0.079 -0.208 0.836 
LEVERAGE Unmatched 0.386 0.252 25.5  3.03 0.002    
 Matched 0.378 0.335 8.1 68.1 0.48 0.629 0.043 0.618 0.538 
LOSS Unmatched 0.479 0.454 5  0.5 0.62    
 Matched 0.468 0.436 6.4 -26.4 0.44 0.662 0.032 0.537 0.593 
BIGN Unmatched 0.615 0.727 -24.1  -2.47 0.014    
 Matched 0.628 0.585 9.1 62.2 0.59 0.553 0.043 0.705 0.482 
AGE Unmatched 2.100 2.538 -48  -5.97 <.001    
 Matched 2.130 2.318 -20.6 57.2 -1.37 0.174 -0.188 -2.114 0.037 
ExpAge Unmatched 13.802 16.44 -19.4  -2.02 0.043    
 Matched 14.053 14.362 -2.3 88.3 -0.15 0.88 -0.309 -0.226 0.822 
Pseudo R2 Unmatched 0.138  MeanBias Unmatched 28.2     
 Matched 0.046   Matched 8.3     
LR chi2 Unmatched 163.57  MedBias Unmatched 24.1     
 Matched 12.1   Matched 6.4     
p>chi2 Unmatched 0         
  Matched 0.208                 
Note 
This table reports the results for examining covariate balancing conditions for the matched 188 firms. PSM is based on one-one nearest neighbour match with common and without 
replacement. 94 noncompliant firms are matched. Variable definitions are the same as Table 3, except for ExpAge. 
ExpAge is the exponential form of the variable AGE, i.e. the true age of firms. 
%bias is standardized bias. 
    %reduct bias is the percentage reduction in covariate bias. 
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    MeanBias is the mean of standardized bias. 





Table 6  
Sample of Firms with Corporate Governance Data 
Panel A: Firms with Available Corporate Governance Data 
 Firm Obs. Firm-Year Obs. Firm-Year-Director Obs. 
Noncompliant firms identified from the SEC's enforcement action 123 - - 
Less: firms without available financial data from Compustat (27) - - 
Less: Firms without matched control firms (2) - - 
Less: Firms without corporate governance information from EDGAR (4) - - 
Total noncompliant firms with corporate governance information 90 390 3034 
Control firms  matched by 1:1 nearest neighbour with available corporate governance information 76 - - 
Add: Control firms  matched by 1:2 nearest neighbour with available corporate governance information 11 - - 
Total Control firms with corporate governance information 87 420 3259 
Total firms with corporate governance information 177 810 6293 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Corporate Governance Data  
Variable 
Noncompliance  Control  t-test for mean differences 
Obs. Mean Median  Obs. Mean Median          t-statistic               p-value 
(1) Firm-Level Governance Structure  
BOARD_SIZE 387 7.277 7.000  420 7.348 7.000  0.280                  0.783 
DUALITY 389 0.692 1.000  416 0.638 1.000  -1.620                0.105 
STAGGERED_BOARD 385 0.338 0.000  420 0.341 0.000  0.100                  0.918 
AUDIT_COMMITTEE_SIZE 342 2.879 3.000  413 2.891 3.000  0.100                  0.921 
COMPENSATION_COMMITTEE_SIZE 342 2.555 3.000  413 2.726 3.000  1.390                  0.165 
NOMINATION_COMMITTEE_SIZE 345 1.688 0.000  414 1.526 0.000  -1.020                0.310 
NO._COMMITTEE 347 1.997 2.000  416 2.101 2.000  1.350                 0.178 
All_DIRECTORS_OFFICERS_SHARES 284 0.216 0.146      372 0.233 0.195  1.100                 0.270 
(2) Firm-Level Director Attributes 
AGE_AVERAGE 372 55.940 57.536  418 56.238 57.310  0.610                 0.541 
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FEMALE_PERCENT  388 0.083 0.000  420 0.058 0.000  -3.180                0.002 
SD_PERCENT  381 0.596 0.667  420 0.661 0.667  3.900                 0.001 
SD_FINANCIAL_EXPERT 336 0.471 0.000  420 0.414 0.000  -1.210                0.227 
LAW_SUM  383 0.553 0.000  420 0.581 0.000  0.470                 0.642 
LAW_PERCENT  383 0.079 0.000  420 0.082 0.000  0.280                0.778 
LAW_ON_BOARD  383 0.404 0.000  420 0.398 0.000  -0.190              0.848 
CFO_ON_BOARD  388 0.258 0.000  420 0.145 0.000  -3.970              0.001 
Note 
This table reports corporate governance data collection and summary statistics for corporate governance attributes of noncompliance and control samples. 
BOARD_SIZE is the number of directors on board. 
DUALITY is a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO and the chairman in the firm is the same person, and zero otherwise. 
STAGGERED_BOARD is a dummy variable that equals one if the directors of the board are divided into more than one class, and zero otherwise. 
AUDIT_COMMITTEE_SIZE is the number of directors on audit committee of the board. 
COMPENSATION_COMMITTEE_SIZE is the number of directors on compensation committee of the board. 
NOMINATION_COMMITTEE_SIZE is the number of directors on nomination committee of the board. 
All_DIRECTORS_OFFICERS_SHARES is the percentage of company shares that all directors and officers beneficially own. 
AGE_AVERAGE is the average age of board of directors. 
FEMALE_PERCENT is the percentage of female directors on the board. 
SD_PERCENT is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. 
SD_FINANCIAL_EXPERT is the number of non-executive directors with financial expertise background. 
LAW_SUM is the number of directors with law background.  
LAW_PERCENT is the percentage of directors with law background on the board. 
LAW_ON_BOARD is a dummy variable that equals one if there is at least one director with law background sitting on the board, and zero otherwise. 
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Panel A Director Turnover            
(1) DEPARTING DIRECTOR            
Window centred on noncompliance beginning year  (t-2, t+2) 0.687      0.450  0.237 3.466 0.001  369 
Window pre noncompliance (t-2,t-1)  0.428      0.228  0.200 2.400 0.018  136 
Window post noncompliance (t, t+1) 0.762      0.601  0.161 1.378 0.170  161 
Window post noncompliance (t+1, t+2) 0.830      0.523  0.307 2.621 0.010  151 
(2) UNNOMINATED DIRECTOR            
Window centred on noncompliance beginning year  (t-2, t+2) 0.786 0.566  0.220 2.920 0.004  369 
Window pre noncompliance (t-2,t-1)  0.596 0.368  0.228 2.557 0.012  136 
Window post noncompliance (t, t+1) 0.857 0.696  0.161 1.287 0.200  161 
Window post noncompliance (t+1, t+2) 0.941 0.636  0.305 2.281 0.024  151 
Panel B  Unexpected-Departing Director Turnover             
(1) UNEXPECTED_SUM            
Window centred on noncompliance beginning year  (t-2, t+2) 0.588 0.366  0.222 3.274 0.001  369 
Window pre noncompliance (t-2,t-1)  0.426 0.191  0.235 2.729 0.007  136 
Window post noncompliance (t, t+1) 0.640 0.503  0.137 1.198 0.233  161 
Window post noncompliance (t+1, t+2) 0.702 0.397  0.305 2.665 0.009  151 
(2) UNEXPECTED_INDICATOR            
Window centred on noncompliance beginning year  (t-2, t+2) 0.304 0.225  0.079 2.391 0.017  369 
Window pre noncompliance (t-2,t-1)  0.291 0.154  0.103 2.138 0.034  136 
Window post noncompliance (t, t+1) 0.335 0.323  0.012 0.238 0.812  161 
Window post noncompliance (t+1, t+2) 0.391 0.272  0.119 2.116 0.036  151 
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Panel C Unexpected-Departing Outside Director Turnover 
(1) UNEXPECTED_SD_SUM             
Window centred on noncompliance beginning year  (t-2, t+2) 0.277 0.163      0.114 2.305 0.022  369 
Window pre noncompliance (t-2,t-1)  0.280 0.081       0.199 3.053 0.003  136 
Window post noncompliance (t, t+1) 0.360 0.335       0.025 0.301 0.764  161 
Window post noncompliance (t+1,t+2)  0.351 0.272       0.079 1.007 0.316  151 
(2) UNEXPECTED_SD_INDICATOR              
Window centred on noncompliance beginning year  (t-2, t+2) 0.223    0.163       0.060 2.000 0.046  369 
Window pre noncompliance (t-2,t-1)  0.192    0.074       0.118 2.813 0.006  136 
Window post noncompliance (t, t+1) 0.217    0.236      -0.019 -0.400 0.692  161 
Window post noncompliance (t+1,t+2)  0.245    0.199       0.046 0.896 0.372  151 
Note 
This table reports paired t-test for differences in main director turnover measures between noncompliance sample and its matched-pair control sample. year t is identified as the year 
when noncompliance starts.  
DEPARTING DIRECTOR is the number of directors who is defined as departing in FIGURE 2. 
UNNOMINATED DIRECTOR is the number of directors who is defined as unnominated in FIGURE 2. 
UNEXPECTED_SUM is the number of directors who is defined as unexpectedly departing in FIGURE 2. 
UNEXPECTED _INDICATOR is a dummy variable that equals one if there is one or more directors defines as unexpectedly departing in FIGURE 2; otherwise zero. 
UNEXPECTED_SD_SUM is the number of outside directors who is defined as unexpectedly departing in FIGURE 2. 
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Panel A Director Turnover           
(1) DEPARTING DIRECTOR           
Window centred on noncompliance beginning year  (t-2, t+2) 0.763 0.465  0.298 3.713 0.001 292 
Window pre noncompliance (t-2,t-1)  0.634 0.269  0.365 3.204 0.002 107 
Window post noncompliance (t, t+1) 0.785 0.597  0.188 1.420 0.158 128 
Window post noncompliance (t+1, t+2) 0.847 0.508  0.339 2.650 0.009 121 
(2) UNNOMINATED DIRECTOR         
Window centred on noncompliance beginning year  (t-2, t+2) 0.831 0.572  0.259 2.998 0.003 294 
Window pre noncompliance (t-2,t-1)  0.768 0.398  0.370 3.061 0.003 108 
Window post noncompliance (t, t+1) 0.885 0.682  0.203 1.455 0.148 128 
Window post noncompliance (t+1, t+2) 0.925 0.605  0.320 2.204 0.030 122 
Panel B  Unexpectedly Departing Director Turnover          
(1) UNEXPECTED_SUM         
Window centred on noncompliance beginning year  (t-2, t+2) 0.650 0.337  0.313 4.046 0.001 294 
Window pre noncompliance (t-2,t-1)  0.611 0.185  0.426 3.571 0.001 108 
Window post noncompliance (t, t+1) 0.695 0.450  0.195 1.594 0.114 128 
Window post noncompliance (t+1, t+2) 0.691 0.347  0.344 2.862 0.005 122 
(2) UNEXPECTED_INDICATOR         
Window centred on noncompliance beginning year  (t-2, t+2)      0.362 0.236  0.126 3.339 0.001 294 
Window pre noncompliance (t-2,t-1)          0.352 0.148  0.204 3.483 0.001 108 
Window post noncompliance (t, t+1)         0.326 0.310  0.016 0.276 0.783 128 
Window post noncompliance (t+1, t+2)    0.398  0.250  0.148 2.367 0.020       122 
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Panel C Unexpectedly Departing Outside Director Turnover 
(1) UNEXPECTED_SD_SUM  
Window centred on noncompliance beginning year 0.379 0.219  0.160 2.787 0.002 294 
Window pre noncompliance (t-2,t-1)  0.416 0.083  0.333 3.957 0.001 108 
Window post noncompliance (t, t+1) 0.357 0.318  0.039 0.414 0.680 128 
Window post noncompliance (t+1,t+2)  0.350 0.250  0.100 1.156 0.250 122 
(2) UNEXPECTED_SD_INDICATOR        
Window centred on noncompliance beginning year  (t-2, t+2) 0.250   0.165  0.085 2.461 0.014 294 
Window pre noncompliance (t-2,t-1)  0.277   0.083  0.194 3.643 0.001 108 
Window post noncompliance (t, t+1) 0.217   0.233  -0.016 -0.300 0.764 128 
Window post noncompliance (t+1, t+2) 0.243   0.194  0.049 0.861 0.389 122 
Note 
This table reports paired t-test for differences in main director turnover measures between a subset of noncompliance sample and its matched-pair control sample. This subset of 
noncompliance sample is required to have the first public enforcement releases at least 2 years after the initiation of noncompliance. year t is identified as the year of a shifted event 
date which is 6 months later than the violation start date. 
DEPARTING DIRECTOR is the number of directors who is defined as departing in FIGURE 2. 
NOT-NOMINATED DIRECTOR is the number of directors who is defined as unnominated in FIGURE 2. 
UNEXPECTED_SUM is the number of directors who is defined as unexpectedly departing in FIGURE 2. 
UNEXPECTED _INDICATOR is a dummy variable that equals one if there is one or more directors defines as unexpectedly departing in FIGURE 2; otherwise zero. 
UNEXPECTED_SD_SUM is the number of outside directors who is defined as unexpectedly departing in FIGURE 2. 
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Panel A Director Turnover Surrounding Noncompliance Start Year    
(1) UNEXPECTED_SUM_CEO  
Window centred on noncompliance beginning year 
 (t-2, t+2) 288 0.108 1.694 0.091 
Window pre noncompliance (t-2,t-1)  117 0.162 2.263 0.026 
Window post noncompliance (t, t+1) 123 0.024 0.210 0.834 
Window post noncompliance (t+1, t+2) 107 0.252 2.048 0.043 
(2) UNEXPECTED_SD_SUM_CEO 
Window centred on noncompliance beginning year  
 (t-2, t+2) 288   0.056 1.084 0.279 
Window pre noncompliance (t-2,t-1)  117   0.162 2.626 0.279 
Window post noncompliance (t, t+1) 123     -0.057 -0.620 0.537 
Window post noncompliance (t+1, t+2) 107   0.065 0.717 0.475 
Panel B Director Turnover Surrounding Shifted Event Year  
(1) UNEXPECTED_SUM_CEO  
Window centred on noncompliance beginning year 
 (t-2, t+2) 229 0.175 2.373 0.019 
Window pre noncompliance (t-2,t-1)  89 0.326 3.318 0.001 
Window post noncompliance (t, t+1) 100 0.040 0.317 0.752 
Window post noncompliance (t+1, t+2) 90 0.211 1.718 0.089 
 (2) UNEXPECTED_SD_SUM_CEO 
Window centred on noncompliance beginning year  
 (t-2, t+2) 229  0.092  1.524 0.129 
Window pre noncompliance (t-2,t-1)  89  0.303  3.843 0.001 
Window post noncompliance (t, t+1) 100 -0.080 -0.783 0.436 
Window post noncompliance (t+1, t+2) 90  0.033   0.354 0.724 
Note 
This table reports paired t-test for differences in director turnover conditional on no CEO turnover between 
noncompliance sample and its matched-pair control sample.  
Panel A reports the results for all matched noncompliance samples. year t in Panel A is identified as the year 
when noncompliance starts. 
Panel B reports paired t-test for differences in director turnover conditional on no CEO turnover between a 
subset of noncompliance sample and its matched-pair control sample. This subset of noncompliance sample is 
required to have the first public enforcement releases at least 2 years after the initiation of noncompliance. 
year t in Panel B is identified as the year of a shifted event date which is 6 months later than the violation start 
date. 
UNEXPECTED_SUM_CEO is the number of directors who is defined as unexpectedly departing in FIGURE 
2 and there is no CEO leaves the firm in the year. 
UNEXPECTED_SD_SUM_CEO is the number of non-executive directors who is defined as unexpectedly 







Corporate Governance Changes around Noncompliance 
Variable 
(1) Change  for Noncompliance 
 (t+1)- (t-1) 
 
(2) Change for Control 
 (t+1)- (t-1) 
 
(3) Noncompliance Change 
VS Control Change 
 (t+1)- (t-1) 
 Mean t-test 
p-
value 




CEO_TIME_ON_BOARD 1.011 3.555 0.001 178  1.145 3.128 0.002 186  -0.365 -0.750 0.456 159 
CFO_ON_BOARD -0.010 -0.377 0.706 205  0.010 0.631 0.529 195  -0.021 -0.650 0.518 195 
LAW_ON_BOARD 0.000 0.000 1.000 203  0.036 1.706 0.090 196  -0.047 -1.480 0.139 193 
LAW_SUM 0.039 1.089 0.277 203  0.036 1.094 0.275 196  -0.010 -0.220 0.824 193 
LAW_PERCENT  -0.001 -0.150 0.881 203  0.007 1.314 0.190 196  -0.009 -1.180 0.241 193 
AVERAGE_TIME_ON_BOARD 0.346 2.372 0.019 193  0.622 4.659 0.001 195  -0.231 -1.080 0.280 182 
DUALITY  -0.005 -0.179 0.858 206  -0.021 -0.894 0.373 193  0.021 0.600 0.548 193 
SD_FINANCIAL_EXPERT 0.086 1.936 0.055 175  0.087 2.929 0.004 196  -0.018 -0.300 0.764 167 
FEMALE_PERCENT 0.008 1.818 0.071 205  0.003 1.044 0.298 196  0.005 0.810 0.422 195 
SD_PERCENT 0.006 0.503 0.616 201  0.019 2.132 0.034 196  -0.013 -0.820 0.413 191 
BOARD_SIZE -0.059 -0.563 0.574 203  0.224 2.257 0.025 196  -0.280 -1.900 0.060 193 
STAGGERED_BOARD 0.000 . . 204  0.005 1.000 0.319 196  -0.005 -1.000 0.319 194 
AUDIT_COMMITTEE_SIZE 0.073 1.058 0.291 177  0.047 0.861 0.390 191  0.037 0.390 0.694 163 
COMPENSATION_COMMITTEE_SIZE 0.080 1.338 0.183 175  0.105 1.996 0.047 191  -0.031 -0.340 0.735 161 
NOMINATION_COMMITTEE_SIZE 0.158 1.400 0.163 177  0.389 4.623 0.001 193  -0.103 -0.790 0.430 165 
Note 
This table reports the t-test for the changes of governance characteristics in noncompliance sample and control sample, and paired t-test for the changes in noncompliance sample relative to the 
changes in control sample.  
CEO_TIME_ON_BOARD is the number of years since the CEO joined the board. 
CFO_ON_BOARD is a dummy variable that equals one if company’s CFO sitting on the board, and zero otherwise. 
LAW_SUM is the number of directors with law background.  
AVERAGE_TIME_ON_BOARD is the average number of years that board of directors have stayed on board. 
DUALITY is a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO and the chairman in the firm is the same person, and zero otherwise. 
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SD_FINANCIAL_EXPERT is the number of non-executive directors with financial expertise background. 
FEMALE_PERCENT is the percentage of female directors on the board. 
SD_PERCENT is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. 
BOARD_SIZE is the number of directors on board. 
STAGGERED_BOARD is a dummy variable that equals one if the directors of the board are divided into more than one class and zero otherwise. 
AUDIT_COMMITTEE_SIZE is the number of directors on audit committee of the board. 
COMPENSATION_COMMITTEE_SIZE is the number of directors on compensation committee of the board. 





Director Turnover and Noncompliance Severity 

















Panel A Window centred on noncompliance beginning year (t-2,t+2) 
DEPARTING DIRECTOR 0.229 2.360 0.020 188  0.246 2.545 0.012 179 
UNNOMINATED DIRECTOR 0.216 2.100 0.037 190  0.224 2.030 0.044 179 
UNEXPECTED_SUM 0.268 3.050 0.003 190  0.173 1.660 0.099 179 
UNEXPECTED_INDICATOR 0.142 3.110 0.002 190  0.011 0.240 0.812 179 
UNEXPECTED_SD_SUM 0.163 2.508 0.013 190  0.061 0.821 0.413 179 
UNEXPECTED_SD_INDICATOR 0.116 2.712 0.007 190  0.000 0.000 1.000 179 
UNEXPECTED_SUM_CEO 0.174 2.100 0.037 155  0.030 0.308 0.759 133 
UNEXPECTED_SD_SUM_CEO 0.123 1.817 0.071 155  -0.023 -0.289 0.773 133 
Panel B Window pre noncompliance (t-2,t-1)  
DEPARTING DIRECTOR 0.258 1.750 0.085 62  0.151 1.660 0.101 73 
UNNOMINATED DIRECTOR 0.318 2.220 0.030 63  0.151 1.350 0.181 73 
UNEXPECTED_SUM 0.333 2.560 0.013 63  0.151 1.310 0.194 73 
UNEXPECTED_INDICATOR 0.190 2.555 0.013 63  0.027 0.440 0.658 73 
UNEXPECTED_SD_SUM 0.302 2.801 0.007 63  0.110 1.424 0.159 73 
UNEXPECTED_SD_INDICATOR 0.190 2.681 0.009 63  0.055 1.160 0.251 73 
UNEXPECTED_SUM_CEO 0.236 2.355 0.022 55  0.097 0.948 0.347 62 
UNEXPECTED_SD_SUM_CEO 0.273 2.764 0.008 55  0.065 0.851 0.398 62 
Panel C Window post noncompliance (t,t+1)  
DEPARTING DIRECTOR 0.058 0.380 0.705 86  0.280 1.550 0.125 75 
UNNOMINATED DIRECTOR 0.128 0.770 0.443 86  0.200 1.043 0.300 75 
UNEXPECTED_SUM 0.093 0.664 0.508 86  0.187 1.005 0.318 75 
UNEXPECTED_INDICATOR 0.000 0.000 1.000 86  0.027 0.331 0.741 75 
UNEXPECTED_SD_SUM 0.012 0.112 0.911 86  0.040 0.303 0.763 75 
UNEXPECTED_SD_INDICATOR -0.012 -0.185 0.854 86  -0.027 -0.376 0.708 75 
UNEXPECTED_SUM_CEO 0.055 0.386 0.701 73  -0.020 -0.101 0.920 50 
UNEXPECTED_SD_SUM_CEO -0.027 -0.248 0.805 73  -0.100 -0.626 0.534 50 
Panel D Window post noncompliance (t+1,t+2)  
DEPARTING DIRECTOR 0.313 2.010 0.048 83  0.299 1.680 0.098 67 
UNNOMINATED DIRECTOR 0.310 1.770 0.081 84  0.299 1.440 0.155 67 
UNEXPECTED_SUM 0.369 2.570 0.012 84  0.224 1.210 0.231 67 
UNEXPECTED_INDICATOR 0.202 2.760 0.007 84  0.015 0.170 0.863 67 
UNEXPECTED_SD_SUM 0.131 1.394 0.167 84  0.015 0.112 0.911 67 
UNEXPECTED_SD_INDICATOR 0.107 1.581 0.118 84  -0.030 -0.376 0.709 67 
UNEXPECTED_SUM_CEO 0.333 2.172 0.034 63  0.136 0.667 0.509 44 
UNEXPECTED_SD_SUM_CEO 0.127 1.183 0.241 63  -0.023 -0.141 0.888 44 
Note  
This table reports paired t- test for differences in main director turnover measures between noncompliance sample and control 
sample by differentiating noncompliance sample into two settings according to median length of noncompliance period. Long 
noncompliance sample consists of noncompliance events with violating period equal and more than 731 days while short 
noncompliance sample consists of noncompliance events with violating period less than 731 days. 
DEPARTING DIRECTOR is the number of directors who is defined as departing in FIGURE 2. 
UNNOMINATED DIRECTOR is the number of directors who is defined as unnominated in FIGURE 2. 
UNEXPECTED_SUM is the number of directors who is defined as unexpectedly departing in FIGURE 2. 
UNEXPECTED _INDICATOR is a dummy variable that equals one if there is one or more directors defines as unexpectedly 
departing in FIGURE 2; otherwise zero. 
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UNEXPECTED_SUM_CEO is the number of directors who is defined as unexpectedly departing in FIGURE 2 and there is 
no CEO leaves the firm in the year. 
UNEXPECTED_SD_SUM is the number of outside directors who is defined as unexpectedly departing in FIGURE 2. 
UNEXPECTED_SD_INDICATOR is a dummy variable that equals one if there is one or more non-executive directors 
defines as unexpectedly departing in FIGURE 2; otherwise zero. 
UNEXPECTED_SD_SUM_CEO is the number of non-executive directors who is defined as unexpectedly departing in 




Chapter 5 Conclusion 
5.1 Summary and Conclusions  
This thesis examines noncompliance effects from the perspective of internal 
control and internal governance. Noncompliance has attracted a great amount of 
attention from researchers, shareholders and regulators, and has dominated the 
headlines over the past two decades. Most of the research on noncompliance effects 
tends to have its investigations based on the public announcement or disclosure of the 
noncompliance event. Unlike the extant research, I investigate noncompliance effects 
surrounding the commencement of noncompliance events. The rationale for this focus 
is that understanding fraudulent behaviour at the time point of its commencement 
contributes to our understanding of the internal mechanisms guiding the noncompliant 
firm. It therefore further helps us to understand possible mechanisms that could detect 
and prevent fraudulent behaviour. 
This thesis generates a noncompliance sample based on the SEC’s enforcement 
actions in Chapter 2, and investigates noncompliance effects on financial reporting 
quality and director turnover surrounding the commencement of noncompliance events 
in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively. Each chapter contributes to the literature in several 
important ways by answering unique research questions. The findings in Chapters 3 and 
4 consistently support my prediction that noncompliance behaviour has an impact on 
other internal mechanisms surrounding the beginning of the noncompliance.  
In Chapter 2, I generate a noncompliance dataset based on the SEC’s non-
accounting enforcement actions. Most of the noncompliance events covered in my 
sample commenced between 1995 and 2009. The industry distribution of my 
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noncompliant firms is consistent with the higher-litigation-risk industries from Francis 
et al. (1994a; 1994b). 
In Chapter 3, I examine whether there is a higher rate of financial reporting 
problems in noncompliance than in control firms surrounding the beginning of the 
noncompliance behaviour. I find a significant association between noncompliance and 
financial reporting problems, and the effect is more pronounced in the windows 
following the start of noncompliance. This study contributes to the literature mainly in 
three ways. First, compliance captures a different aspect of internal control quality, 
which has not been studied previously in research relating to internal control. This 
extends our understanding of internal control as an integrated system. Second, my study 
improves our understanding of noncompliance effects. Third, in contrast to prior 
research which suggests that the responsibility for financial reporting quality mainly 
lies with the CFO and/or accounting controls, I find that noncompliance also impacts 
on financial reporting quality. Finally, my findings provide evidence consistent with the 
current development of internal control policy. 
In Chapter 4, I examine whether there are higher director turnover rates in 
noncompliant firms than control firms surrounding the beginning of the noncompliance 
behaviour. Extant literature suggests that there are several channels through which 
directors can obtain private information through their directorships. Directors have 
innate incentives to leave firms when they perceive them as likely to perform violations. 
I first test the director turnover rate surrounding the noncompliance start year. I then 
arbitrarily shift the event start date to a date which allows noncompliance to have been 
underway for a period of time but that is before the public announcement occurs. I find 
that, in general, noncompliant firms have a significantly higher director turnover rate 
around noncompliance start than control firms. However, outside directors tend to leave 
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noncompliant firms before noncompliance starts. The results for the shifted event date 
are consistent with the main tests and still significant for the pre-event date, and are 
more pronounced. I also provide evidence to exclude several possible alternative 
explanations.  
My study contributes to several strands of literature. First, this study is the first 
to focus on the time surrounding the commencement of noncompliance. Second, my 
study contributes to the research investigating internal governance mechanisms 
between board and management, especially in the situation where the management 
needs to be monitored intensively. Third, I exploit a comprehensive data setting, i.e. the 
SEC’s non-accounting enforcement actions, to explore directors’ reactions to firms’ 
negative events, while most of the related research explores the phenomenon either 
through a single type of negative event or by focusing mainly on accounting problems. 
Finally, this work also has policy implications. To prevent firms from misconduct, 
enhancing the director’s role is only one mechanism. Enhancing internal control 
mechanisms which primarily hold management accountable might be more important 
than the role directors can play in such a noncompliance setting. 
5.2 Suggestions for Future Research  
Regarding my research question in Chapter 3, there are some issues that remain 
for further exploration. First, I only examine securities laws violations as examples of 
noncompliance. Further research could verify whether the associations I document 
persist for other types of noncompliance behaviour. Second, another factor that could 
affect my results is the possibility that monitoring intensity increases once 
noncompliance is detected. My research method and data availability do not allow me 
to rule out the role of monitoring intensity because my research is based on observed 
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behaviour and the measures are external indicators which depend on external parties’ 
criteria. This could be a very interesting topic to look at in future research. 
Regarding my research question in Chapter 4, there are some interesting issues 
to be examined further. First, my study aims to examine director response surrounding 
the commencement of noncompliance. However, given the data constraints, my 
examination is based on the noncompliance year. It would be interesting to investigate 
my research question in a more clearly identified sample. Second, there are several key 
time points along the time line of a negative event, such as when the first warning signal 
occurs, when the first internal or external investigation starts, and when the final 
decision is made by the regulatory agent. It would be very interesting to examine 
directors’ behaviour at each key time point along this timeline so as to have a complete 
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